Politics

Who is winning the war in Ukraine?

Russian defensive tactics have worked to noticeably slow Ukrainian advances. But the die is not cast. The delivery of Western air power could tip the scales back in Kyiv's favour.

A Ukrainian serviceman of the 3rd Assault Brigade fires a 122mm mortar towards Russian positions at the front line, near Bakhmut, Donetsk region, Ukraine, Sunday, July 2, 2023.

Who is winning the war in Ukraine?

Michael Horowitz

last update on 24 Aug 2023

Two months after the beginning of a much-anticipated counter-offensive, slow progress by Ukrainian forces has raised doubts as to what Kyiv can really achieve, and whether the liberation of all of the territory currently occupied by Russia is a realistic objective.

A series of reports in Washington suggests US officials are increasingly pessimistic as to whether the offensive will be able to meet its goal.

This is not the first time scepticism regarding Ukrainian efforts to restore “full sovereignty” over its territory has emerged. Around the same time last year, slow but steady advances by Russian forces in Eastern Ukraine, culminating with the capture of the city of Severodonetsk in Ukraine’s east, raised similar concerns.

Reuters — Local resident Viktoria Aksenova, 61, assesses the damage and removes debris inside her apartment hit by shelling in the course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in Donetsk, Russian-controlled Ukraine, August 23, 2023.

A few weeks later, Ukraine launched a surprise counter-offensive in Kharkiv that pushed Russia out of a key area of northeastern Ukraine, as well as a more sustained offensive that, weeks later, would lead to a Russian decision to withdraw from a significant part of the southern Province of Kherson — including the city of Kherson itself.

Swinging pendulum

Arguably, we’re in a different military and political set-up, but this puts things in perspective. Public opinion and coverage of the war naturally tend to swing like a pendulum between one end of the spectrum and the other. Depending on the moment, voices expressing optimism over Ukraine's effort to free its territory will be bolstered.

A swing of the pendulum, and the same people who said Russia would conquer Ukraine in no time (and were wrong), or that Western weapons wouldn’t change the course of the war (and I would argue were also wrong), are once again getting prime air time.

Patience and determination are how wars are won, but rarely how they’re covered.

Patience and determination are how wars are won, but rarely how they're covered.

Limited progress

To be clear, this doesn't mean the Ukrainian counter-offensive is going splendidly. Ukrainian forces have only made incremental progress, gradually wearing down Russian forces and defences in some limited areas, but never really acquiring the momentum that would turn tactical progress into strategic victories.

This is, in part, because of Russia's "Surovikin line" — a large network of defences built earlier in the conflict under the supervision of General Sergey Surovikin. Incidentally, Surovikin himself has since fallen out of favour over suspicions that he may have helped or turned a blind eye to the short-lived Wagner mutiny in June.

Though the mastermind behind the lines may have fallen from grace, Surovikin's work lives on. Using old Soviet equipment, Russia built a multi-layered line of defence that has proven difficult to overcome.

In most areas of the frontline, there are still at least two — and up to three — lines of defences that need to be dealt with before reaching any of the strategic prizes Kyiv is likely eying. These "prizes" include the cities of Tokmak, Melitopol or even Mariupol.

Capturing those cities would more durably weaken the Russian occupation of parts of Ukraine by severing a land bridge between southern Ukraine and Russia's western border.

AFP — Olena (C), the mother of Nazar Yushchenko, 22, who died in a Russian missile strike on a drama theatre, reacts during the funeral service for her son at a morgue in Chernihiv, on August 22, 2023.

However, Ukrainian advances have been modest at best, with the cost of those advances being high. To put it bluntly, if the offensive was to stop today, it would likely be deemed a failure.

Using old Soviet equipment, Russia built a multi-layered line of defence that has proven difficult to overcome. If the Ukrainian offensive was to stop today, it would likely be deemed a failure.

The Surovikin line challenge

This is because Russia's multi-layered defensive lines mitigate a lot of the weaknesses Ukrainian forces have been able to exploit in the past. The Russian defensive lines consist of a set of mines, anti-tank ditches, concrete obstacles as well as infantry-manned trenches and fortifications.

AFP — A sapper of the National Guard of Ukraine checks for the presence of mines along a dirt road near the abandoned positions of the Russian army in the north of the Kharkiv region on September 20, 2022.

This means that Ukraine cannot "rush" Russian positions, allowing time for Russian reinforcements to arrive from rear positions. The fortifications are also meant to absorb the attack.

Defences are built to funnel the attacking force until it eventually gets stuck, affording the opportunity to surround it or pummel the attackers with artillery strikes. This also means that using the element of surprise becomes quite difficult, and exploiting morale chocs is nearly impossible as mines do not tend to run for their lives.

