Turkey asserts its place in the GCC's new multipolar security structure

They took care to ensure their words and diplomatic outlook conformed to international norms and were seeking to preserve international security and peace.

And so what is the context of the Turkish presidential tour of the Arab Gulf, and has Turkey assumed the role of a partner in the region's security system?

What are Ankara's aspirations for this role, and what capacities does it have to fulfil it? How do influential regional actors, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Iran, view Turkey's increased security involvement in the Gulf?

Evolving power dynamics

In the early 1970s, the Gulf was going through a transformation in terms of its security. British influence was waning and would lead to the end of the United Kingdom's military presence and the rise of the United States' role in its place.

After the events of 1979 – including the fall of the Shah of Iran and the rise of an extremist Islamist regime to power, alongside the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later that year – US control over the Gulf region was further reinforced by the development of what later came to be known as the Carter Doctrine.

It had several key objectives: countering the spread of the Iranian revolution, preventing the Soviet Union from gaining access to warm waters in the Gulf, protecting the region's oil resources, and fostering regional cooperation under the protection of the American umbrella.

This was when the idea of direct military involvement by the US and the consideration of using nuclear weapons to protect American interests emerged.

Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, the security of the Arab Gulf remained subject to three constants.

Firstly, the ongoing Iranian threat to the Gulf Arab states and regional security led them to shape their foreign policies under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Secondly, Gulf states faced numerous vulnerabilities and weaknesses, particularly in the military and defence realms. Thirdly, the United States asserted itself as the key security guarantor for the Gulf states and the region.

In parallel with the protests that erupted in multiple Arab countries in 2011, new forms of threats emerged, increasing the need for more security assurances amid unfavourable international conditions and shifting US priorities.

In addition to the long-standing Iranian threat, Arab governments in the Gulf encountered emerging challenges, such as the escalation of terrorism, extremism, maritime piracy, and the proliferation of militias near their borders.

Furthermore, the Arab uprisings led to divergent positions among the GCC countries, just as the reduced involvement of the US in the Middle East was creating a regional void.

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This, in turn, fuelled intense competition for influence among key powers – including Iran, Israel and Turkey – each pursuing distinct foreign policies and expanding military engagements in the region.

Russia heightened its military presence and intervention, while China and India bolstered their economic presence.

Decline in Gulf confidence

All these developments led to an unprecedented decline in the confidence of the GCC states in Washington as their primary guarantor of security. Significant developments and several changes in US policy – especially during the administrations of Barack Obama between 2009 and 2017 and Donald Trump from 2017 until 2021 – contributed to this decline.

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It seemed necessary for Gulf Arab states to explore new methods to bridge the widening gap between escalating threats and declining US security commitments.

In response, GCC countries began adopting unconventional foreign policies and military activity. The US may have viewed this development in a positive light, as a means to alleviate its burdens and strengthen collective security among the GCC.     

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The repercussions of regional upheavals and the necessity to compensate for the decrease in US security commitments pushed Gulf Arab states to change their strategies on three levels: diversifying sources of arms supplies, diversifying partnerships, and diversifying alliances.

Although the US remains by far the most important security player in the Gulf, the diversification strategies have opened the door for regional and international actors, both established ones and newcomers such as China, India, Russia, and Turkey, to engage in the region.

Now, there is multi-polar security in the Gulf, which raises several questions regarding the prospects of the power balance in the region and the potential roles of new entrants there.

Turkish aspirations

In 2002, when the Justice and Development Party came to power in Turkey, it adopted a new multifaceted foreign policy aimed at elevating Turkey's status, role, and impact both regionally and globally.

This re-cast foreign policy was rooted in a comprehensive understanding of geography and history, driven by the ambitious vision of positioning Turkey as a global player and one of the world's top ten economies.

While this vision remained unwavering at the strategic level, Turkey's foreign policy underwent a transformation after the Arab protests in 2011. Escalating regional threats compelled Ankara to adopt more assertive and resolute measures, seeking a larger security role in the region and expanding its direct military presence abroad.

Turkey's aspirations to assume a greater security role in the Gulf region became evident with the establishment of the Turkish military base in Qatar, the first of its kind outside Turkey. 

Turbulent times

This ambition can be traced back to at least 2014 when Turkey and Qatar signed a bilateral defence agreement. In 2015, Turkey deployed some forces stationed at the Tariq bin Ziyad base. While many experts and observers saw this move as a display of solidarity, Turkey's ambassador to Qatar, Ahmet Demirok, confirmed that the base served multiple purposes, including training and countering common threats.

In April 2016, Turkey's prime minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, revealed the broad mission of the base, stressing its link to Qatar's security as well as Turkey's goal of contributing to a stable and secure Gulf.

During the Gulf crisis in 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt presented 13 demands to end the blockade on Qatar, one of those demands was the immediate closure of the Turkish military base in Qatar and cessation of military cooperation with Turkey.

