Israel’s election on 27 October promises to be different to other recent votes in that it could bring to an end the longest political era in the country’s history, just as America’s priorities seem to be changing. More than simply deciding the next Israeli prime minister, the vote may determine the Middle East’s ability to move beyond war and begin building a new regional order.
Opinion polls suggest that the ruling Likud party will still be the country’s largest, but that does not mean that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (from Likud) will be able to form a government. The decisive issue is whether his political camp can secure the 61 seats required for a parliamentary majority. If it does not, the consequences could reach far beyond Israel.
Gradual divergence
In the aftermath of the 7 October 2023 attacks, American and Israeli objectives largely converged around confronting Hamas and weakening Iran and its proxies. Nearly three years later, however, the priorities of the two allies have begun to diverge. The Trump administration believes that military gains should now be converted into a new set of regional arrangements, whereas Netanyahu treats war as the permanent framework for managing the region.
This divergence helps explain the growing friction between Washington and Tel Aviv across several fronts. In Lebanon, the White House wants to consolidate the ceasefire, strengthen state institutions (including the Lebanese army), secure an Israeli withdrawal from the south, and disarm Hezbollah. Netanyahu’s government, meanwhile, wants to preserve its freedom of military action, so it repeatedly shifts its priorities.
In Syria, Trump is happy for the new government to take its seat around the regional table and has encouraged investment. He wants to help rebuild state institutions and is in favour of an Israeli withdrawal from southern Syria, ideally with a security arrangement in place between Damascus and Tel Aviv. In contrast, Netanyahu’s government continues its military operations there and makes onerous demands.
In Gaza, Washington wants a formula to end the war and commence reconstruction under the ‘Trump Plan,’ but Tel Aviv wants to delay that transition and refuses to withdraw from the strip, of which it now occupies around 60%.
Different visions
These disagreements extend beyond tactics; they reflect different understandings of the phase that lies ahead. The White House wants to build a new network of partnerships and alliances, alongside energy and transport corridors linking the Gulf and Iraq with Syria, Jordan, Türkiye, and the Mediterranean. It also seeks to reshape the regional balance following the decline of Iranian influence.
Netanyahu, however, continues to believe that the security environment does not yet permit a transition from war to settlement. Israel’s election therefore carries significance far beyond the country’s borders. If Washington wants a partner in Tel Aviv that can negotiate political settlements, it will continue to diverge from Netanyahu’s alliance of strictly Orthodox and religious Zionist parties.
