The credibility of American deterrence in the Middle East

US Commander’s admission that Iran-backed militias have carried out 78 attacks, among other significant developments, speaks volumes on America’s shifting foreign policy priorities

AFP

A US armoured military vehicle drives on the outskirts of Rumaylan in Syria's northeastern Hasakeh province, bordering Turkey, on March 27, 2023.

The credibility of American deterrence in the Middle East

Bilal Saab

last update on 03 Apr 2023

I don’t think enough attention has been paid to US Central Command Commander Gen. Michael Kurilla’s public testimony on 23 March, in which he said that Iran-backed militias have attacked American troops in Syria 78 times since January 2021.

A day after Kurilla spoke, local fighters allied with Tehran’s Revolutionary Guards launched another attack with drones, killing a US contractor and wounding six other American service members.

At 2:40 a.m. local time, the United States dispatched F-15E fighter jets to the area and struck facilities allegedly used by the Iranian-backed assailants. The militias fired back with a volley of rocket and drone attacks against coalition bases.

U.S. Army General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made an unannounced visit to a U.S. base in Syria to reaffirm his support for the nearly eight-year-old American mission there to prevent a resurgence of Islamic State https://t.co/pP8JbWhEsH pic.twitter.com/ggZaStv9uo
— Reuters (@Reuters) March 6, 2023

There is much to unpack in Kurilla’s remarkable statement, starting with the fact that the lethal attack against American personnel happened less than three weeks after US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley’s visit to northeastern Syria, which was specifically designed to assess force protection measures for the 900 US troops that are stationed in the country.

AFP — US Central Command Commander General Michael Kurilla (C) visiting a camp, which holds relatives of suspected Islamic State (IS) group fighters, in Syria's northeastern Hasakah province.

But beyond the irony of Milley’s brief stop in Syria, four key points can be gleaned from Kurilla’s powerful words and those of his staff.

US role remains relevant

First, if anybody in Washington or anywhere in the region had doubts about the strategic importance of the modest US troop presence in Syria, think again. Iran would not have relentlessly attacked US forces had their role been irrelevant.

Over the years, Iran has made no secret of its wishes to kick the US military out of the region. That remains a strategic goal of Tehran. But in Syria, specifically, Iran has every interest in ousting the Americans, who have been supporting the anti-Assad and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who control most of Syria’s oil resources.

In addition to checking Iran’s negative influence, the US footprint is absolutely necessary to continue to fight the Islamic State, which according to Kurilla, still has tens of thousands of militants in Syria.

Most are in detention facilities throughout Syria, but many are at large as well, recruiting, indoctrinating, and launching attacks against collective security interests. If US troops leave Syria, you can expect an Islamic State 2.0.

Second, the fact that Kurilla chose to go public with the number of Iranian-directed attacks against his men and women speaks volumes. I suspect he did that for two reasons.

The #US will send old A-10 attack planes to swap for more advanced combat aircraft in the #MiddleEast as part of efforts to shift more modern fighters to the Pacific and Europe to deter China and #Russia, the Wall Street Journal reports. https://t.co/iHlz8tBwqe pic.twitter.com/xrAmXL10Hj
— Al Arabiya English (@AlArabiya_Eng) March 23, 2023

One, he’s generally concerned that Washington will further trim CENTCOM’s posture in the Middle East to focus on the Indo-Pacific and Europe, thus affecting his stability and security cooperation operations and activities in the region (and right on cue, on the same day Kurilla presented on the Hill, US officials announced that the United States will replace advanced fighter jets in the region with aging A-10 attack planes).

Two, he’s worried that with Iranian violence escalating, CENTCOM’s forces, should they be reduced, will be extra vulnerable.

Third, CENTCOM spokesman Col. Joe Buccino mentioned that the United States responded only three times to the 78 attacks.

Why such an insignificant US response?

It’s possible that not all of those Iranian-supported attacks were serious or disruptive, and thus they didn’t necessarily merit a US response. Also, Washington possibly responded using non-kinetic and covert means, including cyber operations, but we just have no way of finding out.

AFP — US army soldiers are pictured at armoured military vehicle on the outskirts of Rumaylan in Syria's northeastern Hasakeh province, bordering Turkey, on March 27, 2023.

But still, coming out and saying that CENTCOM responded only three times to those attacks represents a not-so-subtle message to the national security community in Washington that US Middle East policy under the Biden administration is effectively constraining CENTCOM’s retaliatory options and in many ways weakening deterrence.

This represents a not-so-subtle message to the national security community in Washington that US Middle East policy under the Biden administration is effectively constraining CENTCOM's retaliatory options and in many ways weakening deterrence.

CENTCOM generally cannot respond with lethal force to any of these attacks without unambiguous authorisation by the entire US military chain-of-command, and typically all the way to the president himself.

Deterrence success is incredibly and notoriously hard to assess, but all deterrence theorists agree that consistency and transparency are hugely important when it comes to the credibility and effectiveness of the deterrent threat.

Here, Washington is failing on both counts.

Not only is the United States dramatically inconsistent with its response, but even if it does respond (let's assume those covert and non-kinetic methods have been used), it is not transparent about them.

To make matters worse, the US government has an abysmal track record of effectively capitalising on such actions with effective social media and other forms of "messaging" efforts to persuade both regional and international actors that the United States is both the aggrieved actor, and completely justified in taking such actions.

This whole dynamic tells us everything we need to know about the "contested" nature of US deterrence in the Middle East, as former CENTCOM chief Gen. Frank McKenzie once described it, which leads me to my fourth and final point.

Calculated Iranian aggression

Iran is less likely to engage in state-on-state aggression, block energy choke points in the region, or try to topple a US-friendly regime in the Gulf given the perceived tremendous costs of such actions.

But Iran has consistently shown, even before January 2021, that it is able to carry out various other attacks against US and partner interests that are below the threshold of conventional war without being punished by the United States.

Iran has consistently shown, even before January 2021, that it is able to carry out various other attacks against US and partner interests that are below the threshold of conventional war without being punished by the United States.

Those attacks are typically pursued by proxies of Iran to maintain plausible deniability (although Tehran did directly strike Saudi oil facilities in September 2019 with missiles and drones, causing a temporary shock to world energy markets). And Iran has a large network of those proxies across the region.

US Central Command Commander General Michael Kurilla (R) visiting a camp, which holds relatives of suspected Islamic State (IS) group fighters, in Syria's northeastern Hasakah province.

So, while US deterrence does seem to work at the higher level (we can make that deduction because none of those red lines, as mentioned above, have been crossed by Tehran), it struggles significantly on the lower level, where Iran skillfully operates in the gray zone.

Addressing this old and worsening challenge requires a new US strategic approach, in partnership with Arab partners, to boost integrated deterrence.

The United States doesn't need more fighter aircraft or warships in the Middle East to deter Iran on the lower level. It needs, more than anything else, consistency and communication of resolve.

It also needs willing and capable Arab partners, who nowadays are less trusting of Washington. Until all those things are available — and that's a lot — Iran will have a strategic opportunity to reshape the politics and alignments of the region in its favour, a process we're beginning to witness.

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