Syria and Iraq seek to cross borders in different ways to Iran

Through pipelines, investment, and connections, trade will open up the Middle East’s borders. Tehran hopes it will prove unsuccessful

Syria and Iraq seek to cross borders in different ways to Iran

The Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline has always represented more than an oil arrangement between Iraq and Syria, or a simple scheme for exporting crude. Its significance was evident when it was built in the 1950s, when it was shut down during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, when it was revived in the final years of Saddam Hussein’s rule, and when it was damaged during the US invasion of 2003.

Last week, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed during a business summit at the US Chamber of Commerce to revive the pipeline, as Washington seeks ways to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. The deal involves the US energy giant Chevron, TI Capital led by Ziad Ghandour, and Qatar’s UCC Holdings. It will take oil from northern Iraq’s Kurdish regions to Syria’s Mediterranean coast, with two million barrels per day (bpd) envisaged. Yet this is about more than oil.

Under American sponsorship, it is an effort to reconnect the countries of the region through networks of energy, transport, and investment. As a framework for development, this stands in direct contrast to the ‘Iranian model’ seen since 1979 that has involved the penetration of borders and states via proxy militias, drones, narcotics, weapons, and disorder. The difference between the two visions is profound.

To breach, or bridge?

From Iraq and Syria to Lebanon and Yemen, Tehran has long regarded borders as obstacles to be breached. The emerging project sees borders as bridges to be crossed by pipelines, electricity grids, railways, and investment. The first model was built through infiltration and the Tehran-led ‘Axis of Resistance’. It belongs to the past, if that were not yet clear to all. The second looks towards the future, seeking influence through development, shared interests, and the consolidation of states.

This broader context is essential to understanding the remarks of US envoy Tom Barrack after the MoU was signed last week. He spoke of a programme being developed in coordination with Syria, Jordan, Türkiye, Lebanon, and Egypt to establish alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz (which Tehran seeks to hold hostage by attacking ships passing through). As these alternatives came to fruition, Barrack said, the importance of the maritime chokepoint could diminish, as early as two years’ time.

Yet his remarks concerned far more than a single project. It could redraw the energy map of the Middle East. The pipeline running from Kirkuk in Iraq to the Syrian port of Baniyas on the Mediterranean would form one of the pillars of that new map. Iraq remains heavily dependent on its southern ports and on passage from the Arabian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, so is seeking outlets that are less vulnerable to Iran. Syria, for its part, hopes to become a regional energy hub, while Washington wants to use geography to contain Iran, reducing it ability to influence global oil routes.

Building networks

These plans intersect with other projects under discussion, extending from the Gulf through Jordan and Syria, then onwards to Türkiye, Lebanon, and the Mediterranean. They include oil and gas pipelines, railways, communications networks, and roads. The objective extends beyond diversifying export routes; it is to build a new network of interests in which the stability of each state becomes tied to that of its neighbours.

The pipeline running from Kirkuk in Iraq to the Syrian port of Baniyas on the Mediterranean would form one of the pillars of a new energy map

Such infrastructure cannot function while borders remain aflame, investment will not arrive while militias control the crossings, and energy cannot become an engine of development while geography remains captive to the economy of weapons. This is where Iran has dwelt for four decades, weakening the state and strengthening the militia so that borders remain open to weapons and fighters but closed to trade. Whenever state institutions faltered, Iranian influence expanded.

Any project that restores the authority of the state and links it to a network of economic interests therefore poses a direct threat to the Iranian model. Tehran and its allies will naturally regard such projects with hostility. Every barrel of oil exported through the Mediterranean instead of Hormuz diminishes Iran's strategic leverage, every route through Iraq and Syria that escapes militia control weakens Tehran's capacity for coercion, and every new port, pumping station, and electricity grid erodes the logic of war through which Iran and its "axis" have entrenched their influence.

Interconnected project

Oil pipelines alone will not end Iranian influence and alternative projects will not proceed without difficulty, because the infrastructure is dilapidated and the areas through which the routes will pass remain vulnerable to attacks by Islamic State and other armed groups. Reconstruction costs may run into billions of dollars. Against this backdrop, the timing of Iran's attacks against the Gulf states, Jordan, and Syria appears significant, as they develop alternatives to Hormuz.

Tehran understands that the contest now concerns more than military influence; it concerns the shape of the region itself. Will the Middle East remain a web of militias and smuggling routes, or will it become a network of energy, trade and shared interests? In short, the confrontation today is larger than a contest between a pipeline and a missile. Two models are competing for the region's future. One crosses borders with militias, the other crosses them with pipelines, energy, trade, and investment.

Should the new project succeed, the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline will represent far more than a route for oil; it will mark the dividing line between an old Middle East shaped by war, and a new one that shared interests are striving to build by crossing borders, not violating them.

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