Lifting the veil on secret US-Assad talks

In August 2020, towards the end of Trump's first term, US envoy Stephen Gillen reached out to Syria's Ambassador to the UN Bassam Sabbagh, who relayed it to Damascus. Al-Assad instructed Sabbagh to meet Gillen but merely listen, offering "no official position whatsoever".

During the meeting, Gillen surprised Sabbagh by revealing that his boss, Roger Carstens, had offered to secretly visit Damascus to meet Mamlouk, with the aim of seeking Syrian cooperation in finding Tice, who was believed to have fallen into regime custody after entering Syria via Idlib from Türkiye.

Visiting Damascus

Carstens and Kash Patel (presidential advisor and senior director for counterterrorism) visited Damascus under the radar in August 2020, where they met Mamlouk. It was the fourth such trip in recent years. The Americans emphasised the importance of Syrian cooperation on the issue of American detainees and said constructive engagement would have a positive impact on bilateral relations.

According to a Western official, they told Mamlouk that if new information emerged regarding Tice, Pompeo may visit Damascus and even issue significant political declarations. But the official described Mamlouk as "powerless", adding: "The instructions from Assad were explicit and inflexible: 'We know nothing about Austin Tice, and he is not in our custody.'"

Another source described the visit as "no trivial matter," saying: "Had al-Assad had the necessary foresight, he could have capitalised on it to build bridges and establish a communication channel with the Trump administration. Instead, he squandered this extraordinary opportunity, as he had so many others, while Syria sank deeper into crisis."

Maj. Gen. Ibrahim told Al Majalla that, days later, he travelled to Washington on a private American jet and met senior officials, including National Security Adviser Robert O'Brien, but to his astonishment, during his visit, Trump publicly said he had considered assassinating al-Assad. Mamlouk then contacted Ibrahim in Washington, instructing him—on al-Assad's orders—to halt all talks immediately.

It followed Trump's partial withdrawal of US troops from north-eastern Syria in late 2019, which allowed Turkish-backed Syrian opposition forces to expand their control at the expense of the US-allied Syrian Democratic Forces. In Damascus, hardliners pressed for a complete American exit from Syria.

Biden's turn to try

In 2021, Maj. Gen. Ibrahim resumed his mediation efforts at the request of the United States, aiming to uncover the fate of Austin Tice. Speaking to Al Majalla, Ibrahim said: "There was a request to form a delegation to visit Syria. Austin's mother was pressing the US administration to take action. She met President Biden, who then issued a public directive to all his advisers to do everything possible to resolve the case."

What surprised Ibrahim was that "al-Assad refused to receive the American delegation". By 2022, Arab capitals were once more warming to Damascus, and Syria was reinstated to the Arab League, with al-Assad attending the Arab Summit in Jeddah in mid-2023. A source close to Damascus said the Biden administration extended a hand to Syria.

"Firstly, the United States acknowledged that its military presence around the oil and gas fields in north-eastern Syria could not be sustained indefinitely without a clear plan for withdrawal," they said. "At the same time, it required assurances that a US exit would not lead to control of the area falling into the hands of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard or Iranian-backed Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)."

The source noted that Biden was under pressure from the families of missing Americans convinced that they were being held by the regime, despite its repeated denials. Indeed, history suggested that Damascus often denied detaining foreign nationals, only to later negotiate their release—a tactic designed to maximise leverage.

In 2022, Carstens dispatched his deputy to New York to meet Syria's UN Ambassador Bassam Sabbagh. The envoy tried to persuade Sabbagh of the benefits of cooperation. Sabbagh relayed it back to Damascus, but was given a directive of "non-cooperation." Known to favour communication, Sabbagh "found al-Assad's position strange and incomprehensible," but nevertheless complied. Sabbagh was not alone in his views. Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad also felt that Syria was missing an opportunity.

Omani channel

In late 2022, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq of Oman reached out to al-Assad and discussed the Americans' desire to initiate dialogue. The Sultan felt it important to "keep the door to dialogue open, even between states with deep political differences," but al-Assad was known for his intransigence, limited strategic vision, and general hostility to any form of engagement with Washington. Still, it was difficult for him to decline a personal request from the Sultan of Oman, so reluctantly, al-Assad agreed to proceed.

