The drone that shattered Sahelian diplomacy

The incident is a clear signal that it's no longer business-as-usual in the Sahel. New alliances and shifting dynamics are reshaping the region.

Protesters gather in Bamako on April 12, 2025, to respond to a call from Malian youth organisations to protest "aggression by Algeria," accusing Mali of shooting down a drone belonging to its army on Malian territory.
AFP
Protesters gather in Bamako on April 12, 2025, to respond to a call from Malian youth organisations to protest "aggression by Algeria," accusing Mali of shooting down a drone belonging to its army on Malian territory.

The drone that shattered Sahelian diplomacy

At the beginning of April 2025, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) lost one of their newly acquired Turkish drones along the border with Algeria. Algerian forces shot it down, claiming it had violated Algerian airspace. What could have been a minor diplomatic spat instead escalated into a full-blown crisis, exposing deep fractures across the Sahel and highlighting Türkiye’s role in the region.

The town of Tin Zaouatine, straddling the Algeria-Mali border, became the stage for a confrontation that had long been brewing. Algerian authorities claimed the Malian drone crossed two kilometres into their airspace before being shot down. However, Bamako insisted the drone stayed in Malian territory and accused Algeria of a premeditated and hostile act—an accusation Mali had made against Algeria before.

The incident escalated into a regional crisis, with ambassadors recalled, airspace closed, and a surge of conflicting narratives in regional media, alongside protests in Bamako by angry Malians.

However, tensions surrounding Tin Zaouatine have been brewing for some time. Over the past year, the town has become a symbol of resistance for the Tuareg separatist group, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). In the summer of 2024, FLA fighters—possibly in coordination with Al-Qaeda in the Sahel region, Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)— ambushed the Russian mercenaries Wagner and FAMa forces nearby, inflicting the largest single loss Wagner has suffered in Africa.

Since then, Tin Zaouatine has become a stronghold for anti-government forces. FAMa—fearing further humiliation—now avoids entering the area, relying instead on air strikes. Even when they mobilised a large convoy with the goal of retaking the town after their humiliating loss, they retreated without engaging in any clashes, managing only to recover the bodies of fallen Wagner and FAMa fighters before withdrawing.

Seeds of mistrust

The seeds of mistrust between Mali and Algeria run deep, long before the drone incident. Algeria had played a pivotal role in brokering the 2015 Algiers Peace Accord, which was designed to end Mali's conflict with northern separatist groups that began in 2012. However, from the outset, Bamako viewed the agreement with suspicion, considering it a deal imposed under external pressure that granted significant concessions to armed factions, which many in Mali saw as undermining national sovereignty.

Even before the consecutive military coups of 2020 and 2021 by the military junta, calls for revising the agreement had already begun to emerge. The sentiment grew stronger after Mali’s military government recaptured the northern city of Kidal in November 2023, with support from Russian Wagner operatives.

Türkiye's involvement in the Sahel has often exacerbated local grievances and fuelled the cycle of violence

Recapturing a stronghold of the separatists was a decisive break with Algeria and the Algiers Accord. In January 2024, Mali eventually withdrew from the peace deal, citing both a shift in the stance of some signatory groups and Algeria's alleged manipulation of the accord to serve its own interests.

Mali's accusations against Algeria went further, accusing Algiers of harbouring representatives from groups that had once signed the peace agreement but had since evolved into terrorist factions, according to the Malian authorities. The junta's decision to distance itself from Algeria's mediation and the 2015 accord gained popular support, particularly in southern Mali, seen as a shift towards endogenous solutions and a rejection of foreign influence.

Shifting dynamics

At the same time, regional dynamics were shifting. The Sahel countries, increasingly aligned with one another, were forming a new regional bloc, the Confederation of Sahel States (AES), which included Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. These countries were drifting politically away from Algeria and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which struggled to assert its influence in the region.

The AES quickly rallied behind Mali after the Algerian downing of the drone, withdrawing their ambassadors in a unified stance. From their perspective, Algeria's actions weren't just a breach of Mali's sovereignty but an attack on the confederation itself, as outlined in the Liptako-Gourma Charter.

ECOWAS, which sought to bring the AES countries back into its fold, has opted to advocate for political and diplomatic solutions, while cautiously maintaining relations with Algeria. The situation remains delicate, with ECOWAS aware that further alienation of Algeria could have long-term repercussions.

Therefore, the drone didn't just fall but rather detonated inside this already volatile diplomatic environment marked by the ever-shifting dynamics of the Sahel.

Türkiye's creeping influence

As the traditional diplomatic order collapses, new actors are rushing to fill the vacuum, and Türkiye has been among the fastest and most determined. Ankara has expanded its presence across the Sahel, supplying Bayraktar and Akıncı drones, training local forces, and positioning itself as a critical partner for the new military regimes. It has also been deploying SADAT paramilitary advisers, many drawn from Syrian battlegrounds, into the region.

AFP
At least 1,000 pro-Turkish Syrian fighters have been sent to Niger "to protect Turkish projects and interests," says the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights war monitor.

Turkish drones have become essential to counter-insurgency operations in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. However, these operations often blur the line between insurgent and civilian, with accusations mounting of strikes against communities suspected of supporting separatists or jihadists. Rather than restoring order, Türkiye's involvement has often exacerbated local grievances and fuelled the cycle of violence.

Ethnic armed groups and jihadist factions—notably JNIM— have openly condemned Turkey's role. They see Ankara not as a neutral partner but as an enabler of authoritarianism, complicit in the repression of political dissent and civilian populations.

For Algeria, Türkiye's growing influence is possibly another source of frustration. Algiers now finds itself sidelined by a new, militarised logic it cannot easily counter. Its traditional strategy of hosting opposition figures, such as Alghabass Ag Intalla and Imam Mahmoud Dicko, in anticipation of future dialogue appears increasingly out of sync with Bamako's hardline rejection of negotiations.

Adding to this, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan paid an official visit to Algeria shortly after the drone incident. While public statements focused on shared concerns over security and counter-terrorism, the underlying subtext was about Ankara's role in the Sahel and its mediation of the tension between Mali and Algeria.

The drone incident at Tin Zaouatine will eventually fade from the headlines, as most crises do. However, it marks a turning point, a clear signal that the Sahel is no longer operating under the assumptions of the past. New alliances and dynamics are reshaping the region.

Negotiated settlements, multilateralism, and quiet diplomacy, once led largely by Algeria, are giving way to direct assertions of sovereignty, military interventions, and shifting alliances. Whether this new order will bring stability or deepen the region's turmoil remains an open question.

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