The Middle East’s growing interest in Somalia

This also prompted the White House to endorse its ally Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006 to destroy the Islamist Islamic Courts Union that had taken power in Mogadishu.

The invasion opened the way for greater Middle Eastern involvement in Somalia.

Qatar had pre-existing ties with the Islamic Courts Union and opposed the invasion but maintained ties to Islamists in the presidential political system established by Ethiopia and the African Union after 2006.

Like the US, many Gulf governments shared Washington's concerns about jihadist militants in Somalia. These fears were soon realised when radical youthful supporters of the Islamic Courts Union formed al-Shabab — an al-Qaeda affiliate that captured large swathes of central and southern Somalia in the late 2000s.

This desire to combat jihadism and promote stability along the sensitive Red Sea and Indian Ocean coasts — vital for global shipping — motivated several Middle Eastern states to intervene substantially for the first time.

As tensions grew between regional rivals, Somali politics became an unlikely battleground.

In the 2012, 2017 and 2022 Somali elections, the UAE and Qatar each backed rival presidential hopefuls, pouring resources into their candidates' campaigns.

Both also sent considerable aid to Somalia — especially after it suffered a severe famine in 2011 — invested in infrastructure and helped train Somalia's military forces.

Turkey similarly waded in.

By 2017, Ankara was Somalia's fifth biggest source of exports, while it built new hospitals, schools, and roads via Turkish aid programmes. Turkish companies also won contracts to upgrade Mogadishu's port and airport.

The growing rivalry between Qatar and Turkey on one side and the UAE on the other in the mid-2010s contributed to the UAE temporarily pulling out much of its presence in Somalia when Qatar's preferred candidate won the 2017 election.

This, in turn, increased Abu Dhabi's interest in Somaliland.

The province had rebelled in the late 1980s, only to face a brutal response from Mogadishu. When the southern capital collapsed into anarchy in 1991, Hargeisa, therefore, took the opportunity to declare independence, roughly within the boundaries of the old British colony of Somaliland.

While no one in the international community recognised the secession, Somalia remained too weak to ever recapture the province, and Hargeisa was able to develop a functioning democratic government that enjoyed informal relations with several foreign powers.

One was Ethiopia, which, given its historic enmity with Mogadishu, welcomed Somalia's Balkanisation.

In 2016, Addis Ababa helped broker closer ties between Hargeisa and Abu Dhabi when it successfully lobbied the UAE to develop Somaliland's Berbera port in a deal that eventually saw Dubai-based DP World be granted a 30-year concession.

This included an option for the UAE to build a military and naval base, which it began constructing during the height of Abu Dhabi's involvement in the Yemen conflict but ultimately decided against it as that war wound down.

When the UAE stepped back from its involvement in Somalia in 2017, it stepped up its military cooperation with Somaliland, helping to train its coastguard, police, and security services.

The 2024 crisis

The 2024 accord between Somaliland and Ethiopia is both a continuation and a departure of their long-lasting ties.

On the one hand, it continues their closeness since 1991. As well as welcoming Somalia's fragmentation, Ethiopia also values the access to the Red Sea that Somaliland provides.

When Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1991, the latter lost access to the Sea. Since then, most of its trade has run through the port of Djibouti, representing a narrow bottleneck.

Addis Ababa has long sought greater port access to cater to its 120 million-strong population. Indeed, its eagerness to redevelop Berbera was to find an alternative port to Djibouti.

The UAE further facilitated this by helping to fund the construction of a $400mn road connecting Berbera to the Ethiopian border.

But Ethiopia's 2024 agreement to go beyond trade and build a military base on the Somaliland coast and its willingness to recognise its neighbour's independence in return is something new, hence the furious reaction from Somalia and its Middle Eastern allies.

Somalia did not only seek out assistance from Middle Eastern allies. The EU condemned the agreement, the US expressed concerned and the Horn of Africa regional bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) held an emergency summit in Uganda to urge de-escalation.

However, Middle Eastern actors featured heavily in Somalia's plans to fight the accord.

