Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its profound impact on the Gulf

The second impulse is denialism.

The magnitude of the occupation has led policymakers to ironically — and perhaps unconsciously — evade it as a means to overcome this painful experience even though confronting it was (and continues to be) the surest way to recovery. This attitude has especially manifested in political and psychosocial domains.

As expected of a recovering nation, a parliamentary commission was elected in 1992 to investigate the reasons behind the occupation. This exercise would not only help fend off future threats but also ensure accountability.

However, the commission's findings were neither disclosed nor openly discussed, resulting in partial leaks. The inaccessibility of the full report and lack of substantive changes on the political front with the reinstatement of the 1962 constitution and its accompanying system nurtures these denialist tendencies. 

Another missed opportunity is the adoption of a multifaceted national healing plan. Trauma, anxiety, and other psychosocial disorders have afflicted Kuwait's residents — whether living in the country or abroad during the occupation. These disorders remain largely unaddressed with only a few scattered initiatives. 

The absence of proper healing and recovery has led to adverse effects. It has generated social problems with an alarming increase in corruption, homicides, drug use, gender-based violence, and suicides in the past three decades. It is compounded by political and economic decay coupled with disappointing education, health, and basic services. 

While the picture seems gloomy, there are glimmers of hope: Kuwait's promising youth; entrepreneurial creativity; select public sector successes; and the leadership's belief in its people and their partnership in governance recently expressed most eloquently by the emir of Kuwait.

Upholding a balanced outlook is the healthiest route to recovery, boosting Kuwait's strengths and working on its challenges.

The coexistence of both impulses — survival and denial — has led to a novel tension: the occupation legacy was silenced through a suboptimal treatment yet kept alive through a survival mode mentality inadvertently furthering the country's predicament. 

Security-related discourse replaces healing

Instead of profoundly addressing the causes, manifestations, and effects of the occupation to generate a new Kuwait, security-related discourse and policies took centre stage. This has brought the country to a standstill, even well after the end of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. 

Three decades have passed since the occupation, yet many Kuwaitis are still seeking closure. The reasons are plenty and well-founded at times. For instance, Kuwait continues to receive the remnants of its 1990-91 martyrs. 

The United Nations Compensation Commission tasked with awarding reparations to Kuwait and its residents for invasion-related damages only concluded its mission last year. Much of the border with Iraq has been demarcated in 1993 through United Nations Security Council Resolution 833. But a key part of the maritime border remains unsettled. 

While these elements require collaboration with Iraq, other points in need of closure are completely within the purview of Kuwaiti decision-makers, including resolving the intricacies of the survival-denial spectrum. 

Lingering problems that predate the invasion

Moreover, some problems predate the invasion and continue to this day. They relate to the political, economic, and social domains – in essence, the key elements driving the country.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, many Kuwaitis were battling the regime's suspension of several articles of the constitution; a local market crash with an unprecedented scale even by global standards; and an identity question increasingly left to open interpretation with no conclusive answers or consistent policy direction on the bidun (stateless population). 

The constitution has been reinstated but tends to be violated across the board; the economy remains hostage to hydrocarbons with nominal lip service paid to diversification and youth empowerment; and the bidun issue has only festered since with some individual cases settled without a holistic solution.

Therefore, the ongoing stagnation cannot be blamed on the occupation alone. 

Kuwait urgently needs an integrated bold plan that moves the country forward. Vision 2035 has tried to deliver; some modest results followed.

Read more: Economic reforms face uphill battle in oil-dependent Kuwait

But without addressing the root causes of Kuwait's challenges, drastic change is not expected. An all-inclusive, multi-phased national dialogue that goes to the heart of the matter is the only way to salvage Kuwait's identity and values. 

Once the identity question is sorted, reforming other aspects (political, economic, and social) should soon follow. Shrugging off the challenges originating in the 1980s and the 1990-1991 occupation will not solve them — only honest confrontation will. Kuwaitis – rulers and ruled – are more than capable of taking on the challenge.

Assertiveness and development

The Gulf states absorbed the invasion and seven-month occupation of Kuwait differently.

This came as no surprise. The direct victim will always process the event differently.

The Gulf states demonstrated admirable solidarity with Kuwait and acted as its primary line of support. They also learned a few lessons from the event — lessons that have contributed to their outlook and current rising status. 

The Gulf states have interlaced their strategic drivers and policies with a mix of assertiveness and development, borrowing and modifying from Kuwait's pre-invasion model. 

Assertiveness and development blended and took on different forms. The occupation formally ushered, in a grand way, Pax Americana in the Gulf. The Americans have always been there, but the intensity and breadth of relations have been unprecedented since 1990-1991. 

