Does al-Assad hold the keys to dismantling the Captagon trade?

Around this time, Captagon's formula began to change and diversify, moving away from the original fenethylline formula. Captagon tablets began to incorporate a formula of amphetamine and other cutting agents, such as quinine, paracetamol, caffeine, zinc, copper, ephedrine, procaine, trimethoprim, chloroquine, and other substances.

The health implications of this new, compromised Captagon formula have caused concern amongst public health sectors. While consistent laboratory analysis of Captagon tablets is scarce, there is limited evidence that the lack of precursor ingredients necessary to produce narcotic substances' original formula has incentivised actors to use potentially-dangerous substitutes with toxic levels of nickel, zinc, and other substances that can lead to long-term cardiovascular, pulmonary, and other health complications.

When the Soviet Union collapsed and there was a broad crackdown on crime and organised criminal networks in the Balkans, as many post-Soviet satellite states were seeking to incorporate reforms, the Captagon trade began to shift.

Given that Captagon carved out a major destination market in the Middle East, particularly popular in the Arab Gulf, trafficking networks shifted operations closer to consumer hubs and moved small-scale laboratories to Turkey, then to the Levant in Syria and Lebanon.

Throughout the early 2000s, Captagon production existed on a small scale. Laboratories were primarily makeshift and extremely mobile, with producers using residences, farmhouses, or even basements to manufacture the drug.

When the threat of interdiction was high, producers would often move production sites to dodge law enforcement, using familial, tribal, and security networks to identify temporary areas for production.

This was particularly the case along the Lebanese and Syrian border, where many small-scale Captagon producers collaborated with local militant groups like Hezbollah to facilitate laboratory production, temporary movement along the Lebanese-Syrian border, and use well-established smuggling routes used for the trafficking of diesel fuel, hashish, small arms, and other illicit goods in the region's black and grey market.

Read more: Hezbollah's sordid history of organised crime

In contrast to the non-state actors, warlords, and jihadist organisations that initially dominated Levantine drug economies, the Syrian government and Hezbollah's heavy participation in Captagon and hashish production have introduced a new scale of smuggling capabilities, using large-scale production facilities, large-scale packing operations, and state-owned ports and state-flagged vessels to transport shipments.

Recent evidence has revealed that the Syrian government has engaged heavily in large-scale Captagon production, utilising large-scale pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities and the regime's Fourth Armored Division forces for the transportation of Captagon from Syria to trafficking routes.

The involvement of key members of Syria's business community—individuals such as Khodr Taher and commercial entities such as Neptune Overseas Limited—as well as officials from the Fourth Armored Division and even direct relatives of Bashar al-Assad—Samer al-Assad, Wassim Badia al-Assad, and Maher al-Assad—has woven a tight web of production and trafficking networks around the Syrian president.

In southern Syria, the regime has played a role in establishing an uptick in small-scale Captagon production sites in key contested areas such as Dara'a and Swayda, positioned along key cross-border nodes for smuggling into Jordan and then into destination markets in the Gulf.

Read more: Air strikes alone won't end Syria's drug trade

By positioning Captagon laboratories in southern areas where the regime seeks to consolidate greater territorial and political control, the regime's intelligence and security apparatus has been able to consolidate a greater physical presence and agency in the local security landscape.

In Lebanon, along the Lebanese-Syrian border, and in southern Syria, Hezbollah has engaged in the Captagon trade, primarily serving in a supportive role for Captagon. Hezbollah has offered protection over smaller-scale Captagon manufacturing centres, storage warehouses, and trafficking networks that operate in the Beqaa Valley and along the Qalamoun Mountain range.

It also sends its militants to assist Fourth Division and Syrian Military Intelligence forces in southern Syria with smuggling operations, guarding production sites, and facilitating the movement of mobile laboratories over the Lebanese-Syrian border when there is a high risk for interdiction or arrest.

Hezbollah and its allies in the Lebanese business and political arena have also facilitated the use of formal and informal Lebanese maritime ports, airports, and border checkpoints to dispatch large-scale Captagon shipments.

Individuals such as Hassan Mohammed Daqqou and Noah Zaiter have been heavily implicated in Captagon trafficking operations, some of impressive, industrial scale such as a March 2022 shipment of 94.5 million pills to Malaysia's Port of Klang. These same actors have also engaged in deep ties with the Syrian regime, particularly alliances with Syria's Fourth Armored Division.

