US security policy in the Gulf: Changes and constants

Washington is helping build a new Gulf security architecture. It could take years but the work has begun.

Eduardo Ramon

The US knows that Gulf states have more options in a multipolar world and it accepts their building economic relations with a dynamic China. But it also has a limit. Al Majalla explains.

US security policy in the Gulf: Changes and constants

Robert Ford

last update on 15 Aug 2023

The May 31 announcement from the United Arab Emirates that it had ceased its participation in a US-led naval task force whose mission is to protect commercial shipping in the Arabian Gulf is the latest indication of dissatisfaction of Arab Gulf states with American security policy in the region.

It is particularly remarkable because in the past the Emiratis were close partners with the Americans. It is also remarkable that the Emirati decision produced little discussion or comment in the American media or among the American foreign policy establishment.

Gulf observers wonder how far American policy has changed since the war to liberate Kuwait 32 years ago. The answer is that, of course, some American approaches have evolved. They had to because America is no longer the sole superpower.

In 2023, China represents real competition. America still has a vital national interest in the Gulf region’s energy resources. It will contest the effort by a hostile state, such as Iran, to capture those resources. In that sense, we have not come far from 1991.

Building a new security architecture

However, Washington aims to deter Iranian aggression, and with its many geostrategic challenges, it needs help from Gulf states to ensure the region’s security.

Building a new, regional security architecture under American leadership will take time. Thus, the Gulf is witnessing the start of a transition from the old American security umbrella to a newer regional security architecture with more systems and states.

Emirati frustration is understandable as is its desire to build a wider political-diplomatic network. Washington knows that Gulf states in this multipolar world have more options and it accepts their building economic relations with a dynamic China.

Washington also has a limit: it will not provide the deepest military cooperation to countries that try to enjoy close military relations with both the United States and China.

The US knows that Gulf states in this multipolar world have more options and it accepts their building economic relations with a dynamic China. But it also has a limit.

First change: No more major land wars in the Middle East

In early 1991, American forces in two weeks ejected the Iraqi army from Kuwait after bombing the Iraqis by air and missile attacks for five weeks. Fewer than 300 Americans died in the war. A survey of American public opinion in 2001,10 years after the war, showed 63% of Americans had a favourable view of that American effort.

Getty — A soldier of the Inter-Arab Force in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, in 1990. The flag of Kuwait is flying behind him.

The 2003 Iraq lasted not for eight weeks but for eight years. Nearly 5,000 Americans died in that war. (Many more Iraqis died of course.) Unlike 1991, there were no victory parades when the last American soldiers returned from Iraq in 2011.

Last year a Gallop opinion survey showed that only 16% of Americans now have a favourable view of the Iraq war. Similarly, a survey in late August 2021 shortly after American forces quit the 20-year war in Afghanistan showed that despite the chaotic withdrawal, 54% of Americans thought it was the right decision.

It cannot be said enough. Ignore discredited hawks like John Bolton. The failures in Iraq and to a lesser extent Afghanistan have changed American policy options in the Gulf region: across political circles from left to right, the American public and American politicians do not want another long, costly land war in the Middle East.

Even if Biden wanted to take John Bolton's advice and attack Iran, a significant number of Democrats, especially from the left wing of the party – and Republicans, especially from the Trump wing of the party – would immediately denounce him. The confidence – or hubris – that came from the easy 1991 victory is fading in the rear-view mirror.

The failures in Iraq and to a lesser extent Afghanistan have changed US policy. The American public and politicians do not want another long, costly land war in the Middle East.

Second change: Partners needed

The United States government planned and led the military campaign to liberate Kuwait in 1991. General Norman Schwarzkopf led the half million American soldiers and President Bush and his Secretary of State James Baker led the international diplomatic effort.

A few Arab states participated — notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt. I was working at the American Embassy in Cairo when President Bush visited the Egyptian capital in November 1990 to secure President Mubarak's agreement to send two armoured divisions to operate under Schwarzkopf.

Bush later met President Hafez al-Assad in Geneva to convince him to send a division also. Bush wanted these forces not because Schwarzkopf needed them against the Iraqis. Schwarzkopf had plenty of American firepower.

Instead, Bush and Baker wanted these Arab forces to demonstrate to the rest of the world the legitimacy of the American military operation. (The Egyptian and Syrian forces did little in the war itself.) Operation Desert Storm — as Washington called the military campaign — was essentially an American effort.

In the years after 1991, the Americans stationed military forces in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and eventually Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The Soviet Union soon collapsed, China was still not an international power and the American forces easily took responsibility for the Gulf's security.

Now, in 2023, Washington faces not only the challenge of domestic politics that reject another big land war in the region but also the need to deploy forces to maintain a military balance against a growing Chinese military.

The Chinese navy lacks the experience of the American navy, but it has more ships. In contrast to 1991 or even 2003-2010, every American ship and every infantry division is needed beyond the Gulf.

The situation is similar to the situation that President Richard Nixon and national security advisor Henry Kissinger faced before 1971 as they looked at Gulf security while grappling with the Vietnam War and the Soviet threat in Europe.

They were happy to let Britain manage security issues in the Gulf without a major American role. When Britain withdrew its forces from the Gulf in 1971, the Nixon administration sought only a limited role in the Gulf.