Two weeks after the deal, Somalia called an emergency meeting of Arab League foreign ministers, where Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit stressed the organisation's support for Somalia's sovereignty. Long-standing allies Turkey and Qatar similarly immediately backed Mohamud.

Among the most vocal supporters was Egypt. Unlike Qatar, the UAE and Turkey, Egypt took only limited interest in Somalia in the 2010s, focusing first on its own internal problems and then more on neighbouring Sudan within the Horn of Africa. However, in recent years, it has stepped up its engagement, including offers of military support.

Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi offered Mohamud his backing during a telephone call a day after the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal was announced, and five days later, he sent an Egyptian delegation to Mogadishu. El-Sisi has subsequently called Somalian sovereignty a 'red line' for Egypt.

There are wider concerns at play for Egypt, though. As a matter of principle, it has long opposed any secessionist movements in Africa, a position shared by many other post-colonial states that fear it would set a precedent that could weaken their own states.

More specific to Somalia, Cairo is already worried about instability in the Red Sea, which risks Egypt's vital earnings brought by the Suez Canal and doesn't want Ethiopia bringing more naval power to the fragile maritime environment.

Finally, Egypt is already at loggerheads with Ethiopia over the latter's Grand Renaissance Ethiopian Dam (GERD) on the Nile River. Despite repeated efforts, Cairo has been unable to deter Ethiopia from pursuing the project, which is a major threat to Egypt's water security.

Read more: Ethiopia pushes Egypt into tight corner after Nile dam talks collapse

The UAE, in contrast, has been relatively muted on the deal. In recent years, it has grown closer to Ethiopia after it helped broker a peace agreement between Addis Ababa and its long-running foe, Eritrea, in 2018.

It likewise has close commercial ties with Somaliland and, as noted, has itself informally recognised Hargeisa by signing agreements for the Berbera Port.

However, this has neither translated into a staunch defence of its Ethiopian allies' actions nor a firm endorsement of Mahmoud, though it did contribute to the Arab League summit.

This relative neutrality might reflect the changing geopolitical circumstances for the UAE. While its original involvement in Somaliland came amid the height of its regional rivalry with Qatar, whose candidate had just won the Somali elections, now Abu Dhabi and Doha are in a somewhat better place.

Indeed, in Somalia, the UAE even backed Mohamud's election in 2022. As such it might seem less strategically wise for the UAE to take a stand on one side or the other when it has interests in both camps.

Israeli interests

Another interested party is Israel.

In the past, Israel has been keen to protect its position in the Red Sea as the only non-Arab state on the coastline. It was particularly concerned over Iran using the sea route to supply Hamas in the past via Eritrea and Sudan.

As such, it might quietly welcome the possibility of Ethiopia entering the Red Sea, especially since the two states' cooperated closely in the 1960s and 70s.

However, Israel is far too busy with the Gaza conflict to weigh into the dispute at present and will likely keep a low profile, if any. 

Escalators or mediators?

Given the number of states wading into the crisis, it might be concluded that stepped-up Middle Eastern involvement in Somalia could increase the risk of violent escalation. After all, with el-Sisi calling the issue a 'red line', it is easy to see how outside players could end up militarising the crisis.

However, this need not be the case. Somalia has arguably been more stable since the Middle Eastern states got involved from the 2010s onwards.

Although Al-Shabab has not been defeated, and the state is still far from stable, it has seen more outside investment in the last decade than in the three previous decades. This has contributed to a degree of stability — at least in Mogadishu.

The UAE, Qatar, Turkey, and others may have backed different candidates in elections, but they have not resorted to backing rival armed factions as has occurred elsewhere.

Indeed, elsewhere in the Horn, the UAE played a vital mediating role between Ethiopia and Eritrea, suggesting that, far from being disrupters, Middle Eastern states have the potential to be stabilising forces.

There is a possibility that this might also be the case in the current crisis. With their increased leverage over the Horn players, their involvement could just as easily help defuse tensions as raise them.