The Captagon trade has become a semi-permanent feature of state illicit activities in Lebanon and Syria, especially as elements of the Syrian and Lebanese governments have collaborated to seek alternative financial flows amidst internal instability, regional economic isolation, and international sanctions.

The Captagon trade has also begun to intersect with regional illicit trades such as hashish, khat, fake currency, fuel smuggling, and small arms, particularly as producers and smugglers continue to expand their networks in the region amongst militant groups and along established illicit trade routes.

A growing global network

As the Captagon trade has grown in the Middle East, sponsors of the trade have also sought to identify new transit routes that can dodge suspicion, as well as plant the seeds for potential consumption markets outside of the region.

Since 2018 when Captagon began to grow into a trade of industrial scale, there have been greater instances of Captagon shipments from Syrian and Lebanese formal and informal ports dispatched across the Mediterranean Sea into European and African commercial ports.

The majority of these shipments were destined for Gulf consumer markets, as traffickers were utilising extra-regional ports to reduce law enforcement suspicion given that the shipments originated from Captagon production hubs.

Participants in Lebanon and Syria's drug markets have been able to create reliable networks with existing European criminal groups. For instance, an intercepted drug shipment at the Italian Port of Salerno revealed connections between Syrian drug smugglers and Italian mafia groups like the Camorra.

A joint investigation between Austrian, Dutch, Belgian, and US law enforcement systems identified a well-organised drug ring operating in Salzburg that smuggled 10 million Captagon tablets and 100-200 kilogrammes of cocaine between July 2017 and March 2021.

And in Germany, authorities have identified major storage warehouses that Captagon traffickers have set up in Bavaria to re-transit shipments back into destination markets.

And while Captagon networks have set up nodes across European countries to dispatch shipments back into Middle Eastern markets, there has also been a noticeable wave of seizures along the Syrian-Turkish border, with Turkish law enforcement officials noting that shipments were destined for European countries through overland trafficking routes.

The uptick in Captagon and hashish shipments has posed a severe challenge for Middle Eastern and European law enforcement systems, due to the lack of information, inter-regional coordination, and intelligence-sharing necessary to monitor, track, and intercept major drug shipments from Syria and Lebanon.

There has also been an uptick in Captagon trafficking into African ports and border checkpoints, as traffickers are seeking to re-transit shipments back into Gulf destination markets or create new consumption hubs amongst local communities and militant groups.

For example, in the last three years, Morocco, Egypt, Nigeria, Sudan, and Libya have recorded Captagon seizures and/or storage facilities inside of their borders. However, without considerable data on consumption rates and the true destination of these shipments, it's difficult to ascertain whether or not Africa is an emerging transit or potential destination market for the Captagon trade.

Role in normalisation discussions

Following a considerable regional push towards normalisation with Syria since February 2023, the Captagon trade has become a top-level agenda item in negotiations between Middle Eastern governments and the al-Assad regime.

Regional governments have become frustrated with the influx of millions of Captagon pills into their ports and border checkpoints, with some countries like Jordan particularly concerned by violent —sometimes fatal — clashes with Captagon smugglers along their border with Syria.

With considerable evidence of the Syrian regime's central role in Captagon production and trafficking operations, regional governments like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan have upped counter-narcotics collaboration as a key coordination avenue with Damascus, believing that the al-Assad regime holds the keys to unlocking the Captagon problem in the region and, if incentivised, could use its agency over the trade to reduce the flow of the drug in the region.

As the regime has been able to reap millions of dollars, political power, and security agency through its extensive agency over the Captagon drug trade, it will take a lot to encourage Damascus to reduce its role, let alone significantly halt the flow of Captagon pills into transit and destination markets.

Additionally, without strict enforcement mechanisms or measurements of effectiveness for regional actors to wield in collaborative counter-Captagon efforts with Syria, it's likely that the regime will generate cosmetic seizures and offer occasional intelligence to regional neighbours for lower-profile traffickers while maintaining a significant role in production and trafficking —allowing the regime to 'have its cake and eat it too'.

Whatever the effect normalisation has on the Captagon trade, it is clear that this illicit economy cannot easily be eliminated in the Middle East.

With deep-rooted and extensive networks for the drug's manufacture, logistics, trafficking, and distribution amongst consumption hubs — both aligned with non-state actors and state actors — the Captagon trade will continue to pose a challenge to regional public health, geopolitics, and security.