Politics

Why Israel constantly hesitates when it comes to Hezbollah

Netanyahu is effectively stuck between a rock and a hard place. Public pressure to eliminate the threat posed by Hezbollah in the north is mounting, so why hasn't he acted yet? Al Majalla explains.

Abir Sultan/AFP

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (2L) and Defence Minister Yoav Gallant (R) sit during a commemoration ceremony for Israeli soldiers killed in Gaza on July 16, 2024.

Why Israel constantly hesitates when it comes to Hezbollah

Michael Horowitz

last update on 16 Sep 2024

Since the conflict broke out in October last year, Israel has repeatedly threatened to carry out an operation in Lebanon to remove the threat posed by Hezbollah. These threats are driven in part by real concerns: While Hezbollah has been present along the border for decades, the 7 October cross-border attack by Hamas from Gaza has shattered Israelis' sense of security. Israelis who evacuated around 40 border communities along the northern border with Lebanon fear have not returned to their homes, fearing Hezbollah could do the same.

Yet this constant flow of threats from Israel has not materialised so far, which makes it difficult to discern between what’s purely political rhetoric and what could very well be a prelude to a devastating conflict for both Lebanese and Israelis.

The most recent threat came last week when Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant warned that they would soon launch a broad operation against the Lebanon-based Hezbollah. As he was reviewing a large-scale training exercise meant to prepare troops for a future war in Lebanon, he said that the Israeli military’s “centre of gravity” was “moving northward”, claiming that the Israeli military was nearing its goals "in the south” in reference to the war in Gaza.

He recalled that while some may have doubted Israel would enter Gaza in the early stage of the war, the Israeli military eventually did, vowing the same would happen in Lebanon. Days later, Israeli media reported that during a meeting with security officials, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that Israel would soon face a “large-scale confrontation” with Hezbollah. However, a source close to the Israeli premier downplayed these reports by saying no date had been set and such a confrontation could break out "in the coming weeks or months."

There are also reports that Netanyahu is now willing to add a new objective to the war, namely the return of residents to the northern border with Lebanon. The fact that this wasn’t officially an objective of the war has long been criticised in Israel. Netanyahu’s former political partner, Gadi Eisenkot, had publicly called on the Israeli cabinet to officially declare the return of Israelis displaced from the border with Lebanon as an official goal of the war. Eisenkot himself has long been focused on the Hezbollah threat and served as the head of Israel’s northern command just after the second Lebanon war.

For his part, former war cabinet member Benny Gantz also called on Netanyahu to lay out a clear plan for the return of residents to the north and the neutralisation of the threat posed by Hezbollah before resigning in June—in part because Netanyahu refused to do so. Gallant has officially called for this objective to be added.

If a long war erupts, Hezbollah has enough missiles to fire at Israel for its duration.

Public pressure

In other words, Netanyahu faces mounting public pressure to neutralise the threat posed by Hezbollah. But, despite his repeated threats, he has yet to act.

It is clear that the Israeli military is preparing for a confrontation with Hezbollah and, in fact, has been "rehearsing" a third Lebanon war ever since 2006, creating a fake Lebanese village (with tunnels) to regularly train all combat units on how to fight in Lebanon. In many ways, Israel is far more prepared to take on Hezbollah than it was to launch an operation in Gaza, in the sense that it has been training for the former for years while having to improvise a plan for the latter.

The reason for Israel's constant hesitation and regular threats in Lebanon is that Israel is effectively stuck between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, no serious decision-maker in Israel believes that a diplomatic deal to remove Hezbollah from the border will actually materialise. No UN resolution or deployment has ever led to the removal of Hezbollah, and a future agreement—whatever its content—is very unlikely to force the group to move out.

Hezbollah has built its identity and justified its power as a state-within-a-state through its position in southern Lebanon, facing the "Zionist enemy". It simply won't surrender it without a fight, whether it faces Israel or any sort of interposition force that would seek to push it out forcefully. A diplomatic agreement would be akin to kicking the can down the road, hoping conditions will be better in the future. It is not necessarily a bet that should be ruled out, but it is certainly a gamble.

The other option is one a majority of Israelis—according to several polls—appear to prefer: a pre-emptive operation in Lebanon to remove the Hezbollah threat. The goal of such a war would have to be dictated by those of the broader war Israel is waging, explaining the emergence of recent debates I mentioned—and why they may be a sign that the Israeli government is truly planning an operation in Lebanon.

Devastating consequences

If the goal is to simply allow a return of residents of northern Israel back, then Israel could launch a limited border operation to clear an area along the Blue Line (the de facto Israel-Lebanon border). But this could have devastating consequences, with civilians on both sides likely to be hit beyond the border. Hezbollah's deputy head has also recently warned that a conflict would lead to even more evacuation, suggesting the group understands the domestic politics in Israel quite well and seeks to deter it from conducting such an operation.

Jalaa marey / AFP — Israelis evacuated from northern areas near the Lebanese border due to ongoing cross-border tensions lift placards during a rally near the northern Amiad Kibbutz, demanding to return home on December 26, 2023.

Even if this "limited" border operation is successful, Hezbollah would still be able to return to the border unless Israel is ready to actually occupy a buffer zone in southern Lebanon. Israel did have a buffer zone until 2000, when it decided to withdraw.

However, the international consequences of doing so could prove disastrous and could very well backfire, as Israel's occupation of parts of Lebanon largely boosted Hezbollah's popularity and ability to entrench itself in Lebanon. If Israel does withdraw, then it will have to do so under a diplomatic deal. This deal is likely to be very similar to the one currently being negotiated, raising questions as to why Israel carried out a military operation in the first place.

The other alternative would be to push the goalpost further by aiming for the total destruction of Hezbollah. A former Israeli general estimated that a full-scale war with Lebanon could last between six to 12 months, and this was a conservative estimate. The cost of such a war would be tremendous both for Lebanon, as Israel has made it clear it would use heavy-handed tactics, as well as for Israel, as Hezbollah has enough missiles to continue to fire at Israel for the entire duration of such a long war.

Finally, there is the question of timing. Some military officials and leaders have long been arguing that Israel should first focus on eliminating Hamas before moving to the north. Launching an operation now would also carry devastating consequences for the fate of the hostages. Hamas's Yahya Sinwar believes a war in the north could ease the pressure on Gaza. He won't negotiate as long as the conflict with Hezbollah is raging, which could mean that more hostages could be killed or die in Gaza.

Shift in US military posture

The US has also shifted its military posture by withdrawing one of its aircraft carrier strike groups, while Jewish holidays are due to be celebrated in October. Politically, these dates matter: either Netanyahu feels the Israeli army can "wrap up" a conflict beforehand (a risky bet) or else risk having thousands of missiles fired at Israel at a time when Jews are celebrating some of the most important religious holidays. Optics would not be in Netanyahu's favour.

This impossible choice explains Israel's fundamental hesitation on the northern front and why continued threats have not been followed through...for now, at least.

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