Iran's regime may not be falling, but it is fading

Tehran’s elite have few friends, but regional states fear the consequences of a disorderly transition. If Iran’s 92 million people turn on one another, it could cause millions to flee abroad.

Iran's regime may not be falling, but it is fading

Almost no one would shed a tear if Iran’s theocratic, autocratic regime were to fall following the nationwide January 2026 protests, but most are uneasy at the thought of foreign military intervention to force that result, and few think there is a clear, popular alternative if the ayatollahs’ edifice were to topple.

There has been a sense of déjà vu to the glimpsed footage of mass demonstrations to have emerged from the Islamic Republic in recent days, smuggled out after Iranian authorities implemented a blanket internet shutdown. Iranians have taken to the streets with increasing regularity, most notably in 2019 and 2022. This time, the principal driver was the acute economic hardships.

As a result, the January 2026 outpouring was not led by any one ethnic or ideological group. It was telling that Tehran bazaar merchants were part of it. Generally considered sympathetic to the regime, they have stayed away from previous protests. This will not have gone unnoticed by those in power, but the cross-cutting extent of Iranians’ grievances does not appear to have been enough to cause the system to unravel.

Blackouts and carnage

As with Iran’s other recent convulsions of anger, these protests—that began at the end of December—were met with violence and brutality by the government’s various security branches. Thousands have been killed, more than 10,000 detained, and thousands more injured. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and the loyalist militia known as Basij have been central to suppressing the protests. The internet blackout has led to an information blackout. The true extent of the carnage may never be known.

The Iranian regime attributes the crisis to foreign intervention to destabilise Iran. It blames international sanctions for having a significant detrimental impact on the economy. While quick to blame others, authorities do not acknowledge that these sanctions were imposed because of Iran’s choices, whether this be to pursue a nuclear weapon or to equip and train armed militias around the Middle East.

Sanctions have clearly had an effect. In January 2025, inflation in Iran was high, at 31%, but rose throughout the year, peaking at 48% in October, before falling slightly to 42% in December. Faced with throttled trade and steep costs, Iranians are exasperated. The Iranian rial has lost 64% of its value over the past six months, pension payments have been delayed, poverty is increasing, and opportunities are few.

To add to the misery, air pollution in cities is getting worse, drought has hit agriculture, but those with regime links are growing richer. Corruption is rampant. Still, the Iranian power structure continues to empty the nation’s coffers, pouring what money it has left into the pursuit of its military and nuclear infrastructure, despite both having been badly damaged from Israeli and American airstrikes in June 2025.

Although Tehran's policies have earned it few friends in recent decades, the fear of regional instability has led to calls for caution

Exodus fears

Events need to be seen in a broader context of changes across the Middle East. Although Tehran's policies have earned it few friends in recent decades, the fear of regional instability has led to calls for caution. It is now understood that Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar lobbied the White House against military strikes.

Iran has an estimated population of 92 million, so neighbours fear an influx of refugees. The effects of the Syrian civil war and the exodus it triggered are ongoing. In 2011, Syria's population was around 21 million, so the impact of something similar in Iran could be far more significant.

Although they have not said so, it is likely that the US and Israel are offering practical yet indirect support to the Iranian protesters. Both Washington and Tel Aviv would like to see a change in Iran's governance. The country sits on east-west trade routes and has some of the world's largest proven oil and gas reserves.

Venezuela's oil reserves were a key factor in US President Donald Trump's decision to remove the country's president in a military operation, but Iran is far better defended than Venezuela. Iranian resistance would likely lead to the kind of extended conflict in the Middle East that Trump repeatedly told American voters that he would avoid.

Neighbouring states know that any conflict would quickly spill across borders. Speaking to Reuters, a senior Iranian official said that if the US struck Iran, then Iran would attack US interests in the region, which led Washington to withdraw some personnel from its Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

Like other states in the region, Türkiye believes that military intervention in Iran would have negative consequences

Geopolitical considerations

Türkiye is concerned. Ankara and Tehran have economic and social relations, but they are also regional competitors in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. In Syria, they have different and competing interests. Whereas Iran backed former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, Türkiye backs the new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, whose forces overthrew al-Assad in December 2024.

Like others, Türkiye believes that military intervention in Iran would have negative consequences. It fears disruptions in energy flows and a new wave of mass migration from Iran, where there is a large Kurdish minority. It is also concerned that any new Iranian regime may be an ally of Israel's. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan suggested foreign manipulation of the situation, mentioning Israel by name. "Israel will not get the outcome it expects," he said.

Fidan is in regular contact with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and regional US envoy Tom Barack. Ankara urges calm, outlining the possible repercussions of fragmentation and breakdown in Iran. Yet although reform within Iran remains a possibility, it is hard to imagine the regime accepting changes that would likely bring their rule to an end.

The Iranian opposition is brave and determined but disparate, lacking unity or cohesiveness. As such, there is no one figure or party for opponents of the Iranian regime to rally behind. Some have called for the crowning of Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran's last shah who has been living in the United States, but most Iranians do not want to replace the current rulers with the descendant of a despised dynastic system overthrown almost half a century ago.

Iran's future is unlikely to be determined in the coming days, not least because the brutality of the authorities' crackdown appears to have had the desired effect. But with every wave of violence against protesters at the hands of the state, those in power only add to the levels of resentment. With all that is happening, the regime is fading, with little chance of recovery, but its eventual fall may not be immediate.

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