More mirages of a 'New Middle East'

How the US—and other powers—keep trying to reshape the region

Michelle Thompson

More mirages of a 'New Middle East'

In the midst of a previous Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanon 18 years ago, US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice opposed calls for a ceasefire and argued that the conflict was part of the necessary "birth pangs of a New Middle East." Today, US policy is being swept along by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's expanding playbook but also grasping at visions of building a new Middle East.

It should be noted at the outset that one reason outside powers keep trying to reshape the Middle East is that the region has not properly shaped itself. The region has no overarching political or security architecture that integrates its main powers: the Arab states, Turkey, Israel and Iran. With no stable regional architecture, divergent political systems and attitudes, and several ongoing conflicts, the region remains prone to ambitious interventions.

The previous round of conflict two decades ago was triggered by an extremist Islamist attack—in that case on the US on 9/11, 2001—and led the George W. Bush administration to respond with a broad and aggressive strategy to use military force to fundamentally transform the region. The vision was not only to topple the regimes of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq but ultimately of Iran and Syria as well, and create a Middle East that was dominated by and aligned with the US and potentially democratic to boot.

The current conflict was also triggered by an extremist Islamist attack—this time by Hamas on Israel—and has led the Israeli administration to develop a broad and aggressive strategy to use military force to not only defeat Hamas and reassert control over Gaza but also potentially to reshape the Middle East by first taking on Iran’s proxies, and then Iran itself. In this conflict, the US administration started off trying to contain the conflict and build multiple ceasefires, but after months of failure, the US is finding itself going along with Israel’s much more ambitious and dangerous transformative strategy.

Michelle Thompson

History of meddling

The US has a long history of trying to influence or reshape the Middle East. Some have been more positive than others, and some more successful than others.

More than a century ago, under President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points, the US stood out as a power calling for the right of self-determination of peoples and providing a sharp contrast to the colonial ambitions of European powers seeking to expand their control of post-Ottoman Arab lands. After World War II, the US presided over the dismantling of British and French colonial rule in the region. A good example of that was US President Eisenhower forcing Britain, France and Israel to withdraw from the Suez Canal and the Sinai after their joint attack of 1956.

But this anti-colonial pro-independence approach was eclipsed by the Cold War in which the US and the Soviet Union reshaped the Middle East into rival coalitions of states ranged against each other. The US used its influence to topple hostile governments in the region and put in place pliant rulers; the most famous examples of that is the US-backed overthrow of Prime Minister Mosaddegh in Iran in 1953—an event that still reverberates in current events—and US support for coups in Syria and other Arab countries. Of course, the Soviet Union was playing the same game in its own client countries. This pattern of outside interference strengthened authoritarian and intelligence/police states in the Middle East.

In the late 1970s, the US took a new tack to countering Soviet power. It leaned on radical Islamist groups in Afghanistan to counter the Soviet invasion of 1979. After the collapse of the US-aligned Shah of Iran in 1979, it favoured the Islamist alternative represented by Ayatollah Khomeini over the coalition of leftist and communist Iranian revolutionary parties that the US feared would align post-Shah Iran staunchly with Moscow.

After failing to contain the conflict, the US now finds itself going along with Israel's dangerous transformative strategy

Signal opportunity

The decline and fall of the Soviet Union presented a signal opportunity for the United States at the turn of the 1990s. The US successfully led a coalition of regional and international powers to reverse Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and restore stability in the Gulf. The George H.W. Bush administration tried to build on that achievement by launching the Madrid Peace Process in hopes of a final push to resolve the long-standing Israel-Palestine—and Israeli-Arab conflict. Despite Secretary James Baker's best efforts, that peace push failed to achieve its results.

Indeed, US support for Israel has long run counter to its attempts to also maintain power and influence in Arab countries. It tried to square that circle by launching a 'peace process' after the 1967 war. Today, almost 60 years later, that attempt to resolve one of the core conflicts of the Middle East remains a historic failure.

The most recent attempt by the US to reshape the Middle East is that mentioned at the opening of this essay. The George W. Bush administration responded to the 9/11 attacks as an opportunity to translate America's supposed overwhelming military advantage in the Middle East after the collapse of the Soviet Union to rearrange the region in its favour. The model was partly that of World War II when US-led military victories over Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan created post-war West German and Japanese states that were pro-Western, capitalist and democratic.

The failure of the Bush administration's attempt to reshape the Middle East—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Iran—is well documented. All successive US administrations from Obama, through Trump and Biden, have foresworn any major ambitions in the Middle East. They have been focused instead on getting out of endless wars, while maintaining a long term diplomatic, economic and military presence in the region.