A secret meeting in Muscat was suggested. Each delegation would present its own list of discussion topics, with no right of objection from the other. The Americans told the Omani mediators that their delegation would be high-level, led by Brett McGurk (Middle East Affairs), alongside Joshua Geltzer (National Security) and representatives from the State Department, the Department of Defence, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

McGurk was a senior figure in the Biden administration, enjoyed the president's full confidence, and was a frequent visitor to the Middle East, while Geltzer was a seasoned strategic and counterterrorism expert, serving as a legal adviser to both the White House and the National Security Council. Naturally, the Americans assumed that Syria would send a delegation of comparable rank.

Instead, al-Assad appointed Ambassador Imad Moustapha to lead it. He had previously been Syria's man in China and the US, and now headed the Diplomatic Institute. He was accompanied by two security officials: Brig. Gen. Samer Baridi and Brig. Gen. Majed Ibrahim. "The selection was surprising to both Muscat and Washington by every measure," a Western official remarked. "There was no parity or equivalence."

According to a Syrian document, Foreign Minister Mekdad "felt embarrassed" when told, but "found it difficult to explain to (Assad) that the composition of the Syrian delegation lacked diplomatic prudence". Moustapha felt "well-acquainted with the American mindset". Still, Mekdad "cautioned that sending a delegation headed by the director of the Diplomatic Institute, accompanied by two little-known security officers, would be seen in Washington as a clear signal of disdain… and a lack of genuine commitment".

Preparing for Muscat

Moustapha was fluent in English and understood Washington but had not held any senior Foreign Ministry or National Security position due to his non-Baathist background (unlike Syrian intelligence officer Brig. Gen. Samer Baridi, appointed by Ali Mamlouk during his tenure as Director of General Intelligence, who became one of his most trusted aides, was assigned to sensitive missions such as leading negotiations and infiltrating opposition groups.

Having heard the concerns, Moustapha proposed that the delegation instead be led by a senior figure within Syria's power structure, with him serving as the second-ranking member, but when Mekdad suggested this to al-Assad, a source confirmed that the president replied: "The delegation will be as I said, no changes." When Mekdad informed the Omanis, they were taken aback.

"The Americans were unimpressed," said one Western official. "They saw it as a sign of insincerity. Moustapha no longer held a senior official post, and the two officers were virtually unknown, perhaps included to monitor Moustapha and ensure he adhered to the regime's official line, given his reputation for occasional divergence." The Americans, via the Omanis, asked that Gen. Mamlouk lead the Syrian delegation.

Al-Assad remained true to form, replying: "We did not interfere in the composition of the American delegation. Why should they interfere in ours?" A Western official said al-Assad saw the negotiations "as a contest between two equal adversaries, but… the representation level of the Syrian delegation did not correspond to that of the American side, and Syria simply does not equate to the US in terms of global standing". Despite everything, however, the Americans agreed to proceed.

Negotiating position

Planning sessions were convened in Moustapha's office, the team drafting a list of primary objectives: regaining control of the Conoco and Al-Omar oil and gas fields, easing the sanctions, and a withdrawal of US forces, to reintegrate Syria's north-east. They also compiled a list of potential concessions: help determining the fate of missing Americans in Syria (including Austin Tice), collaboration on counterterrorism, and the resumption of intelligence cooperation.

Finished, they awaited a summons from al-Assad to present their plan and receive final instructions before Muscat, but the call never came. "We're travelling in two days and don't even know the extent of our negotiating mandate," an exasperated Moustapha reportedly told Foreign Minister Mekdad, who could offer no reassurance, since foreign policy decisions could only be taken by al-Assad, who rarely consulted.

A day before the delegation's scheduled departure, al-Assad summoned Moustapha to the palace. What transpired left him stunned. "Don't imagine that you're going to negotiate with the Americans," al-Assad reportedly told Moustapha at the opening of their meeting, according to a source familiar with the discussions. "You are to reject everything they ask. We only agreed to these talks to please our Omani brothers."

