Can Al Sharaa stand the Kemalist ideology?

In pursuit of a difficult consensus

The leader of Syria's Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, Ahmad al-Sharaa, addresses a crowd at the capital's landmark Umayyad Mosque on December 8, 2024.
Abdulaziz KETAZ / AFP
The leader of Syria's Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, Ahmad al-Sharaa, addresses a crowd at the capital's landmark Umayyad Mosque on December 8, 2024.

Can Al Sharaa stand the Kemalist ideology?

Syria’s new Islamist leader, Ahmad Al Sharaa, is presenting himself as a viable alternative to the brutal dictatorship of the Assads and their centralised political order that quashed any threats to its authority for half a century. However, as history has shown before, there is often a gap between what Islamist movements say they will do once in power and the reality they find themselves in once there.

This gap has led to the downfall of other Islamist-led governments in the Middle East over the past decade. For example, Islamist movements in countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco that initially were cautiously welcomed into power soon saw a downward shift in public support. So, if Syria is anything like the examples mentioned above, Al Sharaa may find it difficult to maintain public support, even if he dismantles Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS).

It remains to be seen whether Al Sharaa will be able to succeed where others have failed. Will he be able to reconcile an Islamist-led government with those in Syria who prefer secularism? It’s important to note here the broad spectrum of Islamist ideology ranging from moderate to radical, with some even seeking to establish an Islamic state through militant means. This Islamist variance leads to different agendas, strategies, and interpretations of what it means to govern according to Islamic principles, making consensus difficult.

So far, Al Sharaa has indeed managed to blur the lines in his media interviews since 8 December between secularism and political Islam. This has indeed created a paradox where an Islamist leader who once adopted the ideology of the most abhorrent and brutal terrorist Islamist groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) has so far adopted secular rhetoric and may adopt secular policies in the months to come in a bid to appeal to a wide array of Syrians already collectively traumatised by the Assad regime and disillusioned with the one-party rule.

So far, Al Sharaa has indeed managed to blur the lines in his media interviews since 8 December between secularism and political Islam. This has indeed created a paradox.

In a diverse society like Syria, secularism could be the key to preserving a national identity distinct from religious affiliations. Just on Wednesday (18 December), at a demonstration in Damascus, an armed HTS man took the mic and started speaking against sectarianism and division to a cheering crowd. But when he started talking about Shariah-based rule as a model in the history of Islam, they started chanting in unison: 'Secularism!' and "No to religious rule!'. He then tried to reassure them that Syria would remain free and all-inclusive. 

Reuters/Ammar Awad
People visit an establishment, after the ousting of Syria's Bashar al-Assad, in the Bab Touma district of the Old City of Damascus, Syria, December 22, 2024.

The incident—which has gone viral on social media—demonstrates why many are apprehensive about political Islam and is a real-life example of how political Islam and cultural diversity often clash. Al Sharaa can draw lessons from other countries' experiences with political Islam and government—and perhaps avoid the pitfalls his predecessors succumbed to. While the two could be theoretically compatible, this is rarely the case in practice.

For example, after the 2011 revolution in Egypt, when the Muslim Brotherhood came to power, the elected president, Mohamed Morsi, struggled to govern effectively. Many citizens felt that the Brotherhood prioritised its political agenda over addressing pressing economic and social issues, leading to dissatisfaction among the vast majority of the population. The Brotherhood's approach to governance often alienated secular and liberal groups, contributing to political polarisation in the country. Their attempts to consolidate power and implement policies perceived as favouring Islamist principles over inclusive governance led to widespread protests and opposition, as many Egyptians associated the movement with instability and authoritarianism.

In a diverse society like Syria, secularism could be the key to preserving a national identity distinct from religious affiliations. 

So, in Egypt, the opposition to political Islam had more to do with people's rejection of Islamist rule rather than deeply rooted secularism, as was the case in Tunisia, although both countries were colonised by secular Western countries: England and France.

In Tunisia, after independence from France in 1956, former president Habib Bourguiba implemented a series of reforms aimed at cementing secularism in Tunisian society and succeeded through secular laws in distancing the state from religion. The most notable secular law is the Personal Status Code, which puts women on equal footing with men. The Tunisians respect secular laws irrespective of their political or religious affiliations. I recall when I interviewed a Salafist leader in Tunisia in 2013 and asked him whether he, for example, endorsed polygamy because it was permitted in Islam; he laughed and said of course not because he respected the laws of the country, which strictly banned polygamy.

And in Libya, after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, the country experienced political fragmentation. Various armed groups, including Islamist factions, vied for power, creating a chaotic political landscape. The struggle for power among different factions led to a civil war that further destabilised the country. Islamist groups, such as the Libyan Dawn coalition, faced strong opposition from rival militias and the Libyan National Army (LNA), which was backed by secular and nationalist forces.

And in Morocco, despite the electoral success of the Islamist Justice and Development party due to constitutional reforms, many Moroccans have expressed frustration over high unemployment rates, particularly among youth, and rising living costs. Protests and social movements have emerged, highlighting grievances related to economic inequality and the perceived failure of the PJD to implement effective economic reforms.

In the 2021 parliamentary elections, the PJD suffered a significant setback, losing many seats and failing to secure a place in the ruling coalition. This electoral decline reflects growing dissatisfaction among voters and a shift in public sentiment away from the party, indicating a loss of confidence in its leadership and policies.

AFP
Turkey's Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan (L) being received by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, in Damascus on December 22, 2024.

Even in Turkey, which presents itself as a staunch supporter of Al Sharaa, political Islam is highly controversial in a country that prides itself on secularism, given that the country was founded in the early 20th century by secularist leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who advocated for the strict separation between religion and state affairs. This secularism, rooted in Kemalist ideology, has been a cornerstone of Turkish identity and governance. Political Islam challenges this secular framework, leading to tensions between secularists and Islamist groups within Turkey. Many Turks have rejected the use of religious rhetoric to justify political actions, with many secularists and minority groups fearing the potential imposition of conservative Islamic values on Turkish society, sparking widespread protests and dissent.

And while Al Sharaa's stated plans are centred around promoting a vision of Islam aligned with democratic principles that welcomes different political parties and civil society groups, not everyone in his support base is on board. His attempt to liberalise political Islam doesn't align with some of his HTS followers—particularly the more extremist elements within this grouping. There have already been signs of fragmentation and disagreement within the movement that could obstruct Al Sharaa's ability to put forward a viable plan for the future. Furthermore, a failure to address socioeconomic problems will likely further erode the popular support his transitional government is currently enjoying.

font change

Related Articles