It is no longer a secret that US President Donald Trump proposed that Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa send his troops into Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah, after Israeli attacks seemed like scuppering the US-Iran ceasefire talks. The proposal was made behind closed doors but became public, as did al-Sharaa’s answer: the ‘new’ Syria has no intention of interfering in Lebanon.
Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani was dispatched to meet the Lebanese and carry a message of reassurance that Damascus did not want to reclaim its past role. Syrian troops once occupied their smaller neighbour for decades, finally leaving in 2005. People would be forgiven for thinking that this was history repeating itself, after American talk of disarming Hezbollah, a framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel, an Israeli military presence in the south, and a Lebanese debate about armed non-state actors and the role of the state. Yet this is not a repetition.
A different time
A look back to the 1980s shows two episodes that seem, at first sight, to resemble today’s situation. The first began with the assassination of Bashir Gemayel in 1982, after he had been elected Lebanese president after talks with Israel, particularly with military leaders Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon. He was succeeded by his brother, Amin Gemayel, who sought to reassure Syria’s then president, Hafez al-Assad, while continuing negotiations with Israel. Those negotiations culminated in the signing of the 17 May Agreement in 1983. Assad did more than reject the agreement. Working through his Lebanese allies, he undermined it until it was merely ink on paper.
The second episode is less known, but no less revealing. In early 1987, clashes erupted between Assad’s forces and Hezbollah at the Fathallah barracks, while tensions between Syria and Iran were particularly strained. In March of that year, a meeting between Assad’s deputy Abdul Halim Khaddam and the Iranian ambassador turned into a sharp confrontation, Khaddam accusing Hezbollah of collaboration and treason.
A few months later, two American messages reached Damascus. The first was from Secretary of State George Shultz to Khaddam, the second from President Ronald Reagan to Assad. Both said the same thing: the US would support Damascus if it chose to seize the moment and eliminate Hezbollah, and other organisations that Washington deemed to be terrorist outfits. Assad did not act, however, and left the matter to the “war of brothers” between the two Shi’ite organisations, Amal and Hezbollah. This allowed him to maintain relations with both Washington and Tehran.
New realities
Today, much has changed in Syria, Lebanon, the region, and the world. There is a US-facilitated Lebanese-Israeli framework agreement governing the terms of an Israeli withdrawal; Washington is openly speaking of disarming Hezbollah; Israel is applying military and political pressure from a position of strength; the Assad regime has come to an end; and Syria and Iran are no longer allies.
