UN envoy to Sudan optimistic about transition to civilian rule

He says that he "talked and worked" with "the people who led the coup," such as General Abdel Fattah Burhan and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (widely Known as Hemedti), and "made it clear that we saw the events of 25 October 2021, as an unconstitutional coup and a mistake that needs to be corrected."

Since he arrived in Sudan, Perthes has met with military and civilian actors, from one office to another, from one street to another, in the north, the south, and all other parts and regions. He is aware of the complexity of his mandate. There are many challenges to face.

One was the "war of words" or "controversy" between two men the military council, Burhan and Hemedti, who had divergent opinions about reforming the military institution, implementing the framework agreement, and the transitional phase to reach civil rule. Nevertheless, he has "certain optimism that Sudan today is in a much better place than it was a year ago."

Below is a transcript of the interview that took place via Teams application on 27 February 2023:

It has been almost two months since the signing of the framework agreement, are you confident that the framework agreement will be implemented?

The framework agreement is exactly that. It is a framework which means more has to follow, there has to be a final agreement. The framework lines out the frame in which parties that signed up to it, and others hopefully, will agree on the transition of power from military rule to a civilian government.

It has to also define in greater detail what a new civilian government should do and what the time frames are and the road maps, for the specific tasks of a transitional government which is not elected, but also on important and critical issues such as security issues, transitional justice, how to deal with the east of the country, how to deal with the implementation of the Juba peace agreement and how to deal with the dismantlement of the old regime.

These 5 issues which I mentioned are the subject of workshops which we have been facilitating together with our partners at the African Union and IGAD since the beginning of this year.  

There seems to be a lot at stake, not just the transition from military rule to civilian rule. There are much bigger issues. Is that the case?

 Of course. Let us be clear. There is the military coup of 25 October 2021, which did not come out of the blue. It was not because General Abdel Fattah Burhan and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (widely Known as Hemedti) were at odds with someone. There were political conflicts that existed before which were unresolved.

There were many achievements under Abdulla Hamdok's government, but there were also conflicts and dysfunctionalities. What is important now is that if we get to a final agreement and to the appointment of a civilian prime minister and a civilian Head of State, that the new transition period is better prepared than the last one.

One will never have absolute consensus but a wide range consensus among relevant parties in the political process on the main issues for a transitional government to deal with.

This was not entirely the case in the first transitional period from 2019 until the coup of 2021. There was a lot of disagreement about what a transitional government was actually entitled to do, there was disagreement about the distribution of roles in that partnership between military and civilians.

It will be great if the Sudanese can be clearer on what should be done in a new transitional phase. There seems to be a wide agreement, even outside the circle of those who have signed on to framework agreement, that a transitional government would have a limited scope. It is transitional, not elected.

Its scope should be limited to:

1- Getting the economy back on track

2- Taking care of the poor and vulnerable

3- Complete the peace process by reaching out to parties that have not signed up yet like Abdelaziz al-Hilu and Abdul Wahid al Nur

4- Implement the Juba peace agreement

5-  governance

6- Prepare for credible elections in 24 months after the appointment of a new prime minister

Speaking about agreement and disagreement, we have witnessed in the past few days what journalists have called a 'war of words' between two key figures in the military establishment, Burhan and Hemedti. What is your reading of this?

Some called it the 'war of words' but the most important thing is that it is not a physical war. There is no doubt that there are serious issues, particularly about how to achieve the eventual integration of the Rebel Support Forces into the national army.

But both General Hemedti and General Burhan have committed to the framework political agreement which leaves no doubt, and we have to be very clear on that, that ultimately there can only be one national army. There cannot be two, or five or seven armies.

Since I arrived in Sudan more than two years ago, I have been saying that you cannot have a peaceful country and transformation if you have several armies operating in parallel.

I'm talking here about the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) eventually integrating into one national army, but it is also, of course, about the armed struggle groups which have signed up to Juba agreement and to further peace agreements to integrate into the army or go through Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process to dismantle and integrate into society rather into an army and that is to be decided during the process.

Burhan and Hemedti both agree, despite the 'war of words', but each of them have a different emphasis on whether reform of the Sudanese armed forces should come before or after the integration.

Let us be realistic, this is a comprehensive process where both parts are deeply intertwined — security sector reform and integration. There must be a process, where, step by step, both processes proceed in tandem.

It will take time, but it should be possible, before a final agreement, to agree on an approach, or agree on a road map for what a new civilian government will have to do, both in terms of driving the integration and the reform forward.

Going back to the dispute or 'war of words' between General Burhan and General Hemedti, is it just related to their different views on security reform and integration or to a regional dispute over the future of Sudan?

The core issue is the future of the army and the future of RSF. The future of RSF is also linked to the question of who leads it. The army is an institution whereby the General Commander of the army will eventually be replaced by another General Commander.

In the RSF it is different, we know it is run by a family and this is something that will have to change. General Hemedti understands this very well. The dispute in details is not so much about the strategic goal of having one national unified army, but about the timeline and processes.

This could take three years or 15 years but will probably be somewhere in between. Much reform should take place in the Sudanese armed forces before everybody else is fully integrated on the level of battalions and companies.

