Politics

The future of America's Middle East posture is now

Any US discussion of posture should be informed first and foremost by strategy and regional partners should have a vote

The USS Thomas Hudner guided missile destroyer and other American military equipment were deployed to Gulf waters in response to Iranian threats in July.
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The USS Thomas Hudner guided missile destroyer and other American military equipment were deployed to Gulf waters in response to Iranian threats in July.

The future of America's Middle East posture is now

Bilal Saab
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With its strategic prioritisation of the Indo-Pacific and European theatres, the United States has had to significantly adjust its defence posture in the Middle East through new concepts and procedures to safeguard collective security interests.

The result is at least the beginning of a more dynamic and flexible approach to military deployment in the US Central Command (CENTCOM)’s Area of Responsibility. Instead of emphasising large and permanent basing, the United States will surge assets and resources from other locations depending on threats and needs.

Early signs of execution of this dynamic force employment approach came in early July when in response to increased Iranian threats to the free flow of goods in Gulf waters, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ordered the deployment of the USS Bataan Amphibious Readiness Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit, F-35s, F-16s, and the USS Thomas Hudner guided missile destroyer.

Although the United States already had air and naval assets deployed in the area, the additional F-16s and F-35s came from Aviano Air Base in Italy and the 421st Expeditionary Fighter Squadron from Hill Air Force Base in Utah, respectively.

None of this suggests that the United States has switched to a strategy of offshore balancing or that it is about to gradually give up its forward-deployed military presence in the Middle East. An effective posture that contributes to the missions of deterrence, reassurance, and security cooperation must have an element of forward deployment.

To deter Iran, the United States must have assets in theatre to affect the decision-making calculus of the leadership in Tehran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

A forward-deployed presence provides US officials with options and allows CENTCOM to respond rapidly, if asked. That ability to intervene at a moment’s notice should, theoretically, make Tehran think twice before using violence to achieve its political aims.

A forward-deployed presence provides US officials with options and allows CENTCOM to respond rapidly, if asked. That ability to intervene at a moment's notice should, theoretically, make Tehran think twice before using violence to achieve its political aims.

Has US deterrence against Iran been flawless?

Of course not, but the argument is that it likely would be less effective without immediate and powerful American means of punishment in theatre that could prevent Iran from quickly establishing facts on the ground in a crisis.

Visible and permanent presence still key

To reassure partners, the United States also needs visible and permanent military power in the region. Regional partners feel a lot more reassured by the constant basing of American troops and equipment on their soil because it reflects a certain level of US commitment to their security.

AFP
An American flag flies near US Navy boats docked at Bahrain's Salman port in the capital Manama, on May 12, 2013, one day before the start of the biggest exercise of mine countermeasure maneuvers in the Arabian Gulf.

Every time a US aircraft carrier is moved from the region, even if temporarily, or a US missile defence battery is removed, regional partners express intense dissatisfaction with US policy and fear abandonment by Washington.

And finally, to conduct security cooperation, the United States needs troops and trained personnel in the region to advise and assist their counterparts. Effective US security cooperation requires a consistent presence in the region. The entire enterprise is about building trust and personal relationships, and you simply cannot do that remotely.

Effective US security cooperation requires a consistent presence in the region. The entire enterprise is about building trust and personal relationships, and you simply cannot do that remotely.

The question for US policymakers is: just how much forward presence is necessary to effectively pursue all three of these missions?

First, one has to recognise that — when it comes to Middle East posture in the current strategic environment — there is an inherent tension between deterrence, reassurance, and security cooperation.

While security cooperation certainly does not need a large US footprint – it needs the right kind of personnel in the right places more than anything else – partners will always prefer a robust and sizable presence.

Dynamic force employment approach needed

With respect to deterrence, it is virtually impossible to know how much US firepower is enough to be effective because the concept itself is incredibly hard to measure and evaluate (it also depends on several other variables including credibility and consistency) and because Iran consistently operates below the threshold of war.

AFP
A US armoured military vehicle drives on the outskirts of Rumaylan in Syria's northeastern Hasakeh province, bordering Turkey, on March 27, 2023.

Read more: The credibility of American deterrence in the Middle East

While security cooperation certainly does not need a large US footprint – it needs the right kind of personnel in the right places more than anything else – partners will always prefer a robust and sizable presence.

CENTCOM's dynamic force employment approach, which is in its infancy,  is supposed to smartly balance between all three missions by keeping a forward-deployed presence while putting a bigger premium on maintaining access, investing in adaptability, and building resilience.

This is particularly challenging because regional partners could decide to reduce US access if they see that Washington is further drawing down its physical presence.

It becomes like a game of chicken between the regional partners and Washington. If they threaten to constrain US access because they have concerns about US posture policy, their security could be at risk (it's almost self-defeating).

But they also recognise how critical access is to everything the United States does in the region – not just in terms of basing and overflight permissions but also prepositioned equipment capability sets – so they could use it as leverage to arrest further reduction of US posture.

Access becomes even more important to the United States as tensions with Iran grow and the likelihood of war increases. The first few moments of a potential confrontation or even military crisis between the United States and Iran require a high degree of US operational flexibility, which can only be enabled by access.

AFP
The US Air Force shows the "Thunderbirds" and the United States Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron, the Blue Angels, debut the Super Delta formation consisting of six F-16 Fighting Falcons and six F/A-18 Super Hornets.

Read more: Effectiveness, not size, key to US involvement in Middle East

The first few moments of a potential confrontation or even military crisis between the United States and Iran require a high degree of US operational flexibility, which can only be enabled by access.

Strategy drives posture

In the end, any US discussion of posture, be it in the Middle East or elsewhere, should be informed first and foremost by strategy.

Strategy drives posture, not the other way around. There is no point in debating numbers of American troops and capabilities in the Middle East if the US doesn't have a clear idea of what objectives it wants those troops and capabilities to achieve.

But even when that moment of clarity in US Middle East strategy comes, Washington should always remember that the regional partners get a vote. Without their access and permission, the United States can do very little in the Middle East.

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