What Saudi Arabia can learn from China’s Belt and Road Initiative

When Washington criticised Riyadh over its decision to reduce oil production — a step that aimed to prioritise Saudi interests — it was a wakeup call that pushed Saudi Arabia towards pursuing a more pragmatic foreign policy. 

Here, China's economic development based on its own industrial development and enterprises connecting with nations abroad through the Belt and Road Initiative serves as exemplary model.

Adapting domestic and foreign strategies that take into account changing regional dynamics is the first step to building autonomy in decision making and prioritising the security and development of a country's own citizens.

A profound transformation

Saudi Arabia is going through a profound transformation, implementing reforms and opening up the country, which will help boost its self-reliance in both security and economic development. Riyadh does not have to follow every aspect of the Chinese example as, surely, national conditions differ. 

Still, the outcome of the China-Arab summits and state visit show a growing consensus that there is great potential and opportunity to be had in strengthening relations between the two emerging powers, and this relationship should be based on common understanding.

Saudi Arabia has been China's largest trading partner in the West Asia/Africa region in recent years, despite the relatively young trading relationship.

Today, with Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 Project in full swing, the two states are able to find even more opportunities to work together in areas including trade, finance, capacity building, infrastructure and beyond.

In the meantime, China's experience in infrastructure building and advanced technological development can help steer Saudi Arabia to develop its manufacturing industries in a more autonomous way. 

The BRI: A misjudged initiative

China's ambitions for its global infrastructure programme, the Belt and Road Initiative, have been misjudged by many in the international community. 

The BRI has been misread in the West, particularly in Europe, as a political and military play by China. However, it helps to recall the alternative names Beijing's international investment programme has gone by — namely the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. 

These names demonstrate that China's ambitions are, in fact, rooted in economic development and aimed at improving routes from China into Europe, both over land via rail and over international waterways. The initiative is in no way a bid to build political leverage in Beijing over Brussels or Washington. 

Other nations engaged in territorial disputes with China — especially around waterways along the BRI's route —have also voiced their suspicions, namely Japan, Vietnam, the United States and Australia.

These countries tend to view their relationship with China through the lens of competition and confrontation. They see the BRI's wave of international investment in ports and infrastructure as a showcase of its military ambition and as a potential strategic and security threat in the long term.

But this is to disregard China's stated intention — central to the BRI White Paper in 2017 which established the investment initiative — that it will respect common security interests and a sustained sea order with states along its route.

The prevailing narrative in the West over the BRI and the perception it creates, both clash with China's long-standing strategy and its principle of peaceful and diplomatic development. 

The misunderstanding is rooted in several fundamental differences between China and the West. Some of them are obvious, not least their respective political systems and military positions.

There are more areas where contrasting perspectives can skew perceptions of intentions and fuel deeper misunderstandings. Different ways of thinking, language and culture also fuel misunderstanding.

History is also important — particularly the way in which war is recalled and conflict is perceived. While this can be the biggest factor contributing to gaps in international perception, it can also be the most promising route to bridging them, via better international understanding.  

Regardless of whether international understanding can be reached, friction over China's development of the BRI will likely remain, and the initiative will continue to face criticism and challenges.

However, the 21st Maritime Silk Road project will remain one of China's most significant foreign policies and its most vital maritime policy, accomplishing two main and immediate goals: generating economic opportunity and protecting its personnel and assets along and beyond key sea lanes.

China will continue in its mission to invest in overseas maritime infrastructure and port projects.

Potential for misunderstanding

Throughout, the potential for international misunderstanding of the BRI remains, and any misunderstanding could shape how the initiative takes form.

Tracing the roots of the BRI back from China's perspective and charting the development of its foreign policy and maritime strategy can only help the world find clarity on international development in the decades ahead. 

To start with, China has an internalised security culture that prioritises the stability of society in order to promote the interests of its people. As a developing country with a population of 1.4 billion, maintaining national security is a key priority.

Beijing believes that a safe and stable environment is essential for sustainable economic and social development. And so, in the maritime space, China has incorporated a similar culture of collaborative governance in its development plans with partner states along the BRI routes. 

In contrast, the West and, in particular, the US, has an externalised security culture where its sense of safety comes from keeping perceived threats outside of its borders, away from the country and its alliances. In this way, such nations can misread China's intentions for regional and international development as a possible external threat to themselves.

This perspective pre-defines China as competitive and confrontational and leads to tension and potential hostility in the seas. It does not help that America's own experience of managing its maritime interests comes from waters that are not internationalised, unlike many of those around China. 

Fundamental differences

China and the West do not share the same memories of war and understanding of conflict.

China has never started any war and, in fact, is the largest peacekeeping contributor among UN Security Council permanent members with over 2,000 peacekeepers in active missions. These factors define China's perspective.

In the context of the 21st Maritime Silk Road, with the gradual development of China's maritime power in line with its strategy of building a strong maritime nation, the cultural concept of "harmony" will remain embedded in China's development of maritime corridors and naval support bases overseas, forming part of China's overall diplomatic strategy of peaceful rise and development.
 
China's security culture not only reflects the character of the Chinese people but also the strategic mind of its government, which operates with the same nuance found in the Chinese language. The language provides a more extensive and profound mode of thought with a broader range that is naturally suited for making macro-level decisions and developing strategies and overall objectives. 

English, in stark contrast, favours specifics. It encourages people to get down to the basics of any given issue. This is demonstrated by the tendency of American executive bodies to focus on small and specific goals.

The implications of these cultural and linguistic differences in the maritime space mean that China places emphasis on grand objectives such as forging new partnerships with states along the routes, while the US remains fixated on using its navies in the South China Sea, the Malacca Strait or the Panama Canal to counter China. 