Henry Kissinger and Nixon agreed that they did not want the Soviet Union to fill a vacuum or benefit from regional instability. Therefore, they decided to keep two small warships at the old British naval base in Bahrain.

A secret August 1972 White House National Security Council instruction to the Departments of State and Defense stated Nixon's policy in the Gulf had these principles:

The states in the region had primary responsibility for its security;
The United States would encourage them to cooperate;
The United States would have an active and "imaginative" role.

The Nixon Doctrine that emerged depended on Iran and the Shah on one side, and on the other side the Saudi government, to work with the Americans to ensure regional stability and block Soviet penetration.

The Americans started their first military equipment sales to the Gulf, beginning with Kuwait, at this time. Those sales continued, in part for commercial profit, but more important to Washington was trying to build regional states' capabilities.

In 2023, Washington faces the challenge of domestic politics that reject another big land war in the region but it also needs to maintain a military balance against a growing Chinese military.

In 2023, Iran is the biggest threat, not a potential partner, but Trump and now Biden are copying the Nixon-Kissinger emphasis on Gulf states' responsibility to help ensure regional security and stability.

At the top of the list is their work to create a regional air and maritime defence system that integrates air and naval operations of the various states in the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant.

The Americans lead the effort and devote some military assets to it; the information technology systems integration is a huge challenge. Still, this is a far slimmer military effort than the Americans undertook in the Gulf 20 years as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan raged.

As Bilal Saab wrote recently in The National Review, this work enjoys strong support in the American Congress which wants regional states to do more in the Gulf region. Nato was not built in a day and the Gulf security architecture also will take years but the work has begun.

Third change: Israel and Gulf security

Saddam Hussein struck Israel several times with SCUD missiles to provoke Israeli retaliation and create stresses on the international coalition Washington had built for the Kuwait war.

Bush and Baker were in constant contact with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's government to urge restraint. And in keeping with their promise to Arab states after the Kuwait war, Bush and Baker launched an extensive peace process starting with a summit in Madrid in October 1991.

Trump and now Biden are copying the Nixon-Kissinger emphasis on Gulf states' responsibility to help ensure regional security. A new Gulf security architecture will take years but the work has begun.

In 2023, the Biden administration not only abandoned any peace process but is not hiding their preference for Gulf states to find ways to exploit Israeli capabilities and experience in the construction of a new regional security architecture without a comprehensive peace settlement.

The Americans did not plan it this way, but as Obama and then Trump gradually reduced the American security presence in the Gulf, some of the regional states decided to normalise relations with Israel to help balance pressure from Iran (and use Israeli support for a sustained Washington commitment to the region's defence).

Biden readily praised Trump's work on the Abraham Accords and there are reports Biden hopes to convince Saudi Arabia to reach a deal with Israel too. But unlike Bush and Baker, there is no suggestion in DC of a new, comprehensive peace process as part of the deal.

A constant: Gulf security and US interest

The Biden administration's National Security Strategy notes that "the United States will not allow foreign or regional powers to jeopardise freedom of navigation through the Middle East's waterways, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab, nor tolerate efforts by any country to dominate another—or the region—through military buildups, incursions, or threats."

This pledge to maintain commercial traffic through the Straits of Hormuz is similar to the Reagan administration's protection of Kuwaiti vessels in 1987-1988 during the tanker war between Iran and Iraq. The pledge to stop one country from dominating another, or the region, is a recurring feature of American policy since President Carter 43 years ago.

The Trump administration's failure to respond to the Iranian attack against Saudi energy facilities at Abqaiq in September 2019 hurt American credibility.

Similarly, the Biden administration's failure to strike Iran each time one of its speedboats harasses or captures a merchant vessel raises new doubts about the American commitment to protect the Gulf.

From an American perspective, there are two important considerations. First, we must distinguish between a full-scale Iranian invasion of the Arab side of the Gulf – a sort of Ukraine scenario – and little speedboat raids on Panamanian-flagged ships.

American personnel and military assets are deployed at bases in the Gulf states facing Iran. Just as in Nato countries, those bases represent an implicit American commitment to defend the host nation against invasion, including escalating conventional weapons use if needed.

American bases represent an implicit commitment to defend the host nation against invasion, including escalating conventional weapons use if needed.

Deterring Iranian harassment of commercial shipping is a different issue. The Americans during the tanker war did not stop every Iranian attack and avoided military actions in the operation that could have provoked an Iranian escalation towards major war. The American goal was to ensure maritime traffic could continue without major price spikes.

It was successful.

In 2023, the Americans again do not want to stumble into a big, long war against Iran — especially when it faces challenges from China and Ukraine is consuming large amounts of American military resources.

At the same time, it wants to ensure maritime transport through the Gulf can continue. We are back to Kissinger and Nixon and a world where America needs Gulf states to do more for their own stability.

It is for this reason that Washington has not objected to Gulf states' building commercial relations with China or to the Chinese mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Chinese success in reducing tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran – however unlikely – would, if successful, serve America's interest in Gulf stability.

Washington will, however, be harsher about military relations between Gulf states and China. Washington will not want Chinese intelligence to benefit from facilities to carefully monitor American force movements or to penetrate the capabilities and integrity of American-made military equipment and systems.

Countries that build a close military relationship with China while at the same time expecting close military cooperation and protection from the United States will find that Washington will limit military ties instead, much like what Turkey has seen after it purchased the S-400 system from Russia.

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