Trump's lifting of Syria sanctions solidifies Iran's regional defeat
It could very well boost Israel's security as well as that of everyone else in the region
Bandar AL-JALOUD / Saudi Royal Palace
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (R) watching as US President Donald Trump (C) shakes hands with Syria's interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, in Riyadh on May 14, 2025.
Trump's lifting of Syria sanctions solidifies Iran's regional defeat
While in Riyadh on 13 May, US President Trump announced that he was lifting sanctions on Syria, and then followed that up on 14 May by meeting Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, who flew quickly to Riyadh to extend his gratitude. While Trump was light on details about how the lifting of sanctions would unfold, he stated that he wanted to give Syria "a chance at greatness".
The move settled a bitter dispute within the US government, sealed a rift between the US and Israel on one side and America’s Arab, Turkish, and European allies on the other, and most important, has arguably blocked any realistic chance of Iran exploiting a weak, divided Syria to restore its “Shiite Crescent.” The historic impact of this decision, following and culminating the series of defeats Iran and its proxies have suffered, and the closing of ranks of the international community on the Middle East, cannot be overstated.
While Israel appears isolated given its aggressive approach to the al-Sharaa government (and its Turkish sponsor), cracks in its position have been appearing for some time, including deconfliction discussions with the Turks on Syria in Azerbaijan, and more positive statements by the hard-line Israeli foreign minister on Syria in recent days. But most importantly, by reducing Iran’s options in Syria, and presumably allowing the Israeli military to draw down on at least one front, Trump’s decision could boost Israel's security as well as that of everyone else in the region.
Nevertheless, there is still hard work to be done, beginning with a meeting in Türkiye this week between the US secretary of state and the Syrian foreign minister. There is no indication when the sanctions will be formally lifted by Congress, which, unlike a presidential waiver that Trump could do quickly, can take time. Initial responses from Congress to the president’s announcement have been positive, but details are important.
Meanwhile, the US still has Hay'at Tahrir al Sham (HTS), al-Sharaa’s organisation, on the terrorism list, and Syria as a whole listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. Finally, the US has not officially recognised the new al-Shaara government and the US list of demands passed in Brussels to the Syrian foreign minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, remains in discussion. The meeting of al-Shaibani and Marco Rubio on 15 May will likely focus on the status of those demands.
Trump also pressed al-Sharaa to sign the Abraham Accords and thus recognise Israel
Laundry list
They include a laundry list of security issues, requesting Damascus assist in recovering missing Americans, help resolve outstanding chemical and other weapons of mass destruction issues from the Assad regime, deal with the Islamic State (IS), both on operations, as well as with the detainees at al-Hol and other camps in the northeast, authorise US counter-terrorism military operations anywhere in Syria, and act against a long list of terrorist and militant organisations, starting with the IRGC and Hezbollah, but including various Palestinian groups long residing in Syria.
Finally, Damascus must avoid oppression against minority groups, ensure a diverse government, and weed out foreign jihadists from the senior ranks of the Syrian security forces. President Trump also pressed al-Sharaa to sign the Abraham Accords and thus recognise Israel.
By all accounts, the Syrian response so far to this fairly long set of demands has been mixed, with some already underway, and some—from formally green-lighting US military operations to removing key foreign military leaders, which present Damascus with complicated security and diplomatic issues— that still need to be worked out carefully with Washington. The Abraham Accords may be a step too far at the moment, but al-Sharaa appears interested in adopting the 1974 agreements between Syria and Israel.
And despite Trump's bold decision, there are enough details to hammer out, and enough second thoughts about al-Shaara and HTS within Trump administration ranks, to hold off on celebrations. In particular, when the dust clears from the announcement, commentators will wonder who will wind up with the most influence over the new Syrian government, its original sponsor, Türkiye, or Saudi Arabia, and now, critically, the US. And once again, Israel still has cards to play, vis-à-vis rival Türkiye, with the Druze in the south, but also perhaps now with al-Shaara.
Syrian security forces check vehicles at the entrance of the Druze town of Sahnaya, Syria, May 1, 2025.
Russia factor
Finally, there is the question of Russia. The fall of Assad was a tremendous geostrategic blow for Moscow, particularly given the fact that in 2019, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo offered Putin a compromise solution to the Syrian quagmire, which he rejected at the time.
For its part, Moscow has been talking with Damascus about retaining its bases near Latakia, and despite the wartime enmity between Russia and Syria's new rulers, both sides are pragmatic, and supposedly, the talks may bear some fruit. And apparently, various sources have indicated that neither Türkiye nor Israel are particularly interested in the Russians leaving, as both see Russia as a potential ally in Syrian politics, and both (particularly Ankara) have other important security, diplomatic, and economic interests with Moscow that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan does not want to upset over a secondary issue like Syria bases.
But now that Trump has embraced the new Syria, his position vis-à-vis the Russians will carry much weight, and could well become a pawn in the critical Ukraine negotiations Washington is strongly supporting.
Whatever the geostrategic rationale for Trump's decision, it is a huge plus for the Syrian people. Lifting sanctions will advance perhaps the most important Syria-related challenge beyond avoiding a descent into civil war and chaos: rebuilding the country.
A man looks out to the devastation while clearing rubble and debris from a house at the Yarmouk camp for Palestinian refugees south of Damascus on December 22, 2024.
$400bn price tag
The World Bank has estimated that 14 years of war have generated over $400bn in damage to infrastructure and the economy. Almost half the population has fled their homes—half of them (six million plus) as refugees to neighbouring countries and Europe. Absent the lifting, or at least the waiving of the crushing American "Caesar" sanctions, little aid will be able to flow due to fears of legal action, if not by the current, then some future, US government.
Furthermore, while they can facilitate one-time delivery of assistance and development funds, presidential waivers alone will not permit long-term investment by the international business community, which is the most important and effective way to rebuild the country. Firms need predictability, and a temporary waiver will not provide the needed level for serious financial commitments.
But finally, taken with other recent dramatic developments, not just the regional defeat of Iran, but the near destruction of IS and the recently announced dissolution of the PKK, the reintegration of Syria could open the door to a new, prosperous, peaceful Middle East.
