Politics

Going where? Sudan's illusory new 'Government of Peace'

The formation of a parallel government in Sudan is not the beginning of a solution, but the deepening of a moral and political crisis

Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

A child looks outside from a train window as Sudanese families displaced by conflict return home voluntarily from Egypt to Sudan, on a special train, Cairo July 21, 2025.

Going where? Sudan's illusory new 'Government of Peace'

Amjed Farid

last update on 03 Aug 2025

On 26 July, Sudan’s ‘Ta’asis’ alliance, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), announced the formation of a parallel government to that led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, referred to this parallel government as the ‘Government of Peace’.

The newly declared body consists of a 15-member presidential council chaired by Hemedti, with Abdelaziz al-Hilu, leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, as his deputy. The council includes symbolic governors for Sudan’s various regions—even those beyond the RSF’s current control, which remains confined to parts of Darfur and Kordofan. Mohammed Hassan al-Ta’ayishi, a former member of the Sovereign Council, was appointed head of the Council of Ministers, while retired Major General Fadlallah Burma Nasser, leader of a faction of the Umma Party, was named head of the Legislative Council.

This announcement followed fierce internal disputes within the alliance over the allocation of positions and shares in what many view as a virtual government—reminiscent of what the Andalusian poet, Abu al-Baqa ar-Rundi, once called “titles of a kingdom misplaced.”

The declaration appeared hastily timed, seemingly intended to preempt the meeting of the Quadripartite Group—comprising the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE—on 30 July to discuss the Sudanese crisis. It seems the alliance’s leaders temporarily set aside their disagreements in order to rush the announcement, hoping to secure mention on the meeting’s agenda, gain recognition, or achieve parity with the official government based in Port Sudan.

Government of Peace

Some political forces aligned with the RSF have begun referring to the ‘Nyala government’ in contrast to the ‘Port Sudan government’. Within this framework, Siddiq Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, secretary-general of the ‘Sumoud’ alliance led by former prime minister Abdalla Hamdok, expressed his coalition’s openness to dialogue with the Ta’asis alliance following its announcement, framing it as part of their broader vision for achieving peace and preserving Sudan’s unity.

Mohamed Nureldin / Reuters — Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (aka Hemedti) at a press conference at Rapid Support Forces headquarters in Khartoum, Sudan February 19, 2023.

The formation of this parallel government appears intended to recast the external support and sustained military assistance provided by certain regional actors to the RSF in a more politically acceptable guise. Such support has become a source of widespread controversy, placing the backing states in an increasingly precarious position on the global stage, particularly as they are seen to be arming a militia widely accused of committing atrocities, war crimes, and acts of genocide—charges officially recognised by the US government.

By adopting the formal trappings of a government, the RSF and its patrons aim to mitigate the political, diplomatic, and ethical fallout confronting these regional allies. These states, still actively supplying the militia with arms despite international censure, have faced mounting criticism through UN reports and global media investigations. Their involvement has significantly damaged their reputations—despite considerable investments in soft power and global branding—undermined by their complicity in the atrocities enabled by the RSF in Sudan’s protracted conflict.

Seen in this light, the establishment of the so-called ‘Government of Peace’ serves as a strategic move to lend an air of legitimacy to this ongoing support. It allows backing states to reframe their actions in international arenas such as the UN or the African Union, claiming to support a ‘government’ working towards peace and stability, rather than merely an armed faction implicated in mass violence.

Osman Bakir/Anadolu via Getty Images — A view from the frontline clashes between the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Khartoum, Sudan, on 27 December 2024.

The declaration of this parallel government also aims to rebrand the RSF as a structured political entity with a vision for governance, distancing it from its well-established reputation as a destabilising armed group. The architects of this shadow administration have sought to promote it through promises of service delivery in the areas under their control.

Whitewashing violence

Yet, the reality starkly contrasts with these claims: the RSF has demonstrably failed to establish any credible form of governance in the territories it occupies.

When the RSF seized control of Khartoum State, the result was a descent into chaos and unrestrained violence. Thousands of civilians were killed or displaced, homes were invaded and looted, and an unprecedented wave of sexual violence and rape was unleashed. Civilian infrastructure—ranging from water and electricity facilities to hospitals—was systematically destroyed. The looting and devastation of the National Museum, resulting in the loss of cultural artefacts representing over seven thousand years of history, stands as a tragic symbol of this rampage.

These atrocities extended far beyond the capital. In Al-Jazirah State, similar horrors unfolded during the RSF occupation, including massacres in villages such as Al-Sariha and Wad Al-Noura, accompanied by looting, rape, and forced displacement. In Darfur, cities like Nyala, Zalingei, and El Daein remain mired in systematic sexual violence, repeated assaults, and armed robberies perpetrated by RSF elements.

The formation of this parallel government appears intended to recast the external support and military assistance to the RSF in a more politically acceptable guise

One of the most heinous acts of the conflict occurred in May and June 2023, when the RSF carried out the Masalit massacre in Geneina and Ardamata, West Darfur, resulting in the deaths of approximately 15,000 civilians over the span of a few days.