Moustapha pressed. "The main American demand in this round is Austin Tice. Why can't we at least cooperate with them on this issue?" Yet al-Assad replied curtly: "Austin Tice is not with us." Moustapha replied: "All the better. In that case, we could offer to help determine his fate and gain some bargaining leverage."

The envoy told al-Assad that the Americans "believe they have evidence suggesting he's in our custody," saying: "We could discuss that evidence and perhaps establish a basis for cooperation that could evolve into broader engagement." But al-Assad was unequivocal. "I absolutely forbid you from negotiating with the American side about Tice," he said.

'What are they saying?'

On Wednesday, 22 February 2023, the Syrian delegation gathered early at their hotel in Muscat for a final review, Moustapha noting how the other two delegates appeared to be unaware of al-Assad's specific instructions. Escorted by Omani intelligence, they were driven to a luxurious secluded villa overlooking the Arabian Sea. In a reception room, they met the Americans with handshakes.

In typical informal American style, they quickly adopted a relaxed tone, making small talk. After a brief welcome, the Omanis withdrew. No interpreters were present, and they spoke in English, in which Moustapha was fluent and Brig. Breidi had a reasonable grasp, but Brig. Ibrahim spoke no English at all. One participant noted how Brig. Breidi was recording the conversation with a small device.

McGurk emphasised the importance of cooperation over Austin Tice, suggesting that this could reshape Syrian-American relations. Geltzer and Gillen also spoke before McGurk concluded, underlining the critical nature of cooperation on Tice. One participant noted how Brig. Ibrahim would turn to Ambassador Moustapha and ask loudly, 'What are they saying?', prompting Moustapha to request that McGurk pause briefly so he could summarise in Arabic.

A female member of the American delegation from Defence Intelligence, who was fluent in Arabic, carefully noted Moustapha's translation to Ibrahim. The Americans were astonished that the head of a diplomatic delegation was asked to stop to allow for a translation aloud for a team member.

Moustapha's response recounted the history of Syrian-American relations and reflected on his previous work with CIA Director William Burns, who had closely collaborated with him during his tenure as Deputy Secretary of State. Moustapha then began discussing broader topics such as international diplomacy, the Arab-Israeli conflict, cooperation on counterterrorism, and political dynamics in the Middle East.

Elephant in the room

A Western official noted how Moustapha "never once mentioned Austin Tice" despite the Americans' "repeated insistence that he address it". The US delegation was unaware of al-Assad's instructions. "Instead, (Moustapha) chose to remain silent. Several times, Ibrahim interrupted him to ask, 'What are you saying to them?' prompting smiles from both delegations and bemusement from the Americans."

McGurk and Geltzer concluded by reiterating the urgency. "We recognise that Syria is enduring a brutal war," said McGurk, "and we understand that territorial control is constantly shifting. We know that Austin Tice fell into the hands of Syrian security forces and was detained. We also know he managed to escape, contacted us, and sent a short video message, after which he disappeared.

"Perhaps he is now in your custody, perhaps he was killed by an armed group, perhaps he died in detention amid the ebb and flow of battles between your forces and the opposition. We are not here to assign blame. We simply want to uncover his fate. That is the cooperation we seek from you."

At lunch, Moustapha was seated between McGurk and Geltzer. "The conversations were calm and friendly, covering a range of topics," recalls one participant. They asked Moustapha about the differences between his diplomatic postings in Washington and Beijing, while the female Defence Intelligence representative engaged Breidi in conversation. Ibrahim, on the other hand, focused on his meal.

"This is a classic American approach," said a source. "They analyse each negotiator's personality, trying to discern their true thoughts, unofficial positions, and whether direct channels could be opened or useful information extracted. They might even explore ways to entice cooperation with personal incentives or promises." Well acquainted with such tactics, Moustapha remained courteous but non-committal.

