These differences in thinking, gradually and ultimately, exacerbate misunderstanding between the two countries and create increased potential for geopolitical and security miscalculation.
An example of this can be seen when China positions the roles of ports as "sea posts" or places that could provide ships transiting through the Silk Road sea lanes with necessary logistical support.
This is misconstrued by some as a veil for military control because such development along the maritime silk road would enable China to control the sea lanes and react to traditional and non-traditional security threats in a more efficient and effective way.
Here the word "control" is often misunderstood. The connotation of the term in English contradicts China's core principle of peaceful co-existence and non-interference in other sovereign countries' internal affairs. There is a better word than "control" that gets the idea across: management. It better conveys China's approach to both its interests and the risks to them.
This can be seen in cases where the ports involved are represented mainly by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which play a supportive and constructive role in economic development and security provision when Chinese personnel and assets are at risk.
The Gwadar port in Pakistan is a case in point of how China helps boost local economic development by effectively merging the economic corridor with the port while benefiting from a better access point to the Strait of Malacca, which is key to China's imports of energy and resources from the Middle East and Africa.
The Djibouti example
China's base in Djibouti also shows how its intentions are for "management" rather than "control". It supports the Chinese navy in regular escorts and operations to counter piracy and other transnational threats. It has been used for the evacuation of Chinese civilians in extreme situations, such as the 2015 Yemen crisis.
This photo taken on August 1, 2017 shows Chinese People's Liberation Army personnel attending the opening ceremony of China's new military base in Djibouti.
And it should be noted that Djibouti hosts not only the Chinese military but those from other countries including the US, Germany, France, Italy and Japan, with Saudi Arabia and Turkey set to have bases there in the future.
Some view this form of management along the routes of the BRI as a precursor for Chinese control and the eventual development of a competitive advantage for China. They believe its intention is to become a strong or dominant maritime power by establishing military capabilities in these ports.
But that is based on an American mindset of using security as a bulwark against perceptions of external threats and contradicts China's culture of internalised security. Therefore, it is only natural that countries misunderstand China's true interests when they misread both the conditions around such ports and China's intentions.
It is important to note that for China to further develop its military capabilities it would need to increase spending which goes against China's fiscal policies. Beijing allocates a relatively low percentage of its GDP for upgrading its military capabilities.
Secondly, China knows very well the outcome of regional militarisation given the fact that achieving any US-style of hegemony would only promote force over diplomacy, which is its favoured means to maintain its position in the regional order. China believes that the use of force only causes destabilisation, which would in no way benefit its interests.
Thirdly, stronger military capabilities, or an expectation that it should police the area, would blur the lines of China's clear preference for not interfering in other country's internal affairs. The boundary of peacekeeping under the UN peacekeeping framework might be expanded with international legal risks.
Taiwan is a perfect example of this. While the island is hugely important to Beijing, it has yet to be reunified with mainland China. An expanded sphere of influence for China's military and better international capabilities could lead to what China sees as foreign intervention in a domestic issue.
Non-interference in other states' internal affairs will remain fundamental to international relations and China's core interest will be to adhere to such a principle in its foreign policy. In turn, China would expect other states to do the same.
The role of ports
Therefore, transforming ports into explicit military bases or significantly upgrading its navy, either west of Singapore or in the Horn of Africa, is not on China's agenda, at least for the foreseeable future.
Commercial development and logistical support will remain the main functions of Chinese ports and naval bases along its maritime routes. From both an economic and a supply chain perspective, the strategy is to establish global connectivity between China and countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Pacific, North and South America, West Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Europe. This is crucial to China's sustainable development.
Economically, China's blue economy — its use of the ocean and its resources — accounts for about 10 per cent of national economic output. Nearly 90 per cent of the country's foreign trade by volume relies on sea transportation or shipping.
China also needs a secure supply chain. Its top import is crude oil which travels via transit routes through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean from the Middle East and Africa. Demand will only continue to rise in the next decade.
Already, China has 1.4 billion people to feed. Secure and sustainable shipping routes are a must. Imports of food came in at over $100 billion in 2021.
In the immediate to medium term, China will use state-owned enterprises to develop and manage the BRI ports and the synergies they create alongside land and sea-based infrastructure corridors for both economic and security interests.
The Chinese navy will limit its role to the protection of China's overseas interests by mitigating traditional and non-traditional security risks at sea and creating lifelines when needed.
From an industry perspective based on the author's experience, the private sector may be expected to play a bigger role in the inland states along the BRI in terms of risk management and the protection of overseas interests.
Prevailing mistrust
It is unlikely that misunderstanding between China and the West — rooted in fundamental differences of language, culture and perspective — will end. Talk of "clashes" and "war" is likely to persist. But those who are in positions of influence over security, development and governance, both regionally and globally, should refrain from falling into a supremist mindset.
The world is going through a period of deep political distrust. Bilateralism is currently trumping multilateralism when securing agreements on policy and national interests. We also know that the Western alliance can be swiftly mobilised when it perceives a threat.
This is not necessarily a bad thing for China, which has worked with states in a spirit of mutual respect and through mechanisms under UN frameworks to advance international peace and prosperity.
China also has the advantage of policy continuity. Last year's 20th National Congress strengthened its determination to modernise its maritime strategy. Constantly developing and updating the rules of engagement on a regional basis between China and the West should be on top of the agenda for both sides to remain diplomatic and pragmatic in the best possible way.
The development and sustainability of the 21st Maritime Silk Road will not only be a testament to China's capability and political good faith, but it could also create a global governance structure fit for a multi-polar world joined by both emerging and developed powers.
- Becky Shen is CEO of BP Solutions Ltd., a Chinese consultancy providing solutions to BRI enterprises