US deterrence against Iran damaged but not dead

Pandora's box

Every president since Jimmy Carter has sought to avoid a war with Iran. They all have believed, quite correctly, that a US-Iran military confrontation could open a pandora's box in the Middle East and unleash a wave of terrorism across the region and possibly against the US homeland.

Inflicting greater punishment on Iran for its destabilising regional policies could force the US to launch a(nother) costly and open-ended military intervention in the Middle East.

The last thing the United States wants to do is repeat its debacles in Afghanistan and Iraq, especially at a time when US geopolitical priorities have shifted and are now focused on the Indo-Pacific and European theatres. On top of all this, the US military is currently stretched too thin. 

Read more: Iraq and the limits of American military power

While all these concerns are perfectly legitimate, is Washington's risk aversion excessive, and has it effectively hamstrung US policy and provided Iran with a strategic advantage in the region all these years? 

A thoughtful answer to this question requires knowing what America's core interests in the Middle East are — also, what those of Iran are — and, equally important, what truly threatens them.

The United States has an enduring interest in maintaining stability in the Middle East because it is replete with strategic natural resources and is home to critical transit points in global shipping and trade. That interest is served by ensuring that no malign power imposes its preferences on the region or takes control of its rich resources. 

Iran's hegemonic pursuits v US strategic interests

Iran, on the other hand, seeks a regional order, stable or not, in which its oppressive regime is secure, its radical ideology is rampant, and its strategic position is hegemonic.

Nothing challenges US Middle East policy more than Iran. At the same time, nothing stands in the way of Iran's quest for regional domination more than US military power in the region. 

Every administration over the past 45 years, perhaps with the exception of that of George W. Bush, has tried in some form or fashion to reach a modus vivendi with Tehran, but Iranian leaders have rebuffed every attempt. 

When it suited them, they reached arms control agreements with Washington (for example, the nuclear deal in 2015), but they have no interest in reconciling with it because they believe that the Americans are weakening and blocking the aspirations of the Iranian nation. Iran wants to push the United States out of the Middle East, not coexist with it.

Over the years, Iran has done reasonably well in pursuing its ambitions and spreading its influence across the region. In Yemen, the Houthis are in charge of much of the north and other big population centres.

In Iraq, the Shiite militias control politics and resources. In Syria, the al-Assad regime is essentially an Iranian client. And in Lebanon and Palestine, Hezbollah and Hamas, respectively, decide by themselves on issues of war and peace. 

Iran also has coerced, intimidated, and sometimes attacked key US partners such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The most egregious attack happened in Sept. 2019, when Iran directly struck Saudi energy infrastructure with a swarm of drones and missiles, crippling the world's biggest oil processing facility in the kingdom.

Iran also leverages its hostility to try to drive a wedge between Washington and its partners, and on some level, it has succeeded. Because of their concerns about Washington's ineffective response to Iran's aggression and lack of commitment to their security, the Saudis and the Emiratis have sought to appease Tehran lately by reaching normalisation agreements with it.

Iran's record of violence against US troops is remarkable, too. 

The worst was during Operation Iraqi Freedom when the Iranians killed more than 600 American troops in Iraq. More recently, pro-Iranian forces killed an American contractor in Syria and another one in Kirkuk following drone and rocket attacks, respectively. 

While Iran has denied it was behind Hamas's attack on 7 October and Biden also said there was "no evidence" Iran was behind the attack, Hamas has received Iranian weapons and training.  

Read more: Gaza crisis shows Washington badly missing Iran strategy

Regardless of whether Iran authorised the attack or not, it has managed to seriously derail what possibly could have been a transformational event for the Middle East — a US-brokered normalisation deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Riyadh's plans to normalise with Israel have been put on ice — at least until the conflict in Gaza is over, which doesn't look near.

US deterrence still works

These notable achievements notwithstanding, as they stand, they do not seriously harm any of Washington's core interests in the Middle East. Let's go over them one by one.

