How jihadists exploited the aftermath of the First Gulf War to build a global terrorist networkhttps://en.majalla.com/node/297321/politics/how-jihadists-exploited-aftermath-first-gulf-war-build-global-terrorist
How jihadists exploited the aftermath of the First Gulf War to build a global terrorist network
While Biden claims the Middle East is the most stable it has ever been in 25 years, the threat posed by jihadist terrorism is far from over
Eleanor Shakespeare
Jihadists were able to portray the presence of US troops as an 'occupation', which some extremists fell prey to, birthing the first wave of jihadist terrorism, which lasted through the 1990s.
How jihadists exploited the aftermath of the First Gulf War to build a global terrorist network
In 2023, as the West is preoccupied with the war in Ukraine and the governments of the Middle East embrace a self-described era of “de-escalation,” it would appear as if terrorism has become a thing of the past.
In Washington D.C., during meetings with allied diplomats, the Biden administration has taken to celebrating its role in fostering what it claims is the most stable Middle East in 25 years.
While such a description could be described as premature and over-self-congratulatory at best, one thing can sadly be said with confidence: the threats and challenges posed by jihadist terrorism are far, far from over.
Since the late-1980s, the greater Middle East has been faced with a series of successive waves of jihadist terrorism. Each has existed in different forms and presented varying threats, and every wave has been triggered by a set of consequential catalyst events.
In the late-1980s, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan occurred shortly after al-Qaeda itself was established by Osama Bin Laden and a cohort of mostly Arab mujahideen whose agenda had been shaped by the war against the Soviet occupation.
But not long after the last Soviet troops departed Afghanistan, American troops were arriving in Saudi Arabia, invited there in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
While American troops were arriving on Saudi soil, so too was Bin Laden, who tried to convince Saudi leadership to dismiss the Americans in favour of his “fighters” — an offer that was swiftly rebuffed.
US presence drives jihadist recruitment
However, jihadists were able to portray the presence of US troops as an ‘occupation’, which some extremists fell prey to, birthing the first wave of jihadist terrorism, which lasted through the 1990s.
Jihadists were able to portray the presence of US troops in the Gulf as an 'occupation', which some extremists fell prey to, birthing the first wave of jihadist terrorism, which lasted through the 1990s.
This wave was one driven by a tightly coordinated and newly established al-Qaeda — an organisation that perceived itself as an elite vanguard duty-bound to confront the United States and liberate Muslim lands. Under Bin Laden's tutelage, al-Qaeda's initial energies were invested primarily in Yemen and East Africa, due, in part, to his exile in Sudan from late-1991.
Al-Qaeda's first attack took place in Yemen in December 1992, when a bomb was detonated in a hotel in Aden where American troops were transiting en route to Somalia.
In 1993, al-Qaeda was implicated in the World Trade Center bombing in New York and 18 American troops were killed in the 'Black Hawk Down' incident in Somalia.
Al-Qaeda's laser-focus on killing Americans was formalised in the mid-1990s. In 1998, Bin Laden formally declared jihad and al-Qaeda attacked American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
By this point, al-Qaeda operatives were plotting increasingly sophisticated acts of terror across the globe, from Southeast Asia through the Middle East and into Africa and the United States itself. Though the Millennium Plot in Jordan was foiled, the 2000 attack on the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen killed 17 American sailors.
Al-Qaeda's first attack took place in Yemen in December 1992, when a bomb was detonated in a hotel in Aden where American troops were transiting en route to Somalia.
9/11 attacks mark turning point
While al-Qaeda's centrally-directed campaign of terrorism had been escalating for several years, it was the 9/11 attacks that proved a turning point – and the catalyst for the second wave of terrorism that lasted through the 2000s.
This led to an era of Western invasions and debilitating war, as a wounded United States hit back — first in Afghanistan and then Iraq. While al-Qaeda's core structures were hit hard in Afghanistan, the civil wars and occupations that resulted served as fuel for a decentralisation of al-Qaeda into a network of affiliates, in places like North Africa, Mali, Yemen, Southeast Asia and Iraq.
By proliferating internationally, al-Qaeda grew in scale and reach, expanding its target set to include local governments and the United States and its allies.
While al-Qaeda affiliates focused increasingly on their respective conflict theatres, the group's original 'elite vanguard' remained squarely focused on terror attacks in the West, with notable attacks and plots recorded in the 2000s in the United States, Tunisia, Kuwait, Indonesia, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Turkey, Spain, Qatar, the United Kingdom, Jordan, Algeria, and Pakistan.
Throughout this second wave, al-Qaeda affiliates had sought to take advantage of ungoverned spaces and localised resentment at poor, corrupt or repressive governments. But while al-Qaeda operatives may have managed to establish new areas of operation, their attempts to grow to scale failed.
The 9/11 attacks proved to be a turning point. This led to an era of Western invasions and debilitating war, as a wounded United States hit back — first in Afghanistan and then Iraq.
Jihadists exploit 'Arab Spring' vacuum
Nevertheless, the very real underlying socio-political fissures across the Middle East remained and by late-2010 and early-2011, the so-called 'Arab Spring' erupted. From Tunisia to Yemen, popular protest and civil instability spread like wildfire, taboos were broken, and governments were toppled.