Beyond whitewashing its violent record, the proclamation of the parallel government is also a strategic manoeuvre to reshape the framing of the Sudanese conflict in a way that benefits the RSF and the Ta'asis alliance. It seeks to reclassify the RSF from a militia fighting the regular army to a political entity with a functioning governance structure and an articulated political agenda. This reframing serves to obscure the conflict's nature and provide regional and international actors with a pretext to engage with the 'RSF government' as a legitimate political stakeholder, rather than treating it as a mere armed group.

Deepening divisions

Such symbolism carries significant weight. By recasting the war as a contest between two 'governments', the RSF gains an aura of legitimacy that may allow it to enter future negotiations on an equal footing with the official government—particularly under mounting international pressure for a comprehensive political settlement.

Khalid Abdelaziz / Reuters — Smoke rising from a fuel depot in Port Sudan, Sudan, on May 6, 2025.

Additionally, the formation of this parallel government reflects a deliberate attempt to exacerbate and capitalise on Sudan's deepening political and social divisions. The announcement has already sown discord within the 'Tagadum' alliance, leading to fractures within its constituent parties.

The Umma Party, for instance, has splintered: one faction led by its official leader has assumed the presidency of the RSF government's Legislative Council, while other factions have distanced themselves. Likewise, a breakaway group from the Sudanese Congress Party—calling itself the 'Federal Sudanese Congress'—has declared its defection and alignment with the RSF camp.

This deepening polarisation is accelerating the fragmentation of Sudan's political landscape, further entrenching geographic and ideological divisions and paving the way for broader internal disintegration.

Undermining the state

When viewed in its proper context, the 'RSF government' cannot be regarded as a genuine political initiative aimed at resolving Sudan's crisis, nor does it represent any natural step toward rebuilding or revitalising the state. Rather, it stands as a stark manifestation of the RSF and its allies' intent to dismantle the very concept of statehood itself—where authority stems not from popular legitimacy, effective governance, or a shared national vision, but from armed dominance and the pursuit of external agendas, reinforced by direct regional backing.

AFP via Getty Images — People cheer members of Sudan's armed forces taking part in a military parade held on Army Day in Gadaref on 14 August 2024.

This is not the beginning of a solution, but the deepening of a moral and political crisis—one that implicates both domestic and international actors. Labelling a group responsible for genocide, sexual violence, and widespread looting as a 'government' does nothing to change its fundamental nature. It merely expands the scale of the crime, transforming it from the actions of an outlaw militia into those of an organised criminal enterprise masquerading as a government cloaked in the language of 'peace'.

In this context, the very principles of politics are upended, legitimacy is hollowed out, and the distinction between the possible and the permissible dissolves. This erosion is exemplified by the conduct of political forces that have aligned themselves fully with the RSF—chief among them, the Sumoud alliance. Despite its formal rejection of the RSF-led parallel government, Sumoud has openly expressed willingness to engage with members of the Ta'asis alliance, many of whom were formerly its partners in the Tagadum coalition. Yet, this same alliance vociferously denounces any engagement with the recognised Sudanese government, coupling its stance with an unrelenting stream of accusations and vilification.

This glaring contradiction lays bare Sumoud's role in legitimising a narrative that undermines the state and paves the way for what can only be described as the emergence of a 'Janjaweed Kademool Republic'.

Act of political theatre

At its core, the declaration of this parallel government is an attempt to redefine truth itself—an effort to shroud criminality in the appearance of governance. It represents a tragic Sudanese paradox, exposing the collapse of values and sovereignty among segments of the political elite, who cloak themselves in moralistic rhetoric even as their narratives deepen the wounds of the nation.

Amr Abdallah Dalsh / Reuters — A Sudanese man waits as families displaced by conflict crowd at Cairo's main station to board a free train with a voluntary return to Aswan, where buses will take them back to their homes in Khartoum, on July 28, 2025.

The gravest danger lies not merely in the existence of this government, but in the growing willingness to treat it as a legitimate political entity. This normalisation entrenches the principle of might over right, legitimising the supremacy of arms over the rule of law. If this narrative continues unchecked, Sudan will slide further into fragmentation, with the militia model—and the rule of the jungle exemplified by the RSF—becoming the de facto substitute for state authority in every region it occupies.

Therefore, the responsibility of Sudanese political and civil society actors, along with the international community, extends well beyond rejecting this symbolic formation. It demands a confrontation with the core of the conflict—based on fact, not evasive rhetoric or convenient misrepresentations. Restoring the primacy of the civilian state necessitates a clear-eyed recognition of reality, unvarnished and unfiltered by political aspiration or external interests.

The Sudanese people, who have seen the horrors of RSF rule with their own eyes and lived through its brutality, will not be deceived by political theatre.

What Sudan requires is not a new government in name, but the dismantling of militia power structures and the protection of what remains of the state. True state-building must be rooted in justice, accountability, inclusive participation, and the safeguarding of all citizens—not in formal declarations or diplomatic façades designed to obscure deeper truths.

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