Sharaa's political pragmatism and the myth of sectarianism

After a hugely important deal to integrate Syria's Kurds, there is a growing realisation among myriad factions that national unity is crucial for the country's survival

Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi during the signing of the agreement to integrate the SDF into state institutions, Damascus, March 10, 2025.
AFP
Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi during the signing of the agreement to integrate the SDF into state institutions, Damascus, March 10, 2025.

Sharaa's political pragmatism and the myth of sectarianism

Syria’s new President Ahmed al-Sharaa is acutely aware that national unity is crucial for his country's survival after the downfall of long-time dictator Bashar al-Assad. Recent events have only proven that view to be correct.

The importance of unity drove al-Sharaa’s landmark reconciliation deal with Syria’s Kurds, signed this week with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which controls territory and a sizeable armed militia in the north-east. It also underscores his meeting with Druze leaders.

He is aware of the shifting public opinion three months after he led the successful coup against the regime of former president Bashar al-Assad, and is also aware of the geopolitics, with foreign powers including Iran, the United States, Türkiye, Israel, and Russia all having an interest in Syria.

For his part, SDF commander Mazloum Abdi gave the HTS leader his backing, telling Al Majalla in an exclusive interview that al-Sharaa is "the only president" in today's Syria.

Controlling a strategic region with vital oil and gas fields, Abdi also said that he did not want the SDF to replicate the autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan in Syria. This is a smart way of navigating the Kurdish-Turkish confrontation and possibly ending the Turkish incursions into Syria against his forces.

Abdi's quick and flexible policymaking resonated reasonably well with Syrians in Damascus, where there were celebrations and hope for inclusivity and unity, with Syrians believing that the deal with the SDF could rebuild trust in a country long fractured by division.

REUTERS/Karam al-Masri
Smoke rises while members of the Syrian forces ride on a vehicle as they battle against a nascent insurgency by fighters from ousted leader Bashar al-Assad's Alawite sect, in Latakia, Syria March 7, 2025.

'Sectarian' violence

In a separate development, summary executions of Alawite families in Syria’s coastal region were portrayed in Western media as “sectarian” in nature, but this is quite an oversimplification.

While sectarian violence is a tragic byproduct of al-Assad’s brutal crackdown against Syrians peacefully protesting against his rule, it is only one facet of a much broader conflict that evolved into a civil war. The wider picture is always political, as it includes three main aspects: power, rights, and resources.

Oversimplifying the coastal violence as 'sectarian' ignores the diversity within these groups themselves and the ways in which individuals may identify beyond sectarian or religious lines. It also fails to recognise the historical relations and political alliances that transcend these identities.

Indeed, many Syrian intellectuals like Burhan Ghalioun have long argued that sectarianism is a social construct, influenced by the state and political practices, rather than inherent religious differences.

Viewing things through a sectarian lens is a very simplistic way to explain regional events. For example, Iran and Hezbollah's support for the Assad regime is often framed as protecting Shiites and minorities against Sunni extremists.

For its part, Israel, which plays on its identity as a 'minority' in the Middle East, portrays itself as the 'protector' of Syria's Druze minority, while Türkiye—a Sunni-majority state—supports al-Sharaa and the Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), can sometimes play on Sunni grievances.

The summary executions of Alawites in Syria's coastal region were portrayed in Western media as "sectarian" in nature, but this is quite an oversimplification.

Yet before the 2011 Syrian revolution became a civil war, Syria's Ba'ath Party had roots in both the Sunni and Alawite communities, and often had members from both working together in the government and party structure, even though the Assad regime later endorsed a policy that heavily favoured Alawites. In Syrian society, there are many instances of intermarriage.

Following the killings in Syria's coastal areas, al-Sharaa announced his decision to establish a fact-finding committee to investigate the violence. He also gave reconciliatory speeches stressing the need for national unity, refusing to refer to Syrians as Sunnis, Alawites, Kurds, Christians, or Druze.

Dispelling myths

This seems to be intentional and an attempt to dispel the longstanding myth—propagated for decades by the Syrian regime—that a sectarian conflict is inevitable and any attempts at peaceful coexistence or reconciliation are futile if Assad is toppled.

Al-Sharaa seems to have undergone a fundamental shift in his ideological perspective, recognising that extremism and violence only perpetuate division and endless war in a multi-ethnic society. 

National unity is essential not only for the political stability of his new regime but also for reconstruction. Al-Sharaa understands this, which is why it is so important that he nip any social unrest in the bud. He has also rehabilitated his image in the hopes of attracting the international and regional support needed to rebuild the war-battered country.

Whether this political pragmatism will pay off remains to be seen, but it is certainly a positive step in the right direction.

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