Regional powers do have interests, and we know that — we are not naïve. We know that different powers have different interests in Sudan. Political forces, all kinds of leaders and stakeholders here in Sudan are happy to look for support from regional powers or international powers.

Sometimes it is that regional and international powers are being dragged into the disputes and sometimes regional and international powers are making their own interests very clear and trying to find allies for their policies inside the country.

What is the best timeframe for military reform and to have a unified Sudanese army?

The important thing is to begin as soon as possible, preferably in the first 90 days of a new civilian government. This could begin, as an example, with setting up a security sector reform and integration commission under a new head of state. This commission would be comprised of both military and civilian leaders who would then define the next steps and the security needs of the country.

There is no doubt that in a country like Sudan, with so many borders, which is sparsely inhabited, you need different kinds of forces. You need forces to protect the borders, but you also need forces that can be rapidly deployed to wherever conflicts erupt, in the form a national security strategy or 'white book' to find out what kind of forces are needed in the first place.

The Sudanese Armed Forces SAF began like this, I believe. You will have to find out whether the laws and regulations under which you operate are still appropriate. This includes the selection of officers who will enter the military academy, along with their ranks and salaries.

The aim of reforming the security forces of any country is to make these forces stronger and more effective, not necessarily in how many arms they are supplied with, but more so about their capabilities and acceptance by society. The important thing when starting this process is to set timelines.

Other states which have gone through difficult security sector reform processes — which also included the integration of oppositional forces, or the dismantlement of military — are Spain, Columbia and Chile are examples.  

It is unrealistic to expect a fully reformed army under full civilian control in less than 10 years, as the experiences of other countries have proved. We should not be over ambitious, thinking this can be done in two years. This will only lead to disappointment.

I am not here to say it takes five, eight or 12 years, that is something that the Sudanese have to find out together. But I have to be realistic. The transition period is supposed to take two years, during that transition period you have to bring the process firmly on track, which would probably include a form of visible integration at the top command level.

Are you still confident that there will be transition to a civilian government in two years and that there will be free and fair elections in Sudan?

I think we will have a return to the transition in a way, because there was a transitional process under the Hamdok government after the fall of the al-Bashir regime and the agreement on a constitutional document and a political declaration.

The government led by Hamdok made a lot of progress, particularly in the economic field and debt forgiveness. It also began political reform but this transition was interrupted by the coup of 25 October 2021. We are now talking about returning to a civilian-led transition.  We are striving now to facilitate a political process allowing the Sudanese to start a new transition phase.

There is a very broad agreement in this country — and when I say a very broad agreement, I mean more than just those who have signed up to the framework political agreement — that the transition period should be limited, it cannot be open ended.

This transitional period must end in elections. Two years is a reasonable timeframe. Some called for elections after six months or a year, but this is not enough time, in my opinion, to do the required homework needed to have credible elections.  

You need a reformed electoral commission and electoral commission law, electoral law and political parties law. Parties need to hold their own conferences and have election campaigns and communicate with the people. You need to have statistical basis which is not the entire census but at least the first part of the census.

You have to find out how and where internally-displaced persons can vote, for example. You cannot do that in six months. If you want to have credible elections, I believe a transitional period of two years is still ambitious, but it can be done.

You mentioned Omar al-Bashir, the former president, and one of the phrases that we heard a lot in the last 10 years in the Arab world is the 'remnants of old regimes'. Recently someone from RSF, I think the brother of Hemedti, accused some people in the military council of defendingthe remnants of al-Bashir regime.

I am not going to speak about individuals or their history or their affiliations, but if a country has been under the rule of one party plus military dictatorship for 30 years, basically a one-party dictatorship, that means you have an entire generation in the military, in the civil service and also in the private sector, who have been socialised in the system, and many of them have built connections, networks and patronage structures.

Not all of them have gone with the fall of al-Bashir regime. You can ban a party like National Congress Party (NCP) but of course the people are still there and have their networks and are working as professionals or in the civil service or even in the army and one cannot just ignore them. They are there as individuals, they are legitimate Sudanese citizens as others are.

If a dictatorship is overthrown, the sociological remnants of the old system will remain even if you dismantle political structures. What you also can do — and we know this is a difficult job from the experience of countries in Eastern Europe — is that one may try to dismantle the economic basis of the dictatorships and dismantle the corruption that has happened under these dictatorships.

What about accountability? Are you happy with the degree of emphasis on the accountability included within the framework agreement?

It is important that there is reference to accountability. All parties have signed up for it including the military, Burhan and Hemedti, main civilian forces, forces outside the armed struggle groups, as well as more than half of the key signatories who signed the Juba peace agreement. Some have not yet signed up to it.

Accountability is not being disputed. It is a clear demand of the revolution and  the people who took to the streets and toppled the al-Bashir regime. These people took to the streets again after the coup of 25 October 2021. Without accountability, there is no justice, and you will not have legitimacy for any new transitional government.

There are legitimate questions about whether a transitional justice process will hold people accountable and ensure that those in power hand over the reins to a civilian government without being afraid for their lives. 

