Where does Syria stand after three months of Sharaa rule?https://en.majalla.com/node/324864/politics/where-does-syria-stand-after-three-months-sharaa-rule
Where does Syria stand after three months of Sharaa rule?
If the interim government fails to deliver on promises of stability and prosperity, divisions will deepen, tensions will rise, and Syria could once again descend into violent unrest
Bakr ALKASEM / AFP
Syria's interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa signs a constitutional declaration at the presidential palace in Damascus on March 13, 2025.
Where does Syria stand after three months of Sharaa rule?
As the Syrian caretaker government has recently reached the end of its initial three-month mandate, this is an opportune time to assess where things currently stand. Under interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the caretaker government has taken key steps to advance the political transition, yet its effectiveness and approach are facing growing scrutiny.
While it has maintained relative stability, its handling of governance, the economy, and security has drawn mixed reactions. Supporters of al-Sharaa back his actions, but critics question the rushed transition, unfulfilled economic promises, deteriorating public services, and worsening security conditions.
The transition was always expected to be difficult, but the caretaker government’s failure to deliver tangible results risks fuelling renewed unrest.
Syria’s future hinges on how effectively al-Sharaa navigates these crises. His best chance at steering the country toward stability and prosperity lies in establishing a transparent, inclusive, and participatory government—one that upholds the rule of law and meets the expectations of the Syrian people.
Syria's transition was always expected to be difficult, but the caretaker government's failure to deliver tangible results risks fuelling renewed unrest
Resonating rhetoric
Al-Sharaa's rhetoric has resonated with many Syrians, offering hope for a better future. Since taking power, his actions suggest he is taking concrete steps to shift away from his controversial past. One notable decision was his choice to seek legitimacy from the revolutionary forces that led the offensive against the Assad regime rather than ruling unilaterally.
He also appointed a national conference committee, laying the groundwork for the transition. Subsequently, another committee was tasked with drafting a constitutional declaration, which al-Sharaa later signed, forming the legal foundation for a new legislative body and transitional government.
However, the speed and execution of these initiatives, along with their outcomes, have generated mixed reactions. Some see them as historic achievements, arguing that swift action was necessary to maintain institutional stability.
Others, however, view the process as rushed and superficial, aimed more at solidifying al-Sharaa's authority than fostering meaningful political transformation. The national dialogue, in particular, has faced criticism for being conducted hastily, fuelling concerns that the process prioritised optics over substance.
Syria's interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa addressing representatives and dignitaries of Syrian communities during the National Dialogue Conference called for by the country's new authorities in Damascus on February 25, 2025.
The constitutional declaration has also sparked significant concerns. It grants the president sweeping powers without clear mechanisms for accountability or checks and balances among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Beyond these governance issues, critics argue that the document fails to reflect Syria's diverse social and political landscape.
Supporters, however, defend the broad presidential powers as necessary for ensuring an orderly and efficient transition. While it is difficult to gauge the exact level of support or opposition to al-Sharaa's political moves, it is clear that his efforts have not fostered the unity many had hoped for.
While political opinions remain divided, criticism of the caretaker government's composition and performance is more widespread. Many are concerned about the dominance of HTS members over the government, fuelling fears of exclusion and political monopolisation.
In response, al-Sharaa and other officials have justified the current government structure as a temporary measure to ensure stability and efficiency. Al-Sharaa has indicated that the forthcoming transitional government will be more inclusive. However, with the three-month deadline now expired, Syrians are still waiting for these promised changes.
Beyond its composition, the caretaker government has drawn criticism for its poor performance. For many Syrians—especially those from former regime-held areas—their primary concern is not political affiliations but the government's inability to deliver basic services.
Conversations with residents from various regions indicate that essential services like water and electricity have deteriorated even further compared to the final years of Assad's rule.
Syrians among the rubble and damaged power lines in the Zabadani area in the Damascus countryside, Syria, May 18, 2017.
