What will Trump's foreign policy really look like?
Trump's potential team looks to be split between figures like Vance, wanting to reduce US interventions abroad, and hawks like Pompeo, pushing for foreign confrontations
Eduardo Ramon
What will Trump's foreign policy really look like?
We will now see a pure Donald Trump foreign policy without restraints from the American Senate, moderates in the Republican Party, or professionals in the Department of State, CIA, or Pentagon. The team coming in with Trump know from their unhappy experience in the last Trump administration that they need loyalists inside the offices of the employees who will not resist orders from the White House. We can expect to see the National Security Council try to control foreign policy initiatives carefully, reducing the influence of the State Department and the Pentagon.
And we can expect to see a split within the Trump team: some, led by Vice President JD Vance, will want to reduce American commitments and battles abroad, while hawks among the Republicans, such as former CIA director and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, will prepare to confront China, Russia and Iran. The new Trump administration will need time to organise itself between these two camps.
In addition, when Trump speaks about bilateral relations with another country or an international crisis, he emphasises his relationships with the foreign leaders involved. Rarely does he speak about American national interests, in large part because he cannot separate his view of his own importance from lasting American national interests.
Arguments in favour of his making concessions to defend the world system are difficult for him because Trump and his political base in America think the world order puts America at a disadvantage, often paying the financial costs for other countries' achievements. Thus, he focuses on receiving concessions before agreeing to any from his side. He thinks of “deals,” not mutual interests.
"Beautiful" tariffs
Trump perceives that America did not get a fair deal with international trade, and thus, he will focus on this issue in early 2025. He said during the campaign that the word “tariff” is the most beautiful word in the English language. Trump will raise tariffs against imported products from Mexico to Europe but especially against Chinese products; news reports say he may push for tariffs of 60%.
The large margin of Trump's election victory in 2024 means that he will not feel obliged to the friends of Israel for their election support
The American market buys more imported Chinese products than any other country, representing about 16% of Chinese exports. Trump will not care if China's economy suffers, nor will he care if China's trading partners, such as South Korea, Japan, Europe, and the Gulf states, suffer from a Chinese economic recession.
Trump will insist on Chinese concessions, such as bigger Chinese imports of American agricultural products – a measure that would help a big element of Trump's political base. Beijing, at least, will not have to worry about Trump complaining about the treatment of Chinese Uighurs; it is doubtful Trump even knows who the Uighurs are, and he will not be discussing human rights with any country.
No careful balance of power
Tougher economic relations with China should not lead Taiwan to think it has a big ally in Trump. Instead, the American president has in the past expressed doubt about defending the island while Taiwan enjoys a big trade surplus with the American economy. Therefore, unlike Joseph Biden, Trump is unlikely to pledge in a clear way that America will defend Taiwan. He will instead return to the traditional American ambiguity about its commitment to the island's security.
Trump is sure to demand Taiwan increase its military spending if it wants to enjoy American military support. He will likewise demand more money from South Korea and Japan for the deployment of American forces in those countries. A balance of power with China to maintain the world order alone will not suffice to justify the deployment in Trump's view.
In a similar way, Trump won't be thinking of the implications on the balance of power in Europe when he turns to the Ukraine war. He will instead think first of his relationship with President Putin, with whom he strived to have good relations in Trump's first presidential term. Trump does not view Ukraine as a vital American interest, and he led the Republican Party in resisting more aid to Kyiv.
In this July 16, 2018, file photo, US President Donald Trump, left, and Russian President Vladimir Putin shake hands in Helsinki, Finland.
Their argument is that if Ukraine is so important for European security, then the Europeans can pay the cost. In the second half of 2025, we can expect Trump to press Ukrainian President Zelensky to accept negotiations with Putin, using the provision or withholding of American arms as a stick with both Zelensky and Putin.
American media reports suggest that Trump's advisors have recommended ideas such as an autonomous region in eastern Ukraine or a demilitarised zone there, as well as a definite agreement that Ukraine will not join the Atlantic Alliance, about which Trump is already sceptical. It is not clear that Putin will accept these ideas to end the war, and Trump is not renowned for his patience.
The Gulf and Israel
Trump has had a difficult relationship with Zelensky, but he was happy with his relationships with Gulf leaders and therefore, the starting point of his relationship with them in his second term will be strong. Unlike Biden administration officials, Trump has not publicly spoken about a defence agreement with Saudi Arabia. It is worth remembering that Trump is sceptical about such agreements in general.