Ankara rejected this demand, asserting that the base served as a security guarantor for the entire Gulf region and was not directed at any specific Gulf state.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan conveyed this message during his visit to Ankara in June 2017 when he met with the Bahraini Foreign Minister, emphasising Turkey's commitment to the security and stability of the Gulf as a priority.

Former defence minister, Fikri Işık, also stressed the importance of peace in the Gulf for overall stability in the Middle East, addressing Turkish soldiers stationed in Qatar with the message that their presence contributed to peace and stability, not only in Qatar but also in the broader Gulf region.

These statements by Turkish officials regarding Gulf security serve as clear evidence of Ankara's aspirations to become a security partner in the Gulf region.

Moreover, they highlight that the Turkish military base in Qatar was not a response to some urgent and temporary security developments but rather a rational and strategic choice made years before.

While some may attribute these statements to the crisis at that time, a systematic observation of Turkey's position on Gulf security and Ankara's readiness to play a larger role in Gulf security following the AlUla Agreement in January 2021, which ended the blockade on Qatar and paved the way for broader regional reconciliation, suggests otherwise.

In an article published in February 2022 in the UAE's Gulf Times newspaper, President Erdoğan reaffirmed, "We do not consider the security and stability of all brotherly countries in the Gulf region separate from our own."

Shifting strategy

The Syrian crisis has contributed to Turkey's strategic shift. It has tracked the wavering stance of Western allies led by the US towards the al-Assad regime, the rise of Syrian Kurdish militias in northern Syria, Western support for the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), and the Russian military intervention in Syria conflict.

Ankara recognised the pressing nature of the situation and the need to take proactive measures rather than relying solely on external actors.

Consequently, Turkey's foreign policy changed from one accepting mutual dependence and seeking the role of mediator and integrator to an alternative that prioritised self-sufficiency, accompanied by a resolute diplomatic approach and a willingness to intervene militarily when necessary.

Coup in 2016 – far-reaching consequences

The pivotal events of the attempted coup in Turkey in 2016 – alongside the 2017 constitutional referendum and the 2018 elections – had far-reaching consequences for the country's political landscape.

They culminated in the establishment of a presidential system with considerable executive powers and increased centralisation in decision-making. This major political transformation played a significant role in fostering a more assertive foreign policy outlook,  and a pursuit of strategic independence on the global stage.

The emerging power vacuum in the Middle East left Ankara with the motivation to assert its own strength in the region, as Turkey was faced with the rise of extremism, terrorism, and Western interventions through proxy wars.

Turkey began to display its strength through various means, including military operations beyond its regional borders, military deployments on foreign soil, forward military bases, and showcasing its land, naval, and aerial capabilities in critical regional theatres such as the Levant, the Gulf, the Horn of Africa, North Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the South Caucasus.

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Home-grown defence

Ankara also developed its own defence sector, reducing its dependence on foreign defence imports from around 70% to 30% in less than 18 years.

Arms imported in the four-year period between 2016 and 2020 fell by 59% compared with the years between 2011 and 2015, with a significant 81% drop in the transfer of US weapons to Ankara.

Sales in Turkey's defence and aerospace industries were over $11 billion in 2020, up from $1 billion in 2002. Over the same period, exports reached $4 billion from £248 million.

The scale of this growth – alongside its pace and the increasing sophistication of Turkey's capabilities in the industry – has led to confidence in Ankara that Turkey is capable of playing a leading security role in confronting threats, forging new security partnerships, expanding defence exports, and maintaining peace, security, and stability in the Middle East.

The nature of regional and international politics in the Gulf region means three GCC countries appeared among the top 10 biggest arms importers between 2016 and 2020. Saudi Arabia came first, while Qatar and the United Arab Emirates ranked eighth and ninth, respectively.

Between 2011 and 2016, GCC countries showed increased interest in developing defence and military ties with Ankara, leading to the integration of Turkey's growing domestic defence industry capabilities with the large defence budgets of the Gulf states and their desire to import weapons.

Regional demand for Turkish weapons

Turkey and the GCC countries signed several deals, and Ankara significantly increased its defence exports to the Arab Gulf states.

During this period, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia emerged as prominent partners, ranking second and third, respectively, in terms of Turkey's defence exports to the Gulf region. Each of these two countries accounted for approximately 20% of Turkey's defence exports to the Gulf region.

Qatar and Turkey deepened their relationship in 2014, involving the establishment of a military base to host Turkish forces on Qatari soil.

Oman emerged as the largest importer of Turkish arms between 2017 and 2021, accounting for 16% of Turkey's total arms exports. Qatar followed closely in third place, constituting 14% of Turkey's arms exports. These figures indicate that there is potential for further cooperation in the future, especially if Turkey continues its rapid pace in developing its domestic defence industry.

AlUla agreement brought relations back on track

Relations between Turkey and some Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries faced difficulties, setbacks, and even crises between 2017 and 2020.