While the caretaker government's limited resources, the impact of sanctions, and a lack of external support contribute to these struggles, public frustration has been exacerbated by unfulfilled promises. Authorities had pledged significant improvements, including a 400% salary increase and a swift resolution to electricity shortages, but these high expectations have not been met, deepening public disappointment.
Another major grievance has been the mass dismissal of tens of thousands of public sector employees. While some dismissals may be justified—citing corruption, absenteeism, and overstaffed institutions—the scale and speed at which they occurred have left many without alternative employment or financial assistance.
Additionally, the restructuring of government institutions has led to the suspension of essential bureaucratic services, further complicating daily life. While the caretaker government has recently reinstated some dismissed employees and reactivated some state institutions, its efforts have yet to address public concerns on a meaningful scale.
The caretaker government initially achieved some economic successes, particularly in trade and fuel supply. Following al-Assad's ouster, authorities lifted many import restrictions and lowered customs fees, increasing the availability of foreign goods at more affordable prices. Fuel shortages that had plagued the country for years also eased, making gas and diesel more accessible.
Although fuel prices remained higher than previous subsidised rates, they were still lower than black market prices, which had long been the primary source of supply. These early improvements, coupled with a temporary strengthening of the Syrian lira against the dollar, initially boosted purchasing power and economic optimism.
Stacks of Syrian pound banknotes are piled on a currency trader's stall at a market in the city of Manbij, currently controlled by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, in the Aleppo province on January 4, 2025.
Lira crisis
However, these gains quickly unravelled. One of the major issues has been the government's failure to stabilise the lira, leading to extreme fluctuations—over 30% within days. The currency's volatility has disrupted markets and created widespread uncertainty.
At the heart of the crisis is a severe liquidity shortage of the Syrian lira, exacerbated by restrictive policies imposed by the Central Bank. Until recently, individuals were limited to withdrawing just 200,000 lira per day—approximately $20—and only a few times per month. These restrictions also applied to businesses and charitable organisations, severely hampering their operations. Combined with delayed salary payments and mass layoffs, these measures forced many Syrians to rely on savings or debt.
Recently, authorities raised the daily withdrawal cap to 1 million lira (still roughly $20), and the lira has stabilised at around 10,000 per dollar—3,200 below the official rate. While these measures have provided some relief, the broader economic challenges remain daunting.
While external factors such as international sanctions and the financial collapse inherited from the Assad regime have played a significant role, many Syrians do not absolve the caretaker government of responsibility, blaming it for failing to manage the crisis effectively.
Smoke rises while members of the Syrian forces ride on a vehicle as they battle against a nascent insurgency by fighters from ousted leader Bashar al-Assad's Alawite sect, in Latakia, Syria March 7, 2025.
Like the economy, Syria's security situation initially remained stable but has since deteriorated. Early discipline among military and security forces helped prevent widespread incidents, but attacks against caretaker forces have escalated. Reports of revenge killings and human rights violations have surfaced, alongside a rise in criminal activities such as kidnappings and theft.
These challenges stem from multiple factors, including the dismantling of all former regime-affiliated security forces, the government's limited capacity to secure former regime-held areas, and worsening economic conditions. The lack of accountability for former regime officials has also fueled instability, as no transitional justice process has been initiated.
The recent escalation in Latakia, where coordinated attacks killed over 13 security personnel, marks the most serious security challenge the new authorities have faced. Although the government swiftly crushed the military rebellion, concerns remain over its ability to address human rights violations and prevent further unrest.
One hundred days after the Assad regime's fall, Syria remains at a crossroads. Al-Sharaa has an important chance to guide the country toward stability and prosperity, but his ability to do so hinges on delivering on his promises in an inclusive and transparent manner. If these promises remain unfulfilled, divisions will deepen, tensions will rise, and Syria could once again face violent unrest.
However, it should be made clear that neither al-Sharaa nor any single leader can achieve this alone. Regional and international support will be crucial in giving Syria a fair chance to overcome its interwoven crises. Lifting sanctions and providing non-humanitarian assistance will be essential for Syria's reconstruction.
Syria's future is being shaped now, and the choices made now will determine not only its trajectory but also the stability of the broader region.
