Would a US strike on Iran hurt or help protesters?

A welcome distraction?

But whether it's symbolic or more painful, a US strike could embolden the protestors and distract the regime, forcing it to channel some of its attention and resources away from the streets and toward addressing outside threats. All Trump has to do is shoot to cause panic inside the regime. Khamenei won't know if it's a one-off or an extensive campaign, which could lead some Iranian officials to reconsider their loyalties to save themselves. Cracks from within could happen.

It would be incredibly hard for the regime to deal with two foes simultaneously while maintaining internal cohesion and preventing defections. If the strike can reduce the means of repression in the hands of the regime—by eliminating personnel in the Basij and destroying security capacities across the country— the protestors can keep up their activities, perhaps with fewer risks to their lives.

But let's also not rule out the scenario of a strike being irrelevant to the course of the uprising, neither harming nor supporting the protestors. After all, no factor is more consequential to this regime-protestor showdown right now than dynamics on the ground, in every province, every neighbourhood, and every street. 

Trump's threats should be taken seriously, but Iran is not Venezuela—it's a nation of 90 million people with a resilient regime that can still wreak havoc both at home and abroad. Decapitating the Maduro regime is one thing. Decapitating the theocracy in Tehran is another. Does Trump, who has championed an America-First foreign policy, have the appetite to launch what could be an open-ended war against Iran or deal with what most probably will be a messy day after?

The Iranian regime can say all it wants that it is ready to respond to any US attack, but it knows very well that the real existential threat is internal. That should be the top priority, not a confrontation with an unpredictable Trump or a trigger-happy Israel.

Non-kinetic options

Trump is currently weighing his options. Many of his advisors are recommending non-kinetic action for the time being, including cyber operations, harsher economic punishment, and providing the protestors with means of communication, including Starlink (the regime has shut down the internet in the country).

I suspect that the most important consideration for Trump will be personal—i.e., how a strike, if it succeeds or fails, will affect perceptions of him both at home and abroad. That's not necessarily unique to Trump. Every president contemplating military action in a foreign crisis thinks about the political implications both internally and externally. But there's something a little extra about Trump, where the personal overshadows almost everything else. He wants to be seen as a successful peacemaker and dealmaker, someone who has been robbed of a Nobel Peace Prize.

By issuing multiple warnings against the regime, he has essentially cornered himself. To stay credible, he must attack. And I doubt the regime will stop using violence. If anything, it will kill more protestors.

What happens on the ground in Iran in the next few days and weeks could also tip the balance for Trump, one way or another. If the protest movement continues to grow and regime defections start to happen, Trump might find it more appealing to strike. If the regime gains the upper hand and the protests start to fizzle, he might hold fire, at least until domestic circumstances become more favourable.