Unexpected offer

At 2pm, both delegations returned to the meeting room, where the Americans delivered an unexpected proposal. "We understand that your side never offers anything without receiving something in return," said McGurk. "Therefore, we present the following offer. Your regular army forces are currently stationed just a few hundred metres from our troops at the Omar and Conoco oil fields. We are prepared to withdraw from these two sites and allow you to regain control, on the condition that you cooperate with us in uncovering the fate of Austin Tice."

American withdrawal came with two conditions, he said. "First, no non-regular forces—specifically Iran's Revolutionary Guard and the PMF—may enter the vacated areas. Second, and this should go without saying: the territories must not be used as launchpads for mortar or Katyusha rocket attacks on our forces. Should that occur, we would be compelled to reoccupy the sites."

The Omani mediators considered the offer "generous." Syria was facing an acute shortage of oil, its economy had all but collapsed, and the population was enduring unprecedented levels of poverty. In effect, the Americans were offering Syria's oil wells back in exchange for cooperation on Tice. But Moustapha was under strict instructions not to negotiate on any matter.

Unaware of this, the two military officers accompanying Moustapha assumed the offer was open for discussion. One participant recalled "Moustapha telling Breidi: "I believe this is purely a military matter, and since I have no role in military or security affairs, I'll leave you to speak. I'll simply translate." Breidi promptly produced a set of maps from his bag, indicating the locations of American forces in Syria, and began marking suggested withdrawal points with a pen.

The same source said: "When he tried to approach the issue of the al-Tanf area, he was firmly told that al-Tanf was a red line, a critical location used to safeguard neighbouring countries—a veiled reference to Israel—from potential jihadi terrorist threats." The Americans took the maps, and both sides agreed to speak to their respective leaders, agreeing to reconvene in Muscat three weeks later, in March.

Private meeting

At 5:25pm that same afternoon, McGurk approached Moustapha, asking for a private conversation. They stepped onto an outdoor balcony overlooking the Gulf of Oman, two yachts in the distance. "Do you think those yachts belong to intelligence services, eavesdropping on our negotiations?" McGurk jokingly asked. "I can assure you they belong to Israeli intelligence trying to find out what's going on," replied Moustapha.

The conversation then turned serious. "I'm leaving Muscat this evening and heading directly to Tel Aviv," said McGurk. "I have a meeting tomorrow morning with (Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin) Netanyahu. What would you say to me, sounding him out about the possibility of resuming Israeli-Syrian peace talks? Reviving those talks could have a significant positive impact on members of Congress and on those within the US administration who oppose any rapprochement with Syria."

Moustapha replied: "I suggest we resolve our bilateral issues first before bringing in a third party." McGurk noted his response. "You may be right. If you cooperate with us in resolving the Austin Tice case, it could generate a new dynamic that might prompt us to consider reviving peace talks between Syria and Israel." McGurk then asked if they could exchange direct contact details via WhatsApp, giving Moustapha his number and saving Moustapha's in return.

Back in Damascus, Moustapha submitted a 20-page report to al-Assad detailing the meeting. According to a source, al-Assad was furious upon learning that Brig. Breidi had entered into discussions with the Americans about the withdrawal of US forces from the Omar and Conoco oil fields.

He was especially displeased by the exchange of personal contact information between McGurk and Moustapha. Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad later informed Moustapha that al-Assad had ordered him to delete McGurk's number and warned against any further direct contact. Moustapha complied.

Assad's tantrums

Three days after the meeting, Gillen sent a message to Syria's UN Representative Bassam Sabbagh that the US considered the Muscat talks "very good" and wished to continue them. This was fed back to al-Assad, heightening the president's suspicions of Moustapha. Al-Assad then told Mekdad that the talks had yielded no tangible results and that there was no need for a second round.

The agreed three-week period came and went, with no reconvening in Muscat. Weeks later, mortars repeatedly landed near US forces in north-eastern Syria. McGurk messaged Moustapha, warning of repercussions, and saying that they had shattered any goodwill from Muscat.

But Moustapha never saw the messages. As instructed by al-Assad, he had deleted McGurk's contact from his mobile phone, so the messages went unread and unanswered, frustrating the Americans. Al-Assad remained unconvinced that resuming talks would yield any value, so the Omanis once again dispatched a special envoy to Damascus, while the US sought to elevate the level of dialogue, believing the previous Syrian delegation lacked sufficient authority for meaningful negotiations.