As the New York Times noted on November 6, he does not see alliances as ways to boost American power. Rather, he perceives them as risks that America will have to bear the burden of defending other countries. Already, some in the Republican Party think that Washington should press for states in the region, including Israel, to cooperate more among themselves against Iranian threats while Washington focuses more on China. At a minimum, Trump will demand significant Saudi financial and military contributions to a mutual defence agreement.
Trump is far more interested in the Gulf states than the Palestinian issue. In his first administration and in his campaign, Trump never pretended to care about Palestinian rights and self-determination. He was proud of securing the Abraham Accords in 2020, but those offered little for the Palestinians and instead focused on developing business relations between Israel and the Gulf states. Angry at Palestinian criticism during his term, Trump stopped dialogue with the Palestinian Authority and cancelled economic aid.
Initially, Trump will not continue the Biden administration's discussions with the Palestinian Authority, and the economic aid that Biden restored will also disappear. Trump will strongly support Israel's effort to destroy UNRWA.
A Palestinian woman walks past a damaged wall bearing the UNRWA logo at a camp for internally displaced people in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip on May 28, 2024.
Trump does, in fact, have human sympathies, as we saw in his reaction to Syrian civilian casualties from an al-Assad government chemical weapons attack in 2018.
He is not happy to see civilian suffering in Gaza, but he blames Hamas, not Israel, and like the Israeli government, thinks the way to end the civilian suffering is for Israel to win total victory and destroy Hamas. Trump will not restrain Israel in Gaza or against Hezbollah in Lebanon. The flow of weaponry will continue. Nor is he going to punish Israel for expanding settlements in the West Bank – or Gaza.
The Biden administration started imposing sanctions on a few Israeli settler leaders, but Trump will stop that, too. There is no Trump domestic political ally who will argue the Palestinian case with the new president. Probably, leaders from Gulf states are the only ones that could interest Trump in taking a new look at the Palestinian issue. They will have to decide how much influence with Trump they want to risk.
This Trump support has made the Israelis very happy with Trump's election victory, but they should remember that at the end of Trump's first term, he thought Netanyahu had betrayed him after the Israeli Prime Minister congratulated Biden for his 2020 election victory. Trump was furious and he has not forgotten it.
Moreover, the large margin of Trump's election victory in 2024 means that he will not feel obliged to the Friends of Israel in the United States for their election support; initial analysis suggests that only about a quarter of the American Jewish community voted for Trump in this election. This Trump sense of injury from 2020 and his sense of not always needing the help of Israel's friends will mean that he will not feel obliged to always write a blank check for Jerusalem in his second term.
Iran: The hawk and the dove
Indeed, while Israel and Republican hawks will press Trump to join in an attack against a weakened Iran, he himself may resist because he is cautious about launching a long new war in the Middle East. It is worth remembering that Trump in 2016 emphasised repeatedly that American military interventions in the Middle East were a terrible mistake, and his base and part of the Republican Party, including his vice president, agree strongly.
While Trump will face pressure to attack a weakened Iran, he may resist, having little appetite for a regional war
In September, Trump said he must negotiate a nuclear agreement with Iran, but he gave no details about his thinking. Negotiation would be extremely difficult technically, but unlike Biden, Trump need not fear political attacks from the Republican Party if he opens talks with the Islamic Republic. Trump had hoped for a Nobel Peace Prize after the Abraham Accords and might view an Iranian deal as the path to that prize in the future.
However, winning that Nobel Prize will not stop Trump from restoring the maximum pressure campaign against Iran next year. Trump will want to apply sanctions vigorously. There will be no repetition of the Biden deal that had Washington ignore Chinese purchases of Iranian oil in return for Iranian restraint against American forces in Iraq and Syria. Trump will be happy to implement the Biden agreement with Iraq to withdraw American forces in 2025 and 2026, if not sooner, and he will withdraw those last American forces from Syria, too, perhaps in return for concessions from Turkey and Russia elsewhere.
We can also expect that the new Trump administration will change traditional American policy and apply sanctions against Iraq if it continues to pay Iran for imports of energy; there will be no more waivers. This is especially true as Trump has no personal relationship with Iraqi Prime Minister Al Sudani and will not make meeting Al Sudani a priority. In the meantime, he perceives Iraq is little more than a proxy for Iran.
It is important to remember that Trump is unpredictable, even to close advisors. In his second term, he will face fewer constraints in Washington than he did in 2017. There is no broad Trump Doctrine for determining strategy to guide him or us.