These differences in thinking, gradually and ultimately, exacerbate misunderstanding between the two countries and create increased potential for geopolitical and security miscalculation.

An example of this can be seen when China positions the roles of ports as "sea posts" or places that could provide ships transiting through the Silk Road sea lanes with necessary logistical support.

This is misconstrued by some as a veil for military control because such development along the maritime silk road would enable China to control the sea lanes and react to traditional and non-traditional security threats in a more efficient and effective way. 

Here the word "control" is often misunderstood. The connotation of the term in English contradicts China's core principle of peaceful co-existence and non-interference in other sovereign countries' internal affairs. There is a better word than "control" that gets the idea across: management. It better conveys China's approach to both its interests and the risks to them. 

This can be seen in cases where the ports involved are represented mainly by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which play a supportive and constructive role in economic development and security provision when Chinese personnel and assets are at risk.

The Gwadar port in Pakistan is a case in point of how China helps boost local economic development by effectively merging the economic corridor with the port while benefiting from a better access point to the Strait of Malacca, which is key to China's imports of energy and resources from the Middle East and Africa.

The Djibouti example

China's base in Djibouti also shows how its intentions are for "management" rather than "control". It supports the Chinese navy in regular escorts and operations to counter piracy and other transnational threats. It has been used for the evacuation of Chinese civilians in extreme situations, such as the 2015 Yemen crisis.

And it should be noted that Djibouti hosts not only the Chinese military but those from other countries including the US, Germany, France, Italy and Japan, with Saudi Arabia and Turkey set to have bases there in the future.

Some view this form of management along the routes of the BRI as a precursor for Chinese control and the eventual development of a competitive advantage for China. They believe its intention is to become a strong or dominant maritime power by establishing military capabilities in these ports. 

But that is based on an American mindset of using security as a bulwark against perceptions of external threats and contradicts China's culture of internalised security. Therefore, it is only natural that countries misunderstand China's true interests when they misread both the conditions around such ports and China's intentions.

It is important to note that for China to further develop its military capabilities it would need to increase spending which goes against China's fiscal policies. Beijing allocates a relatively low percentage of its GDP for upgrading its military capabilities. 

Secondly, China knows very well the outcome of regional militarisation given the fact that achieving any US-style of hegemony would only promote force over diplomacy, which is its favoured means to maintain its position in the regional order. China believes that the use of force only causes destabilisation, which would in no way benefit its interests. 

Thirdly, stronger military capabilities, or an expectation that it should police the area, would blur the lines of China's clear preference for not interfering in other country's internal affairs. The boundary of peacekeeping under the UN peacekeeping framework might be expanded with international legal risks.

Taiwan is a perfect example of this. While the island is hugely important to Beijing, it has yet to be reunified with mainland China. An expanded sphere of influence for China's military and better international capabilities could lead to what China sees as foreign intervention in a domestic issue.

Non-interference in other states' internal affairs will remain fundamental to international relations and China's core interest will be to adhere to such a principle in its foreign policy. In turn, China would expect other states to do the same. 

The role of ports

Therefore, transforming ports into explicit military bases or significantly upgrading its navy, either west of Singapore or in the Horn of Africa, is not on China's agenda, at least for the foreseeable future.
        
Commercial development and logistical support will remain the main functions of Chinese ports and naval bases along its maritime routes. From both an economic and a supply chain perspective, the strategy is to establish global connectivity between China and countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Pacific, North and South America, West Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Europe. This is crucial to China's sustainable development. 

Economically, China's blue economy — its use of the ocean and its resources — accounts for about 10 per cent of national economic output. Nearly 90 per cent of the country's foreign trade by volume relies on sea transportation or shipping.

China also needs a secure supply chain. Its top import is crude oil which travels via transit routes through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean from the Middle East and Africa. Demand will only continue to rise in the next decade. 

Already, China has 1.4 billion people to feed. Secure and sustainable shipping routes are a must. Imports of food came in at over $100 billion in 2021.

In the immediate to medium term, China will use state-owned enterprises to develop and manage the BRI ports and the synergies they create alongside land and sea-based infrastructure corridors for both economic and security interests. 

The Chinese navy will limit its role to the protection of China's overseas interests by mitigating traditional and non-traditional security risks at sea and creating lifelines when needed.

From an industry perspective based on the author's experience, the private sector may be expected to play a bigger role in the inland states along the BRI in terms of risk management and the protection of overseas interests. 

Prevailing mistrust

It is unlikely that misunderstanding between China and the West — rooted in fundamental differences of language, culture and perspective — will end. Talk of "clashes" and "war" is likely to persist. But those who are in positions of influence over security, development and governance, both regionally and globally, should refrain from falling into a supremist mindset. 

The world is going through a period of deep political distrust. Bilateralism is currently trumping multilateralism when securing agreements on policy and national interests. We also know that the Western alliance can be swiftly mobilised when it perceives a threat.

This is not necessarily a bad thing for China, which has worked with states in a spirit of mutual respect and through mechanisms under UN frameworks to advance international peace and prosperity. 

China also has the advantage of policy continuity. Last year's 20th National Congress strengthened its determination to modernise its maritime strategy. Constantly developing and updating the rules of engagement on a regional basis between China and the West should be on top of the agenda for both sides to remain diplomatic and pragmatic in the best possible way.

The development and sustainability of the 21st Maritime Silk Road will not only be a testament to China's capability and political good faith, but it could also create a global governance structure fit for a multi-polar world joined by both emerging and developed powers. 

- Becky Shen is CEO of BP Solutions Ltd., a Chinese consultancy providing solutions to BRI enterprises