Washington proposed sending US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, recommending that Gen. Ali Mamlouk lead the Syrian delegation. A well-informed source reported that "Al-Assad became increasingly irate, insisting, 'It's none of their business who heads our delegation.'"

Once again, the Sultan of Oman intervened, speaking directly to President Assad, who reluctantly agreed to dispatch the same delegation. The Americans also consented to resume the dialogue. The Syrians returned to Muscat for a second meeting with the Americans on 23 May 2023, coinciding with al-Assad's attendance at the Arab League summit in Jeddah, his first since 2012.

Delegates in Muscat privately acknowledged "that the trip was pointless, that al-Assad remained inexplicably obstinate, and that the negotiations were purely ceremonial, a gesture of courtesy to please the Omanis," as one put it.

Emiratis get involved

The second session was delayed by ten hours from its scheduled time, but finally began at 7pm, with McGurk adopting a noticeably firmer tone. "There's no point in discussing any details if you're unwilling to address the Austin Tice issue," he told Moustapha. Again, Mustafa dodged the subject, owing to his confusion and lack of insight into the true circumstances of Tice's disappearance. He only had al-Assad's categorical refusal to engage in any conversation about the matter. The meeting swiftly drew to a close.

Following the collapse of the second meeting, all channels of communication between the US and Syria were severed until January 2024, when al-Assad informed Mekdad that the United Arab Emirates had offered to mediate on behalf of the Americans. With unusual insistence, the UAE asked that Syria elevate its negotiating delegation, specifically asking for Mamlouk, Moustapha, and other senior officers for talks with Jake Sullivan, McGurk, and Geltzer.

Al-Assad told Mekdad that he had agreed to the meeting and would send a higher-level delegation, with one caveat: no Mamlouk. The Americans insisted. Angered, al-Assad told Mekdad that a new delegation would be selected, but that "we'll take our time setting a date" for a meeting in Abu Dhabi. Al-Assad then abruptly dismissed Mamlouk as head of the National Security Office, making him security adviser at the presidential palace.

In September 2024, Oman once again intervened, seeking to revive dialogue between Washington and Damascus. Around the same time, al-Assad relieved Mamlouk of all his remaining duties, giving him just a few days to vacate his office and return home.

"To this day, Mamlouk does not understand what triggered al-Assad's sudden shift in attitude toward him," said a source. Some think it was a response to the American demands. Others wonder whether it related to Mamlouk securing Palestinian passports for his family through Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Either way, his firing coincided with Israel's escalated military campaign against Hezbollah, which culminated in the assassination of its leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah.

Amid these unfolding events, al-Assad tasked Mekdad with proposing a new, higher-level negotiating team. Mekdad recommended that it be led by his newly appointed deputy, Bassam Sabbagh, with Moustapha as a key member. Sabbagh's star in the Foreign Ministry was rising (he was ultimately appointed Foreign Minister). Al-Assad approved it.

Assad's ouster

On 26 November, Sabbagh—who had just been appointed Foreign Minister—instructed Syria's UN Ambassador Qusai Al-Dahhak to engage Gillen to arrange a meeting. They were due to speak at the Syrian mission in New York on 2 December, but by then, events had taken a dramatic turn.

In Syria, the Idlib-based anti-Assad group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Ahmed Al-Sharaa, launched a military operation to seize the country and defeat Assad's army, taking the major city of Aleppo with relative ease. On 2 December, Gillen failed to appear and made no attempt to contact Al-Dahhak, a silence that effectively marked the end of the long and halting dialogue between the US and Assad's regime.

The rebels went from city to city before entering Damascus on 8 December, Assad's army melting away with little or no resistance. Five months later, Trump met Al-Sharaa in Riyadh, a landmark moment. Held under Saudi sponsorship and mediation, it culminated in a historic announcement: the cessation of US sanctions on Syria and the formal restoration of bilateral relations, prizes that al-Assad might have achieved had he not acted in the way that he did.