Emerging Kurdish divisions threaten Syria’s peace

A tenuous ceasefire between Damascus and the SDF holds, but PKK hardliners in Qandil want to continue the fight

Emerging Kurdish divisions threaten Syria’s peace

The Syrian army's operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), launched in Aleppo in the first week of January, upended Syria’s political and security landscape and map. The Kurdish group now finds itself squeezed into a part of Hasakah province, after having been driven out of Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. It has also been forced to sign the Ceasefire and Full Integration Agreement on 18 January, after dragging its feet to implement a 10 March 2025 agreement requiring it to integrate its forces into the Syrian army.

After a spate of fierce fighting, a four-day ceasefire was declared on 20 January, following a meeting between Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi in Damascus. The SDF is now reviewing the proposals put forth at that meeting and will give its response in two days.

Those who follow events in Syria closely understand that developments there have implications for the entire region and the concept of a ‘new Middle East’. They also know that the influence of external actors—with Türkiye, the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia among the most important and with the US playing a central role—plays a key role in determining Syria's future.

Despite several misgivings, the SDF is most likely to respond positively. But if the SDF rejects the agreement, fighting will resume, which would negatively impact the surrounding countries with Kurdish populations. Renewed hostilities would result in all sides sustaining heavier casualties. At the moment, the ceasefire holds. But it is tenuous, with pockets of fighting continuing in different areas.

Emerging differences

This can be attributed to emerging differences within the ranks of the SDF, YPG, and PKK. Abdi is seen as more realistic and malleable to Washington’s demands. However, groups under the influence of PKK cadres in Qandil have taken a hardline stance in favour of continuing the fight.

Differences have emerged in Kurdish ranks. Abdi's SDF is seen as more malleable to US demands, while the PKK has taken a more hardline stance.

For his part, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who has been in Turkish prison since 1999, described the events in Syria as an attempt to undermine the peace process in Türkiye and accused cadres in Qandil of disregarding his guidance.

Ankara wants to eliminate the PKK in Türkiye, Syria and everywhere else. For his part, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—who has long stated that his fight is with the PKK, not the Kurds—reiterated his position this week. Meanwhile, prominent Iraqi Kurdish politician Masoud Barzani made a striking statement, accusing the PKK of becoming "a burden on the Kurds."

A devil in the details?

Going forward, both sides of the aisle will be going over the integration agreement with a fine-tooth comb, looking for hidden landmines and any devils in the details. Several documents issued over the last two to three weeks include very sensitive issues and clauses that could be open to interpretation during implementation.

For instance, Article 4 of the integration agreement refers to "considering the special case of Kurdish areas".  To this end, the Syrian government will need to make arrangements that allow Kurds to exercise their cultural and linguistic rights, as stipulated in Decree No. 13, signed by al-Shaara last week.

Prominent Iraqi Kurdish politician Masoud Barzani made a striking statement, accusing the PKK of becoming "a burden on the Kurds"

It remains to be seen what kind of formulation could be worked out under the circumstances, where even in the Hasakah province, where the Kurdish population is primarily concentrated, they still constitute only about 30% of the population.

The other important test will be how the Druze and Alawites will react to the agreement with the Kurds. They are very likely to demand that the privileges granted to the Kurds be extended to them as well. Whether these privileges will be enshrined in the new constitution is also an important issue to be addressed, and if so, how?

Down, but not out

It should be noted that despite serious setbacks and defeats, the SDF has not disappeared. Even though Washington has now sided with Syria as an ally against the Islamic State (IS) and a partner to Erdoğan, it will still want to keep the SDF in reserve. Brokering an agreement granting special rights to the Syrian Kurds and integrating SDF units into the Syrian army could be seen by some as a way to preserve its structure. This is something that Ankara does not want.

If things go smoothly, a relative peace can take hold, giving the new Syrian government the space to focus on rebuilding the country, establishing a political system to navigate the transition period, and attracting much-needed foreign investment.

The alternative is more pain and suffering for all.

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