Since its establishment in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has positioned itself as a revisionist force on the global stage. At the core of Iran’s revisionism lies a distinctive vision rooted in an unusual fusion of Shiite political Islam as a governing model and anti-imperialist ideals as the driving force behind its foreign policy.
This blend of political Islam and anti-imperialism, interpreted through a universalist revolutionary ideology, has shaped key policies such as “exporting the revolution,” support for Islamist groups, and backing “resistance” movements against occupation and imperialist forces throughout the Middle East and the Islamic world.
Additionally, the devastating eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s, along with subsequent US military interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003—both of which took place close to Iran’s immediate neighbourhood—have heavily influenced Iranian leaders’ threat perception.
At the same time, Iran’s southern Arab neighbours have maintained close alliances with Washington. These dynamics contribute to Iran’s view that it exists within a highly hostile regional environment, surrounded by adversarial imperial powers or their allies—all of which possess superior military and technological capabilities.
Forward defence strategy
In this context, the concept of “strategic depth” has emerged in Iranian strategic thinking, positing that Iran must guarantee its security by expanding its influence across the region. In the same vein, by pursuing a forward defence strategy, Iran aims to contain security threats before they reach its territorial borders.
By pursuing a "forward defence" strategy, Iran aims to contain security threats before they reach its territorial borders
The central theme unifying these ideological and geopolitical factors in Iranian foreign policy is opposition to the United States. The US is perceived both as the embodiment of imperialism and "global arrogance" and as the primary source of direct and indirect security threats against Iran. Consistent with this perspective, leaders of the Islamic Republic also regard Israel as both a regional symbol of imperialism and as America's primary regional ally, making it Iran's principal adversary.
These considerations contribute to an alternative vision for regional order—one that Iranian officials have referenced both explicitly and implicitly. This vision entails a region where US influence is minimised, and Israel is isolated. In such a framework, while geopolitical disputes between Iran and its Arab neighbours persis—including those predating the 1979 revolution, such as the dispute over three islands in the Gulf— opportunities are created to address these issues through indigenous solutions without "intervention" by Western powers.
Furthermore, in this ideal vision, Iran's non-state or semi-state allies within the so-called "Axis of Resistance" would be recognised by neighbouring states as legitimate regional actors. For Tehran, "the Axis of Resistance" is viewed not only as an ideological network but also as a geopolitical counterbalance to regional rivals.
Three reasons for optimism
Over the past three years, starting in early 2022, three major developments have bolstered Iranian leaders' optimism about eventually realising this alternative regional vision.
First, Russia's military invasion of Ukraine underscored limitations in US global influence—particularly in the Middle East. Instead of aligning with the US and Europe in isolating Russia, most Arab states adopted a hedging strategy, maintaining favourable relations with both sides.
Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian with his Saudi counterpart Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, right, and former Chinese counterpart Qin Gang in Beijing April 6, 2023.
This approach, alongside expanding Arab relations with China, demonstrated that Arab states—especially Iran's Gulf neighbours—now exercise greater autonomy in their foreign relations and have shifted away from solely relying on alliances with the West. Previously, Tehran perceived Gulf countries as simply regional "proxies" of the United States.
This shift in perception contributed to the second development: improved relations between Iran and its Arab neighbours, culminating in the Tehran-Riyadh détente agreement in March 2023. For Tehran, this agreement also served as an attempt to counter—and ideally curb the spread of—the Abraham Accords between Arab states and Israel. While Iran expects potential economic benefits from improved relations with Arab states as well, it prioritises security and geopolitical considerations in its regional diplomatic outreach.
Meanwhile, the political and diplomatic standing of Iran's regional allies began to improve. The return of Bashar al-Assad's regime to the Arab League and the halt in the Yemen war were encouraging signs for Tehran.
The third and most significant development that Iranian leaders see as a catalyst for a new regional order was the outbreak of war in Gaza and the international responses to it— particularly across the Islamic world. The Gaza war halted the normalisation process between Saudi Arabia and Israel—a process that Iran viewed with deep concern.
Apart from the widespread public sympathy across the Muslim world for civilians in Gaza, it brought the Palestinian issue back into the spotlight both regionally and globally. This situation created challenges even for those Arab states that had already normalised relations with Israel, as they encountered obstacles in advancing those ties.
Protestors calling for a ceasefire in Gaza raise their hands, painted in red, during a Senate Appropriations Committee hearing with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on October 31, 2024.
Iran seized the opportunity presented by rising pro-Palestinian sentiment in the Arab and Islamic worlds. By positioning itself as a leading advocate for Palestinian rights, Tehran aimed to expand its regional influence. Relations with Saudi Arabia have notably improved over the past year, signalling a thaw in their long-standing rivalry, and Iran has made diplomatic strides with other Arab states, including Egypt and Jordan.
This bolstered Iran's strategic narrative, portraying Israel as the primary source of regional instability while establishing Iran as a central actor in regional geopolitics.
Historic turning point
From Iran's perspective, these developments mark a historic turning point for reshaping the regional order. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei asserted that in the aftermath of the Gaza war, "the calculations of resistance" now define the region, suggesting that the political landscape of the Middle East will look markedly different moving forward.
However, a closer examination of developments over the past year reveals significant challenges for Iran, tempering its optimism. On the one hand, contrary to Iran's expectations, the Gaza war has not diminished the US role in the Middle East; instead, Washington has substantially increased its military presence to support and protect its ally, Israel.
Additionally, the Gaza war has notably constrained the capabilities of Iran's allies within "the Axis of Resistance", particularly Hamas and Hezbollah. This constraint may impact their military strength and long-term political roles, potentially limiting Iran's regional influence. Meanwhile, Bashar al-Assad has maintained a cautious distance from both Iran and "the Axis", aiming to shield Syria from possible adverse consequences of the war.
Perhaps most critically, the direct tit-for-tat attacks between Iran and Israel, while underscoring Iran's missile capabilities, have also exposed substantial intelligence and technological vulnerabilities. If the current pattern of direct Iranian-Israeli confrontation persists and significantly weakens Iran's military capacities, its regional position—particularly regarding the balance of power with Arab rivals and Turkey—could be jeopardised.
Therefore, despite some promising developments, the 'New Middle East' may not entirely align with the vision that Iran's leaders had anticipated.
