Sudan clashes demonstrate high-stakes nature of political transition

Political jostling

Although this crisis may appear to centre around technical military issues, there is a political aspect to it that is not openly discussed between the two largest military blocs in Sudan. Each side is trying to bolster their position ahead of the final agreement which will determine Sudan's political and economic future.

Read more: Explainer: Why are military forces fighting each other in Sudan?

Both sides worry that any boost to the opposing side's position will subsequently diminish their own standing.

The army wants to ensure that the stage is appropriately set ahead of the signing of the agreement, to curb the influence of the RSF — which is led by the Vice-President of the Sovereign Council, Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemeti) — and limit their future role in Sudan.

Read more: Hemedti: From camel trader to second most powerful man in Sudan

This is crucial as the final agreement aims to grant civilians a major takeover of political and executive power and limit the military's control over political and economic activity.

The army may use this opportunity to reap significant gains in this race, as civilians and the international community are eager to finalise the agreement to restore civilian rule and re-establish the democratic transition that was put on hold when the army seized power on 25 October 25 2021.

Despite their public commitment to distance themselves from politics and cede power to civilians, the army leadership has found it difficult to follow through on this promise. At this critical stage of the political process, they are trying to push through their own agenda and negotiate with civilian parties under the table — particularly in regard to foreign relations and security issues.

Israel and the Red Sea coast

The army wants to ensure that it maintain power in particular areas during the transitional period. One of the key areas of concern for the army is their relationship with Israel, which began with a controversial handshake between Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Entebbe, Uganda in 2020.

The army is keen to ensure this issue remains under its mandate. Additionally, the army wants to retain control over the Red Sea coasts, which are being contested by Russia, the United States, and China.

Read more: Why do so many foreign powers have military bases in Djibouti?

Under the previous regime of Omar al-Bashir, Russia was granted permission to establish a naval base on the Sudanese coast, but objections from the US and Gulf countries have prevented this from materialising. The army views this issue as a top security matter and has appointed a general to oversee the Sudanese coasts and ports.

Curbing Russian encroachment

Another security issue that intersects with foreign affairs is the western borders of Sudan, which are adjacent to countries experiencing security fragility.

The army is concerned about the presence of the Russian Wagner forces, which have been taking advantage of the instability in these countries.

Wagner has been able to compete with the militaries of European countries, particularly France, which historically has had a presence in West Africa. The army believes it is their responsibility to take charge of this issue, particularly on behalf of the Europeans.

Read more: US counter-terrorism efforts increasingly focusing on Africa

The army's retention of power in these areas during the transitional period is likely to extend their influence in other areas beyond those related to security and defence.

As such, the army is putting pressure on the civilian government to accept their de facto presence in the executive government and relinquish certain portfolios. This will allow the army to maintain the foreign relations they have established since taking power in October 2021.

Reform before integration

The RSF Command, on the other hand, has a clear vision for integrating its forces into the Sudanese army, summarised by the motto "reform before integration." The Command believes that reforming the army that was plagued by 30 years of Islamist control and influence must take place before the merger process.

The RSF Commander has repeatedly stated that he will not merge his forces into an 'Islamist' army. The army is seen by many as the last stronghold of the old regime, dominated by Islamists during the era of Omar al-Bashir.

The army does not hide its Islamist leaning, as evidenced by the social media accounts of prominent members. In fact, loyalty to the Islamists was often a precondition for admission to the Military College at the time.

On their part, the Islamists view Lieutenant General Hemeti as a traitor who, instead of defending their regime, supported the revolutionaries.  

The presence of RSF forces has effectively curbed the army's influence which is why the army is so adamant about integrating these forces into the army as a way to keep them under its control instead of operating as an independent force.

The army remains hell-bent on their stance, and they will not back down on this strategic point— regardless of whether the political transition succeeds or fails.

Importance of joint bloc

The RSF comprised a special unit of the army under al-Bashir, who used to refer to them as 'my protection'. These soldiers did not graduate from the Military Academy, nor did they receive formal military training. This is why large segments of the military — whether active or retired — are in favour of dismantling the RSF.

The crisis over choosing the officers who will be responsible for managing the integration demonstrates just how high the stakes are. Apart from the integration of military forces, the joint bloc will also oversee the settlement of civil issues related to power and state administration and the return of democratic transition.

While the RSF wants a civilian to head the joint unit, the army wants the army commander-in-chief or high-ranking officer to oversee the process.

The recent snags in the political process gives insight on how these influential blocs will conduct themselves in the upcoming transitional period in Sudan.

Initially, discussions were limited to a coup bloc that included the military and their civilian backers, as opposed to a civilian bloc working to end the coup.

However, with the beginning of the political process, the coup bloc split into two: a military-civilian bloc that called itself Freedom and Change; and another bloc that refused to sign the framework agreement led by the Communist Party.

The Democratic Bloc, which worked with the coup bloc, became a signatory to the framework agreement led by Freedom and Change.

At the end of the political process, three blocs emerged that have the greatest influence on the political process, and perhaps even the future of the entire transitional period. They are the bloc of civilians who signed the framework agreement, a military bloc represented by the RSF, and the Sudanese army.

Despite everything, the political process still has a good chance of success and building a new transitional government. But it is clear that for this process to succeed, the coup leaders must be involved in the political process.

Any attempt to exclude them from the process or diminish their role could lead to an armed confrontation.