Experiences in other countries such as South Africa and Colombia have shown that such a transitional justice process is possible. Accountability is exacted through transparency, apologies and clear guarantees that the new democratic institutions will be secure.

You have bluntly called al-Bashir a dictator and what happened on 25 October 2021 a coup, does that make your mission easier or more difficult?

I believe it makes it more meaningful. We are encouraged to use diplomatic language and we do, but sometimes you have to call a spade a spade.

If you follow statements by officials here in Sudan over the past couple of weeks even the leaders of the coup have called it a coup, although it has taken some time. We have called it a coup since the day after it happened.

The Security Council, meanwhile, referred to it as a 'military takeover'. On its part, the African Union described it as an 'unconstitutional change of government', and occasionally used the term 'military coup'. I think we should not pretend that it was something normal. It was unconstitutional, and it was a military takeover, which, in political science, we call a coup. Plain and simple.

That does not mean we should not engage with those involved. General Burhan and General Hemedti were part of the collective head of state, even before the coup. So, we worked with them before and we continue to work with them after, but we made it very clear that we believe the 25 October events to be unconstitutional, a coup, and something that needs to be corrected.

Look where we are: a year and a few months later, everybody agrees that this has to be corrected and that we have to return to civilian rule. That was not the case few days or weeks or months after the coup. 

If we compare the situation today to a year ago, at the time military leaders said we can never again talk to these parties which we ousted, and the parties were saying we can never again talk to the military.

This inflexibility has not worked for both sides. The military were not able to form a credible government; the military were not able to stop the deterioration of the economy and of the security situation.

The civilian political parties were not able to overthrow the military. Now the parties are talking, which is an important step to reach an agreement which will return Sudan to civilian-led governance.

Do you consider what is happening in Sudan as part of the 'Arab Spring' or is it true that what happened in Sudan over the past two or three years is a second wave of 'Arab Spring'?

I never liked the expression 'Arab Spring', I find the expression too seasonal, short-term and sometimes it overlooked and ignored that change — for example the fall of the government in Tunisia — is a long-term and a generational process. I referred to them as the 'Arab Revolts'. I don't think that what is happening in Sudan is a second wave of this.

People learn from other people's experiences. Given the deep connections between Sudan and the rest of the Arab world, people here have been watching the experiences of other Arab countries.

But we also have to understand the deep connections between Sudan and the rest of Africa. We see that we had a generation of struggles for change in Africa, which have led to rather stable democracies in countries that were not democracies 30 years ago such as in South Africa and Kenya. In Nigeria, credible elections are taking place where no former military officer is running for office. This is quite significant.

Sudan is in two worlds: It is watching the experiences of the Arab world and the African world. The Sudanese people, particularly the young generation, want the best of both worlds. They are proud of their mixed culture, and they are very much looking at the successful experiences of democratic transitions, particularly in Africa. There are not that many successful transitions in the Arab world.

Speaking about Africa again, in addition to what is happening internally in Sudan regarding the transition, there are cross-border issues as well with Ethiopia: the refugees, Tigary and the Renaissance Dam. What is your input on that?

Geopolitics do not go away just because you have a revolution. There are geo-political and geo-economic factors and developments that any government here will have to deal with, but it is certainly the case that democratic governments often deal in a different way with external conflicts than authoritarian ones.

One of the important developments in this part of the world is that after trying to do everything else for a long time, most regional leaders have now found out that it makes no sense to try to undermine your neighbour, or to sponsor rebels in neighbouring countries.

There are always exceptions to this learning curve and sometimes political establishments, or military establishments, fall back into the old ways. But generally, we have seen a change in government in Ethiopia and the beginning of the era of Abiy Ahmed has led to a positive attitude towards Sudan.

Ahmed did help to find a compromise in Sudan in 2019. Ethiopia went through a very difficult period in the last two years, now with Ethiopia finding its own peace again, we have seen how much that has visibly contributed to an improvement in relations between Sudan and Ethiopia.

As to the Nile issue, it has always been there with Sudan's northern neighbour Egypt has a strong interest in its water security. We know it can be dealt with through negotiations and with agreements and Sudan finds itself in a neutral position. Whatever contributes to the stability of the flow of water is probably in the interest of Sudan.

You worked extensively on Syria as a researcher and scholar, then with the UN in Syria for three years. Now you are working in Sudan for more than two years. Are there any similarities between the two countries?

There are some similarities but more differences.

We did have a civil war in parts of Sudan, particularly in Darfur, as well as in south and the Blue Nile, but there is no civil war in Sudan today. We are a political mission here to support transition process, we are not a classical peace keeping mission.

We have some work to do in supporting the ceasefire monitoring and chairing the so-called Permanent Ceasefire Committee for Darfur. We are witness to a much better situation than the one in Syria, which is ongoing.

Syria experienced an intense civil war where the state lost authority over huge parts of the country and has to tolerate other countries exercising sovereignty in Syrian territories. That all is not the case here in Sudan.

The main difference is that we do not have a civil war in Sudan, and what was once a civil war has been overcome through peace agreement.

We have a certain sense of optimism in that Sudan today is in a much better place than it was a year ago.