Hakan Fidan: A stable Syria is key to a stable region

President Trump praised Türkiye's role in Syria, particularly its participation in facilitating the transition to the new administration. What are the main areas of US-Turkish cooperation, and is there any point of contention with Washington?

In this new phase, we will continue to cooperate with the Trump administration at the highest level. As you know, Türkiye and the United States have a long history of relations. However, our approaches to certain issues diverge, particularly on regional matters. That said, mature nations navigate such differences by setting contentious issues aside and focusing on areas of agreement.

Regarding the United States, our primary point of contention remains its policy in Syria—a policy that began under President Obama. During that time, the United States, alongside Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, supported the Syrian opposition. However, the US later withdrew its support, citing its focus on combating IS.

This shift in strategy inadvertently ignited a geopolitical crisis, as it involved supporting another terrorist organisation – namely, the PKK and its affiliates like the YPG – as proxies in their fight against IS. We have consistently communicated to the United States that this approach is flawed and directly threatens Türkiye's national security.

It is worth noting that the United States itself has long classified the PKK as a terrorist organisation and placed bounties on its leaders. So, its support for the PKK's Syrian offshoots is contradictory.

Although President Trump attempted to reverse this policy, certain factions within the US administration resisted, leading to delays. We remain hopeful that cooperation with the Trump administration on Syria, counter-terrorism, and regional security will reach its fullest potential in this new period.

What challenges do Syria's new leaders face with other opposition groups—whether in Sweida, Daraa, or other areas? What is hindering all parties from sitting at one negotiating table?

This is undoubtedly among the most critical issues facing the new Syrian administration. One of the key tasks is to unite the armed factions under a single military structure. The existence of armed groups affiliated with various parties only lays the groundwork for civil war, which cannot be tolerated.

Efforts are underway to bring together opposition forces that stood against the Assad regime – whether in the south, the groups supported by Türkiye in the north, or HTS –under the umbrella of the national army. The exception, of course, is the Kurdish Protection Units (known as the YPG), who chose to reconcile with al-Assad. We have done our part by leveraging our constructive influence on factions in the north.

Do you worry about Israel's presence in Syria?

We are concerned primarily because there is a contradiction in Israel's policies. Previously, when Iran and its militias held huge sway in Syria, Israel's justifications had a clear basis. But this justification no longer exists.

Despite assurances from the new administration that Syria will not pose a threat to anyone, Israel's current campaign—occupying Syrian land, advancing to certain strategic points, deploying military personnel, and establishing bases—represents a provocation and a dangerous military and political approach. Türkiye—along with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq—unequivocally reject Israel's actions.

On the subject of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the issue of US support remains controversial. How does Türkiye intend to address this matter with the US, and what does it hope to achieve to satisfy all parties, both in terms of Türkiye's relations with the US and with the SDF?

The new administration has called on the Kurdish Protection Units (YPG) to disarm, as it has done with other groups. Our expectation is for all of Syria's ethnic groups—Kurds, Turks, Yazidis, Christians, Arabs, Sunnis, Shiites, Alawites, and Nusayris—to enjoy equal rights as Syrian citizens while preserving their respective cultural identities.

Naturally, we seek a mechanism to ensure this is realised, which aligns with the new administration's objectives. However, this cannot be achieved while the YPG cling to their weapons in defiance of the new Syrian leadership.

With al-Assad gone, is the time right for the millions of Syrian refugees living in Türkiye to return? Is Ankara seeking any guarantees in this regard, and has a timetable for their return already been set?

Our Syrian brothers are our guests; we will not demand their return. Such an approach is neither part of our culture nor our state policy. That said, we are working to create conditions inside Syria that will pave the way for their voluntary return. The new Syrian administration is also pursuing this and is supported by the international community.

The war has displaced 10 million Syrians outside of their country. Their return is essential for Syria's recovery. As conditions improve, I think more and more Syrians will return.

How has the fall of the Assad regime affected Turkish-Iranian relations, given Iran's massive investment in Syria over the past decade?

We think the regime's fall will improve Turkish-Iranian relations because the issue that kept us divided is now gone. Iran is no longer present in Syria in a way that negatively impacts Türkiye. I see this as an opportunity for both countries to enhance their relations and, simultaneously, for Iran to recalibrate its relations within the region.

I sincerely hope Iranian officials seize this opportunity. While Iran may view what happened negatively, I think there is greater potential for good.

Russia has been a major supporter of Bashar al-Assad's regime. How were you able to convince Russia to abandon its ally?

We had discussions.

Does Russia expect a price from Türkiye and Israel for facilitating al-Assad's fall?

We are not in a position to speak on behalf of the new Syrian administration or the Syrian people, as the decision ultimately lies with them. However, Russia's expectations from Syria are clear, primarily regarding the status of its military bases. Mr. Ahmed al-Sharaa was asked about the fate of these bases, and he provided his response. I believe this matter will be appropriately managed in due course as time progresses.

How are you addressing the issue of Russia's presence on the Syrian coast? While al-Sharaa's administration respects existing agreements with Russia, it has expelled the company managing the Tartus port.

As I mentioned earlier, Russia and the new Syrian administration need to work towards further adjustments. I am aware of the Russian naval and land bases in Syria. Regarding the commercial relations between the two countries and the concessions granted to Russia on maritime trade, I am not in a position to comment. However, I believe that as the new administration reviews its agreements with Russia, it will address these matters and negotiate any points of contention.

Just a few days ago, Mr. Lavrov (Russia's foreign minister) called me regarding Syria. He emphasised Russia's intention to establish a new relationship with Syria based on mutual equality and expressed hope for Türkiye's contribution to this effort. Russia appears to be taking steps toward recalibrating its approach.

Given the new dynamic in Syria and changing US policies, what are the main challenges and opportunities in Türkiye's relations with the Trump administration?

President Trump assumed office with a series of radical changes, as evidenced by the sweeping decisions he implemented immediately upon taking power. These changes signalled the scale of the transformations to come. Just as these shifts have had ramifications for the European Union, Russia, China, the Arab Gulf, Africa, and both North and South America, they have also had significant implications for our region and our country.

Our objective is to maintain fruitful and harmonious foreign relations, which aligns with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's vision. As you know, he has a longstanding relationship with President Trump. The relationship between the two leaders is characterised by directness and brevity, which paves the way for ministers on both sides to further strengthen bilateral relations.

Turning to Gaza, how does Türkiye view the recent ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel? What does Türkiye aspire to in this regard as an influential power in the Middle East?

The ceasefire agreement could have been reached much earlier.  It was a massacre and ethnic cleansing campaign that claimed the lives of 50,000 civilians, including women and children, displaced around 2 million people, and left countless families homeless. Gaza's infrastructure was completely destroyed.

I extend my gratitude to all those who contributed to the achievement of this ceasefire, particularly Qatar and Egypt, as well as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, represented by my colleague, His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Faisal. Together, we worked tirelessly to defend the Palestinian cause in global forums.

The ceasefire is merely the first step toward alleviating Palestinian suffering. It is essential to urgently advance the two-state solution to prevent such tragedies from recurring. Without realising Palestinian hopes for an independent and sovereign state, there is no guarantee that this catastrophe won't be repeated.