First, Iran hasn't achieved regional supremacy. Second, Iran hasn't caused a divorce between Washington and any of its Arab partners. Third, Iran hasn't significantly threatened the region's freedom of commerce and navigation. Fourth, Iran hasn't forced the United States to leave the Middle East.

For all its limitations, US deterrence has had its stamp on each of these outcomes. Equally, if not more important, local resistance in the Middle East to Tehran's oppressive and sectarian model, in its various forms, has played a role, too.

Indeed, some Arab governments are susceptible to Iranian influence, but even their populations, including parts of their Shiite communities, do not accept Iranian subjugation. Some will revolt peacefully, others, like the Islamic State (IS) and other militant groups, through violence.

For all the influence Iran has in both Iraq and Lebanon, for example, it cannot impose its wishes on the Iraqis or the Lebanese without facing local backlash. Influence and control shouldn't be confused. 

Iran has a good bit of the former but not the latter. Even the United States, despite its unparalleled influence in the region, doesn't control the politics or actions of its partners.

Effective counterweights

Beyond the Arabs and the United States, Israel, the strongest military actor in the region, and Turkey, a NATO member and Sunni stronghold, are two stout regional powers that will continue to check and compete with Iranian influence and designs through diplomacy (Turkey) and military force (Israel). Iranian hegemony is something neither Israel nor Turkey will tolerate. 

While the tensions between Washington and its Arab partners are real, they're not overwhelming or relationship-ending. For all the concerns and complaints about US policy from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, for example, both wish to improve — not cut — their relations with the United States.

Despite their rapprochement with Tehran lately, which is tactical in nature because they do not trust its leadership, they want to strengthen their defence ties and sign formal defence pacts with Washington. It's not a divorce they're seeking. Rather, it's the renewal of wedding vows. 

Iran, and lately the Houthis, have undermined freedom of commerce and navigation, but the threats have hardly risen to the level of a real and significant crisis. Even with the successful attack on 19 September against Saudi Aramco facilities, oil prices spiked only briefly.

And although Iran issues threats every now and then about closing the Strait of Hormuz, through which 21% of the world's crude oil passes, they are empty.

Not only would such a move be self-defeating economically for Iran because it would undermine its own interests and damage its relations with important economic partners such as China, but it would also be hard to physically stop all shipping through the Strait because modern cargo vessels are massive and difficult to disable.

Though always hard to prove, US deterrence has frustrated all of Iran's hegemonic plans. There's no doubt that US deterrence has taken multiple hits over the years, but mostly at the lower level, not the higher level, where core US interests reside. 

On freedom of commerce and navigation, for example – a foundational principle of US Middle East policy – the Iranians know and fear that the U.S. Fifth Fleet could sink their navy if they close the Strait. They also know better than to repeat Saddam Hussein's critical mistake of trying to invade neighbours, topple US-friendly Arab governments, or control the region's energy resources. 

It's true that America's appetite for using military force in the region has decreased in recent years, but in no way should that suggest that Washington is about to have an 'East of Suez' moment and instruct its troops to pack their bags and go home.

The Middle East will always be a major theatre for US grand strategy, and for American decision-makers to surrender it to China, Russia, or Iran is inconceivable. 

Of course, it's unfortunate that American military power, not American diplomacy or economics, is what primarily protects US interests and preserves US influence, but that is a reality US officials cannot ignore. If they shrink or withdraw that military presence from the region, it would shatter American influence in that part of the world. 

Critical concerns

Critics of America's Iran policy raise two major concerns: First, Iran is determined to achieve its hegemonic goals, and continued US passivity and nonchalance will guarantee Iranian success.

Iran is nothing if not pragmatic and patient. If undeterred, it will keep coercing, harassing, and assaulting until it gets its way. The Iranians firmly believe that time is on their side and that the US will eventually tire of their asymmetric tactics and cut its losses like it did in Afghanistan. And if the Iranians get a nuclear bomb, regional hegemony may not be that much of a distant dream. 

Second, if unaddressed, Iran's already formidable proxy network will mushroom and ultimately harm core US interests, not just secondary interests. These militias aren't just an irritant of marginal consequences; they are a strategic problem that will only grow if not properly treated. Hamas's historic attack against Israel is just the latest proof. 