More broadly, this makes a "by the book" offensive far more difficult — if not suicidal. Those offensives tend to be based on the sudden concentration of forces against one weak point along the enemy's defensive line. Yet doing so has proven costly.

Ukraine cannot rely on superior air and ground power to "soften" defences and pave the way for an attack. Russian forces have also adapted, and will quickly counter-attack against unprepared forces who just went through hell to get to where they are.

AFP — Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky stands next to a Danish F-16 fighter jet in a tent at the Skrydstrup Airbase in Vojens.

This multi-layered defence has, in turn, forced the Ukrainian military to adapt. It has returned to the use of light infantry tactics, rather than a more conventional "combined arms strategy" that would use Western-supplied tanks and armoured vehicles in larger numbers, alongside other types of units (artillery, aeroplanes) to break through Russian defensive lines.

The Russian defensive lines consist of a set of mines, anti-tank ditches, as well as infantry-manned trenches and fortifications. This means that Ukraine cannot "rush" Russian positions.

Risk-averse approach criticised

This decision explains some of the criticism Ukrainian forces have faced, recently. In the weeks that led to the attack, in June, Ukraine received a set of new Western weapons, including German-made Leopard tanks, US-made Bradleys and other armoured vehicles. The idea behind these deliveries was to use these systems as cohesive units to break through defensive lines.

In the first days of the offensive, Ukrainian forces did attempt to use these vehicles in formation. However, the Ukrainian military quickly found this to be a perilous strategy when pitted against the multi-layered Russian defensive network.

They set aside their most combat-ready units, probing Russian defences, until they found a new strategy for what Western generals may have had in mind when they provided Ukraine with tanks and armoured vehicles. It is a strategy that relies on smaller infantry attacks, counter-battery fire to destroy Russian artillery, attrition and more gradual advances.

Behind closed doors, some US officials have criticised Kyiv's decision to stop using this equipment en masse, viewing the Ukrainian military as too risk-averse to succeed.

Ukrainian officials have hit back, arguing that they cannot apply Western tactics, which rely on a set of weapon systems they don't have; This includes warplanes and long-range missiles.

Behind closed doors, some US officials have criticised Kyiv's decision to stop using this equipment en masse, viewing the Ukrainian military as too risk-averse to succeed.

No silver bullet

This is not a new debate.

Since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, experts and officials have argued over what kind of weapons to provide Ukraine. As some have pointed out, there is no silver bullet that will suddenly turn the tide of battle.

But this does not mean that weapon deliveries do not work because they can afford new opportunities to use different tactics or hit new targets that were out of range before.

One single weapon won't change the military dynamic. But different systems with different purposes, provided in a coordinated way may do the job. This also explains the continuing criticism against the slow drip of Western deliveries to Ukraine.

On the ground, Ukrainian forces have adapted the equipment they have to the tactics they find successful, rather than the opposite. In addition to the decision to go back to small infantry tactics, Kyiv also made a significant effort to hit both Russian supply lines and the Russian homefront.

New long-range drones, as well as repurposed Soviet anti-aircraft missiles and a line of explosive-laden unmanned vessels have allowed Ukraine to hit Russian rear positions, including bridges used to bring in reinforcements.

Alone, these attacks won't lead to victory, but alongside gradual advances, they can create new opportunities and fragilities that can be exploited in the future.

One single weapon won't change the military dynamic. But different systems with different purposes, provided in a coordinated way may do the job.

Beyond that, Ukrainian drones now regularly hit Russian cities. Over the past six days, Moscow has been hit by drone attacks on a daily basis.

Bringing the war home

In this case, the goal is different, as Kyiv seeks to "bring the war home" to Russia. A segment of the Russian public has sought to ignore the war, something the Ukrainian leadership may want to change.

This is not a strategy without risks, as it may in fact backfire into domestic support for Putin's war. But a limited campaign of attack can also highlight the fragilities of a regime that relies on the apathy of part of its own population.

AFP — People inspect the damage sustained to a building of the Moscow International Business Center (Moskva City) following a drone attack in Moscow on August 23, 2023.

Two months after the beginning of the Ukrainian offensive, it is clear that the quick victory some had hoped for will not materialise.

Russian defensive tactics have worked to noticeably slow Ukrainian advances. But the die is not cast. We're not in a war of attrition but in the midst of an evolving Ukrainian counter-offensive.

In recent weeks, there has been a slow but noticeable pick up in the pace of Ukrainian advances, including in areas where Ukrainian troops faced significant difficulties and suffered losses initially.

It is still too early to gauge whether this is more than just temporary momentum but the tactics used by the Ukrainian army means it can still revert to more fast-moving operations if chinks in Russia's armour start to appear. In fact, it seems that the whole Ukrainian strategy is based on such a scenario.

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