An Egypt-Iran alliance? Not likely, and here’s why

Apart from being an indispensable source of national income, the Suez Canal is core to Egypt's geostrategic relevance, and has been largely bypassed for 18 months, since the Houthis began attacking Canal-bound ships in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. Yet contrary to some expectations, Egypt has not taken part in any military action against the Houthis.

Of all the states in the region, it probably has the most to gain from the Houthis ending their attacks, but instead, Cairo has simply said it is Israel's responsibility, given that it is the one bombing Gaza. The Houthis suspended their attacks on ships after Hamas and Israel signed a ceasefire and a prisoner/hostage exchange deal in January this year, but within weeks, Israel unilaterally ended the truce.

Incapable of influence

Egypt has tried to relay its concerns to the Iranians more than once, hoping they could sway the Yemeni militia to end its maritime blockade, but in Cairo on 2 June, Aragchi maintained that Iran wasn't able to stop Red Sea attacks. True, Iran supported the Houthis, he said at a press briefing with his Egyptian counterpart, Badr Abdelatty, but the Yemeni group takes its own decisions.

Egypt was waiting for a clue from the Iranians as to a policy shift, or a favour returned, but none came. This may reflect Iran's position, standing virtually alone in the field, given that most of its proxies have been weakened by Israel and the United States in recent months.

If it fails to reach a compromise solution over its nuclear programme, Tehran now faces the very real risk of military action against it, given that its first line of defence—its proxies, such as Hezbollah and Hamas—are in no fit state to wage war on Iran's enemies, while its main ally—Bashar al-Assad's Syria—is now governed by fighters who forced Assad to flee to Russia.

Bones of contention

Iran's lack of pressure on the Houthis over their Red Sea attacks is not the only point of contention with Cairo; Iranian regional interference has long been an Egyptian bugbear. At the press briefing, Abdelatty stressed the importance of shunning non-state actors. To no one's surprise, Aragchi did not concur.

Egypt's calls for nuclear non-proliferation and a region free from weapons of mass destruction gain no agreement from Tehran, either. Although both Cairo and Tehran have reason to grumble at Tel Aviv, disagreements over such key issues undermine any notion that Egypt and Iran will become close allies anytime soon.

That said, there are areas in which the two states hope to gain. For instance, around six million Iranians travel abroad for holidays every year. Egypt aspires to attract a chunk of that action, especially as the country boasts a large number of sites of religious interest to Shiites. Likewise, Iran may view Egypt as a favourable opportunity for its investors and traders, given its vast market and strategic location as a gateway to Africa.

Whether these possible business partnerships lubricate bilateral relations towards a wider normalisation by effecting a change in Iranian policy, only time will tell.