For years, America's Arab partners have warned Washington about the cancer of these proxies. They were as befuddled as they were devastated to learn that Washington didn't even discuss this issue with Tehran during the nuclear negotiations that led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. For them, the real Iranian bomb is the proxies, not the atomic weapon. 

The first concern is fair but ultimately alarmist. There is no way we can predict with any degree of confidence whether Iran will continue to have the capacity to do what it has been doing in the region and with the same level of success.

The regime, hardly stable internally because of its inherent contradictions, severe economic struggles, and clash with its own population, could implode at any moment. Local resistance to Iran's designs in the region also could intensify. Washington can shape these processes in its favour, but it can't control them.

The real threat

The United States is not about to leave the Middle East because of anything Iran is doing. The only real threat to the persistence of the US military presence in the Middle East is politics in Washington.

So long as there is an American consensus on the strategic importance of the region — and there is one — the United States will have troops and assets in that part of the world committed to deterring Iran from harming core US interests and managing its regional threat.

And that's the keyword for the second part of that mission – managing. Unless the United States decides to topple the regime in Tehran — which we've determined it won't do — the Iran problem is not one to be solved but managed.

The second concern about the likely implications of the growth of Iran's proxy network is more compelling. If the United States doesn't apply more pressure on Iran to reign in its proxies (because, let's face it, it won't abandon them), regional partners will further distance themselves from Washington or pursue courses of action that are detrimental to US interests.

Israel, for one, could strike Iran next time it is attacked like it was on 7 October. Indeed, don't count on Israel retaliating against Iran's proxies if it suffers from another debilitating hit. And if Israel does pull the trigger, the United States will be forced to enter into the fight, which is precisely what it has always sought to avoid.   

Fed up with Washington and its lack of concern for their security, the Arabs could further appease Iran, cultivate stronger ties with China and Russia, and start to limit or deny access to the United States in the region.

Read more: Managing US competition with China in the Middle East

That would be a major problem for Washington because there are very few things it can do in the region without that Arab access and without that Arab cooperation. The entire US military infrastructure in the Middle East is dependent on the consent of Arab governments. If they start to waver on that, Washington's strategic position in the Middle East could crumble. 

The United States can always invest in better military equipment and training to more effectively counter Iran's irregular tactics. It can apply more targeted sanctions and diplomatic pressure against the regime.

Still, we must be honest and recognise that absent a holistic approach that tackles poor governance and bad economics across the region, Iran will continue to capitalise on those conditions and enlist people to its cause.

Group effort

Tackling Iran's regional challenge has to be done in partnership with Israel and the Arabs. There's no way Washington can do this alone. It doesn't have the knowledge, the tools, or the willingness to do this right on its own. 

Read more: Effectiveness, not size, key to US involvement in Middle East

America's primary responsibility in this partnership is regaining the Arabs' and the Israelis' trust by ensuring their physical security—no more Iranian drones and missiles hitting civilian targets and critical infrastructure and killing innocent civilians.

The Arabs, in return, would have to commit to building capabilities that are actually suitable for battle in the grey zone. Less glitz, more real combat power.

The Israelis, on the other hand, have to accept the reality that as long as they refuse to compromise and make peace with the Palestinians, Hamas, and by default Iran, will have a reason and an opportunity to resort to violence against Israelis.  

The US should commit to forging peace between moderate Israelis and moderate Palestinians in part because that would be disastrous for Tehran. 

Deterrence is not an end in itself

The calls for restoring US deterrence against Iran are reasonable and understandable, but they must be rooted in a better diagnosis of the Iran problem.

Let's stop pretending that more military force against Iran will magically solve this problem. This is a problem to be contained, and the only way to clip Iran's wings effectively is through a serious partnership with Israel and the Arabs.

The United States pursued this approach with its Western allies against the Soviet Union, and it worked. There's no reason why it can't also succeed with Iran — a far less formidable foe.