In US-Iran war, willpower could trump firepower

Washington and Tel Aviv may think the key to ending Iran’s regime is to kill its missile bank and capabilities, but sometimes strategy matters more than hardware

An Iranian military truck carries surface-to-air missiles past a portrait of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during a parade on the occasion of the country's annual army day on 18 April 2018, in Tehran.
ATTA KENARE / AFP
An Iranian military truck carries surface-to-air missiles past a portrait of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during a parade on the occasion of the country's annual army day on 18 April 2018, in Tehran.

In US-Iran war, willpower could trump firepower

Missiles and drones are core elements of Iran’s military power. The country has relied on them heavily and almost exclusively in its fight against the US and Israel. The Iranian air force can’t be trusted because it has antiquated equipment dating to the Shah era, and while the Iranian navy has some capabilities, it doesn’t stand a chance against its American counterpart.

So, it’s understandable why many have argued that if only Iran’s opponents could force it to run out of those weapons, it would fall. That is, of course, if those opponents don’t run out of interceptors first. But this missile race argument is misleading. This isn't merely a numbers game, but rather a contest of wills and opposing strategies. The side whose strategy outperforms the other's is more likely to win.

The United States is employing a shock-and-awe strategy, seeking swift and decisive outcomes culminating in regime change (either toppling the leadership altogether or keeping some officials who are more compromising). In contrast, Iran wants to geographically expand and prolong the conflict in order to exact a high-enough political and economic price on its adversaries and force them to discontinue military operations.

It is within this strategic and political context that one should scrutinise weapons inventories and usage on both sides. Even though Iran has one of the largest missile and drone arsenals in the world, and an ability to produce more, it is not about to exhaust it by firing in great numbers every day to survive— its top priority. Dispersion, tempo conservation, precision, and lethality trump volume.

A single missile hitting a Gulf oil field, an American consulate, or an Israeli urban centre is far more useful and politically consequential than dozens landing at sea or in the desert. And the Iranians have enough precise and hard-to-intercept missiles and drones to hit such targets, and they have already.

REUTERS/Moshe Mizrahi
A drone photo shows the damage to residential homes at the impact site following a missile attack from Iran on Israel, in Tel Aviv on 16 June 2025.

US-Israeli approach

The US-Israeli approach obviously isn’t limited to waiting out Iran’s missile and drone attacks. US and Israeli fighter jets, along with US bombers and warships, are going on the offensive and striking as many Iranian launchers and arms production facilities as they can find. The intent is to deny Iran the ability to launch those missiles in the first place and manufacture more.

Assessments of the current status of Iran’s launchers and production capacity have varied—and let’s face it, both sides will have every interest in lying and inflating numbers to suit their goals. President Donald Trump claimed that the Iranians are “running out and they’re running out of areas to shoot them, because they’re being decimated; they’re running out of launchers.” He added: “We have unlimited amounts of middle- and upper-middle ammunition and things. We save it, and we build it.”

Iran is using cheaper and shorter-range missiles and drones to try to overwhelm missile defence systems to pave the way for more lethal strikes

His military advisors were more nuanced but essentially agreed. Israel, for its part, has struck hundreds of Iranian missile launchers, some carrying sophisticated and long-range missiles like the Ghadr missile. Iran has denied all US and Israeli claims, saying that it is able to sustain its war effort. Whether that's true will depend on several variables beyond Iran's stockpile size.

Iran's strategy

First, Iran is adjusting its Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) in accordance with its strategy. It is leveraging cheaper and shorter-range missiles and drones to try to overwhelm and confuse air and missile defence systems in Israel and the Gulf and pave the way for follow-on strikes using more lethal missiles. The Shahed drones and hypersonic missiles are proving to be the most difficult to intercept so far, given their flight trajectories (slow, low altitude for the Shaheds) and speeds (the hypersonics).

Second, Iran is also banking on financial cost, reducing the political appetite of its adversaries to keep going. They spend billions to try to intercept Iranian missiles and drones, which cost Tehran a whole lot less to make. Straining the economies of its opponents is part and parcel of Iran's strategy. Of course, Iran's more advanced missiles are more expensive, and it has fewer of them, but that's why it is very careful about how and where it uses them.

CENTCOM / AFP
Long-range Precision Strike Missiles (PrSMs) used by the US in combat during "Operation Epic Fury".

Third is the potential involvement of external powers, which could affect the war's military dynamics. If the UK, France, and Germany join the United States and Israel in the effort to destroy Iran's military capacities, Tehran might not last as long as it wishes. Already, the leaders of these NATO powers have issued a joint statement saying that they are considering strikes  "to destroy Iran's capability to fire missiles and drones at their source." The Gulf states might become active participants as well if Iran intensifies its strikes against them, and they possess considerable air power capabilities.

But China and Russia could also get involved and support Iran. Russia, in particular, would love to bleed the US as Washington has in Moscow's war against Ukraine. China is especially nervous about regional instability affecting its oil imports, but keeping the United States distracted and potentially exhausted from another war in the Middle East is also strategically beneficial.

The fate of this war will be determined by numerous military, economic, political, and psychological factors that go well beyond weapons inventories. Combat power in war is indispensable, of course, but political considerations and tolerance for economic pain and human casualties, especially in democracies, are more powerful forces.

font change