Michelle Thompson

As candidates, both Trump and Harris continue in this trajectory, with Trump insisting that the Hamas attack on Israel would never have happened if he were president and Harris focusing on futile attempts to get ceasefires and bring this war to an end. But both are also wedded to strong support for Israel, and this is how Israel has been able to effectively commandeer US policy in the Middle East in the past year and into the next months.

Stubborn

commitment 

Unlike recent US administrations, Netanyahu and his government are currently committed to an ambitious and transformative strategy to shape a new Middle East. One in which Iran and its proxies have been faced and defeated and one in which the Palestinian cause has been buried beyond hope.

It is important to note that this was not fully the case before October 7. Before then, the Netanyahu government thought it had sustainable understandings with both Hamas and Hezbollah that they would remain hostile but not pose any major threat, and both the Israeli and Islamist right wings were conveniently opposed to a two-state solution. Israel was gravely concerned about Iran's progress toward a nuclear weapon, but that was not linked to an urgent crisis on Israel's borders and did not have the sense of urgency it now has.

After devastating wars against Hamas and Hezbollah and the civilians in their areas of influence, Israel has now executed the first significant direct air attack on Iranian territory since the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. It is not clear if this is the end of the direct Israeli-Iranian escalation or if there is more to come—from Iran or Israel—in the coming weeks. Unlike in Gaza and Lebanon, the US did appear to have some influence on Israeli decision-making regarding the strike on Iran, mainly because Israel needs much more military cooperation from the US to mount any major attack on Iran, hence the US has more say in the matter.

US support for Israel has long run counter to its attempts to also maintain power and influence in Arab countries

Three scenarios

Whoever wins the US presidential election on November 5 will take office on January 20, 2025, and face a Middle East that has been largely shaped by the decisions of two Middle Eastern leaders, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. 

There are three general scenarios that could face the next president. Israel and Iran might have exchanged blows but stopped short of further escalation, in which case, some form of deterrence between Israel and Iran has been re-established. Today, this looks like the most likely scenario. In this case, a new US administration would be focused on working on the 'day after' negotiations for Gaza and Lebanon and figuring out which combination of sanctions and diplomacy can bring Iran back to the negotiating table.

In a second scenario, Israel has hit Iran repeatedly, and Iran has chosen the route of urgent diplomacy to try to defuse Netanyahu's onslaught and has offered concessions to the US on the nuclear and other files; in that case, the new US president would be seizing on those diplomatic opportunities to deal with the Iran nuclear threat and also get Iran to move away from its 'forward defence' strategy of arming proxy militias through the region.

A third scenario is that Iran has responded to multiple Israeli attacks by not only hitting back at Israel but also obstructing energy transport in the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz. This strategy could make sense to an embattled Iran, as it would trigger a global energy crisis, which would immediately get any US president's full attention and bring serious pressure to bear on Israel to defuse the crisis.

Trump would not take kindly to Netanyahu's attempts to bully or humiliate him, as Netanyahu has done with Biden and Harris

Different approaches

If Trump were to win, he would come into office with a much more positive attitude toward Netanyahu and his right-wing government; he is also a president who prides himself on being disruptive, pivoting away from longstanding US policy, and in his own mind at least, making big and transformative deals. In dealing with any of the three scenarios outlined above, he and his team would work closely with Netanyahu or a successive Israeli government. Keep in mind that Trump is also very opposed to open-ended US involvement in wars, so whatever wars Netanyahu has up his sleeve in the coming weeks, Trump would want to get to the 'deal-making' phase once he's in office.

It's also important to note that Trump considers himself the ultimate alpha male and would not take kindly to Netanyahu's attempts to bully or humiliate him, as Netanyahu has done with Biden and Harris; Netanyahu would have to keep that in mind in navigating a new Trump presidency.

If Harris were to win, we are likely to see a continuation of the derivative US policy under Biden, which Netanyahu has largely led for the past year, and that has been reduced to complaining about many Israeli actions and trying to clean up afterwards, with little strategic influence or impact. Harris would likely welcome the first and second scenarios but would be hard-pressed to deal with the regional and global crisis that a spread of the conflict to energy flows in the Gulf would unleash.

Both presidents will try to pursue a tri-partite deal between the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, but that would require an Israeli government willing to say the words "Two-State Solution." In all cases, the challenges of US policy in the Middle East that the next US president will face in January 2025 will be defined by decisions made in Israel and Iran and only tangentially by decisions made in Washington.

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