This has meant more and larger bases, including the headquarters of the United States Central Command in Qatar; the headquarters of the United States (US) Fifth Fleet and US-led Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain; and one of the biggest US bases in the world in Kuwait.

This has also meant major arms sales; joint training and exchange of information; and the eventual trickling down to other domains like the economy, culture, and education. 

Security considerations were high following Kuwait's liberation; but absent an immediate external threat, the ongoing preoccupation driving Kuwait was less intense elsewhere in the region. Several Gulf states have advocated for more from their relations with the US, building their military capabilities and local defence technologies. 

It took another major event, the Arab protests of 2010-2011, to mutually and gradually reassess the US role amid heightened superpower competition and continued Gulf hedging and balancing aimed at serving its interests and preserving its standing in the region.

Next came the economic component. Less financially endowed Gulf states did not miss the opportunity to optimise their oil and gas offerings or develop niche sectors, whether it is for instance Islamic banking in Bahrain or logistics and transport in Oman.

Qatar's gas bonanza was unleashed in the late 1990s and continues to this day. On its part, the UAE has been leading in climate change and economic diversification, among other indicators, with its blossoming tourism, ports, and re-export sector. 

Saudi Arabia has joined the fold paving a makeover that takes into account further command of the hydrocarbon industry's value chain and venturing into new fields. The airline industry has become yet another domain for healthy competition in the Gulf, namely among its three rising stars: KSA, Qatar, and the UAE. 

This is a non-exhaustive list, and Kuwait can certainly list some of its successes too. But the scale of achievement in the other Gulf states is admittedly higher and follows Kuwait's once bolder leadership on these fronts prior to its occupation. 

In terms of culture, education and sports, the Gulf states have intensified their efforts. Once known for its regional leadership in these sectors, Kuwait has ceded to the rest of the Gulf with its higher-ranked educational outlets; leading media and print outlets; bustling entertainment scene; and a global sports blitz securing foreign sports clubs and players. In effect, the Gulf has successfully put itself on the map turning into a global destination. 

Read more: The promising future of Arab tourism

To put it into perspective, the other Gulf states have been leading the way vis-à-vis Kuwait each at its pace in varying degrees of assertiveness across different domains. 

What has made the assertive development mix more evident in the other Gulf states is a formula that boasts young leaders whether at the helm or throughout the different echelons of power; clear succession plans promising unity within the ruling families; ambitious and globally-conscious visions; less red tape; and a statist approach to running the country's affairs. 

There were many hiccups along the way no doubt and not all policies and actions of these different states have always hit the mark. Still, Kuwait cannot claim many of the above elements.

Kuwait can, however, claim its continuously running political system. The Gulf's assertiveness and development agenda were not restricted to the non-political. Following Kuwait's liberation, more Gulf states subscribed to elements of Kuwait's open political system.

More constitutions came about: Saudi Arabia's Basic Law of Governance in 1992 (revised in 2013); Oman's Basic Law in 1996 (latest revisions in 2021); and Qatar's constitution in 2004 (approved by referendum in 2003), to name a few. 

The same can be said of the introduction of more representative bodies, the enfranchisement of women, the normalising of civic action, and a varied opening through non-traditional modes like social media.

Each state has attempted to mirror its understanding of its history and traditions on its political system. 

How can the Gulf states benefit from one another?

The legacy of Kuwait's occupation is rich and diverse. It has shown different trajectories for the formerly occupied state vis-à-vis its Gulf neighbours. Moving forward, how can synergies be built around a shared legacy of the occupation that takes into account the experiences of all six GCC states? 

For one, development and openness do not cancel one another. They are mutually reinforcing, even if obstacles present themselves in either category.

As Kuwait is best served to learn from its neighbours' assertiveness and development, the Gulf states have benefited (and will continue to) from Kuwait's political system, adopting that which works while avoiding pitfalls that Kuwait has fallen in. 

The different Gulf states do not have to mimic one another — especially given their different evolution and state-society relations. But all six states would serve themselves better if they develop a formula that enables the shared rise of responsible citizenry – a Gulf citizen whose agency is preserved and whose global self is enshrined and better understood. 

What the GCC member states need the most is a frank dialogue on how to converge their systems in ways that do not diminish sovereignty yet enhance tangible integration and seamless cooperation. 

Sustainable prosperity would be the goal – one that comes through, not despite, the average Gulf citizen. Such a model – when conceptualised and practised – will preserve the Arab Gulf states' leadership in the Middle East and secure it a comfortable spot among the world's leading nations for years to come.