The rapid proliferation of instability presented the jihadist movement with unprecedented opportunities. For a time, al-Qaeda's guidance to its affiliates was to deprioritise the most extreme elements of their agenda in favour of more locally tailored approaches aimed at winning local legitimacy and deeper, more durable roots.
Nowhere did this succeed more than in Syria, where Jabhat al-Nusra managed to embed itself into the heart of an armed rebellion against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime. From 2012 to 2015, there wasn't a single opposition victory of note in which al-Nusra wasn't leading from the front.
Fighters from the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda's Syria branch, hold a position as they fight against forces loyal to the regime on December 19, 2014 in the southern countryside of Syria's northern city of Aleppo.
While outwardly identifying as an affiliate of al-Qaeda, al-Nusra had distinguished itself to such a degree that even Western governments occasionally made a private point to differentiate it from 'traditional' al-Qaeda branches.
But beyond al-Nusra's capacity for 'controlled pragmatism,' the crisis in Syria was even more notable for facilitating the rise to global infamy of a new, second jihadist movement: the Islamic State (IS). For the first time, the world now faced two international jihadist movements, but IS was altogether different.
Whereas the largest deployment of foreign fighters recorded in any conflict since 1945 had been approximately 10,000 to the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan (1978-1992), IS managed to recruit at least 40,000 men from more than 80 countries around the world between 2013-2016. A substantial number of women, children and even the elderly also travelled to join IS's 'state' project in Syria and Iraq.
The rise of IS prompts Western military action
Its rise and proclamation of a 'Caliphate' changed the game.
The group's takeover of large swathes of Syria and Iraq – a territory equivalent to the size of the United Kingdom – triggered the formation of the largest multinational coalition in history and led to US-led military interventions in Iraq and Syria.
Whereas the previous wave of jihadist terrorism in the 2000s had been motivated by perceived Western occupations, this time, military efforts were driven largely by local forces, with US and Western backing.
Syrian Kurdish Asayish security forces stand guard outside a house during a raid against suspected Islamic State group fighters in Raqqa, the jihadist group's former de facto capital in Syria, on January 29, 2023.
While that may have illustrated that important lessons had been learned, it was still more than enough to fuel a debilitating campaign of IS terror attacks around the world, with major attacks recorded between 2013-2023 in Belgium, Australia, Canada, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, Kuwait, Egypt, Lebanon, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Germany, Jordan, Sweden, the Philippines, Finland, Spain, Russia, Tajikistan, Iran, Sri Lanka, Austria, New Zealand and Israel.
The military defeat of IS's territorial 'state' in the eastern Syrian village of al-Baghouz in March 2019 was a significant achievement and marked the start of the latest wave of terror threats and challenges
In 2011, the rapid proliferation of instability due to the 'Arab Spring' movement that swept the region presented the jihadist movement with unprecedented opportunities.
IS defeated but threat looms
While outwardly the threat appears diminished, all the ingredients remain in place for a resurgence in Syria and Iraq.
The situation in Syria remains dire and prospects for a resolution to the crisis are negligible at best. Moreover, the scale of IS's accomplishments in the previous phase has left an unprecedented challenge today – the presence of 30,000 male fighters and at least 60,000 of their family members in prisons and camps in Syria and Iraq. As US Central Command makes clear, IS already has an 'army in waiting' and a 'next generation.'
Al Majalla takes an exclusive tour inside Al-Hol camp in Syria, where IS families are housed with no promising prospect of being repatriated to their home countries.
But beyond Syria and Iraq, the picture is sobering.
Across vast swathes of Africa, the scale and scope of jihadist threats are expanding dramatically, with barely a whisper coming from the international community. Afghanistan is now back in Taliban hands, with al-Qaeda commanders in paid government positions and IS presenting a persistent challenge to security.
Across Africa, the scale and scope of jihadist threats are expanding dramatically. Meanwhile, Afghanistan is back in Taliban hands with al-Qaeda commanders in paid government positions.
Since the 1990s, a great deal of important lessons have been learned in terms of how to better counter-terrorism. Working 'by, with and through' local partner forces have now become the rule when it comes to foreign efforts – and the benefits are clear.
But to an extent, some lessons have been over-learned.
Occupations have consistently been deleterious, but premature withdrawals have also backfired. Almost nowhere has the international community achieved positive long-term results from a counter-terrorism campaign.
Within multilateral gatherings, officials continue to over-emphasise the importance of countering ideology, when the most potent drivers of jihadist recruitment continue to be local issues – unemployment, underdevelopment, corruption, political repression, a lack of representation, instability and ungoverned spaces.
Until we truly grasp that truth, we will continue to win many tactical victories, whilst losing the war.
Today, Western governments are now so determined to pivot towards great power competition that they have lost sight of how theatres of counter-terrorism are actually a pivotal component of countering the influence of rival or adversarial great powers.
It is within this environment that the current wave of terrorist threats and challenges continues to evolve – in new theatres like West Africa but also in the older, more established ones, whether in Iraq and Syria, Afghanistan and Yemen, or elsewhere.