But the AlUla agreement in 2021– reached between a group of countries led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which ended the Gulf crisis of 2017 – paved the way for the normalisation of relations between the United Arab Emirates and Turkey on one hand and between Turkey and Saudi Arabia on the other.

This positive development demonstrated that the fractures and disputes between Turkey and some GCC countries do not outweigh their common interests and regional strategic imperatives, which call for cooperation and coordination among the different nations.

Experience shows that Gulf countries often do not agree on foreign policy issues, including Turkey's aspiration to play an enhanced security role in the Gulf.

Differences remain

Consequently, their positions towards Turkey will vary depending on circumstances and timing. While Turkey enjoys a qualitative relationship with Qatar since 2014, which makes Qatar supportive of a more significant Turkish role in the Gulf, acceptance from Kuwait and Oman remains subject to these essential conditions:

• Sustaining current relations with Turkey on the same trajectory in the future.
• Ensuring that there are no major contradictions between Turkey and the US.
• Avoiding any explicit and principled objections from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

In addition to these conditions, Oman's particular stance towards Iran should be taken into account, given the nature and scope of its relations with Tehran, which is considered one of Ankara's regional competitors.

Foreign military bases – a sign of strength, or weakness?

Despite the fact that both countries have good relations with Ankara, both Kuwait and Muscat prefer to turn to the United Kingdom as an additional security guarantor for their respective security.

As for the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, accepting an enhanced Turkish security role requires more precision and case-by-case consideration, considering factors such as the advanced position of Saudi Arabia on the international stage and the strategic relationships it has built with global powers. Turkish considerations towards Iran also remain.

However, Abu Dhabi appears to be more open, at least theoretically, to the idea of enhanced Turkish security participation in the Gulf, provided there is a level of confidence-building measures, in addition to the absence of ideological considerations. 

While the United Arab Emirates perceives foreign bases as a strength, Saudi Arabia views them as a sign of weakness, undermining their rulers' legitimacy.

Despite these differences, the United Arab Emirates hosts several foreign bases, accommodating troops from the US, the UK, France, Australia, and Italy. However, the presence of these bases may evoke concerns regarding potential Turkish involvement.

Turkey and Iran: Rivals that cooperate

As for Iran –Turkey's historical rival in the region – the two countries have recently managed to cooperate on some regional issues. However, they have also found themselves in conflicting positions on many other issues.

While the Gulf crisis of 2017 forced Ankara to approach Iran to assist Qatar in overcoming a blockade, Tehran may not view favourably any larger economic or security role for Turkey in Qatar and the Gulf.

During the early stages of the Gulf crisis with Qatar, Iranian authorities obstructed the passage of Turkish trucks carrying food and goods to Qatar, citing bureaucratic procedures.

This situation persisted until the three nations –Turkey, Qatar, and Iran – reached a verbal agreement in August 2017, which was later formalised in November 2017. Additionally, Iran did not accept the direct Turkish military presence in Qatar and expressed concerns about the potential deployment of Turkish aircraft in Doha.

The manifestations of this complex relationship between Turkey and Iran can be clearly seen in Iraq, Syria, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, among other theatres.

Iran's strategy towards Turkey in the Middle East relies on obstructing Ankara's access to the Gulf region by disrupting its overland routes and extending its own influence through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon, where it heavily invests in countering Turkey's efforts.

Transformation, ambition and a good reputation

Turkey's role as a provider of security in the Gulf has grown in the last decade to a transformative extent.

The process has tracked changing relations with Iran and the GCC countries, along with shifts in global priorities of Washington.

At the same time, Turkey's independent foreign policy, the rise of its domestic defence industry, and its proactive defence policy have encouraged decision-makers in Ankara to aspire to a more active role in the Gulf.

But all of this has raised some questions in some quarters about Turkey's capabilities.

The extent to which Turkey can fulfil any such role depends on the specific nature and scope of the desired involvement in Gulf security affairs. Moreover, the preferences of established regional and external powers – as well as the interests of emerging ones – could potentially present challenges to Turkey's ambitions in the region.

Forecasting the future in an exceedingly volatile and unstable region is inherently challenging. But some trends last.

As the US disengages from the region and Turkey's regional standing increases while it is making such notable progress in the defence industry, Ankara has an opening to bolster its position and seek a more robust security role.

Nevertheless, it always remains essential to consider the internal, regional, and international dynamics. Turkey must achieve stability in its domestic policies, boost its economic strength, and significantly increase its trade interactions with Gulf countries if it is to achieve an enhanced security role in the Gulf region.

Turkey's geographical proximity to the Gulf and its willingness to share defence technology will help. It also has a reputation as a reliable, committed, credible, and capable partner in various geopolitical theatres, founded in the Gulf itself in 2017, North Africa in 2019, and the Levant and the South Caucasus in 2020.

That means it is seen favourably in the eyes of potential allies and contributes to its progress towards a potential security role in the Gulf region.