At Hatzerim Airbase on 23 October, Israeli defence minister Yoav Gallant told Israeli pilots that “after we strike Iran, everyone will understand what you did in the preparation and training process”. It was an acknowledgement of the time it has taken Israel to respond to the wave of ballistic missiles fired at Israel from Iran on 1 October.
That Iranian attack, in turn, was in response to Israel’s killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, hours after he met the country’s Supreme Leader and President, in gross violation of Iranian sovereignty.
The initial expectation was that Israel would retaliate shortly after the attack and would target Iran’s nuclear and oil facilities. Could it be that Israel has heeded Washington’s counsel to limit its military action in a way to avoid further escalation?
Listening to the US
While avoiding regional escalation may indeed be US President Joe Biden’s primary goal, Washington continues to convey mixed signals. On the one hand, it has urged caution. On the other, it was seen to be preparing to support Israel if it attacks Iran.
Just days before Americans go to the polls, Biden clearly does not want Israel to take any action that would lead to regional escalation. The effects of this would almost certainly have a negative impact on the chances of Democrat and Vice President Kamala Harris. Oil prices would jump and Americans would start worrying about the economy.
While Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu occasionally listens to the White House, ultimately he does what he thinks is in his personal interest, which does not necessarily coincide with the interests of Israel.
There may be several reasons why he has not yet retaliated against Iran. One is that he is more comfortable postponing or avoiding big decisions, preferring to manoeuvre to gain personal advantage. Yet, this does not provide a full explanation. For that, one needs to consider the objectives of the military mission itself.
Attack objectives
The first reason for Netanyahu to attack Iran is a personal one: to save himself. If he loses political power, his political career will end in disgrace, and he will again face court proceedings for bribery, fraud, and breach of trust while in office.
The second objective is strategic: to drag the United States into a war with Iran. Israel knows that, on its own, it cannot destroy Iran's nuclear programme nor bring about regime change—a Netanyahu aim for 20 years. Since 2003, he has tried every trick in the book to get the US to attack Iran and has not yet given up hope. If Donald Trump wins the White House back, Netanyahu will lick his lips.
The Israeli leader's desire to instigate regime change in Tehran is obvious: his latest message to the Iranian people cannot be interpreted any other way. This is part of a broader plan to reshape the Middle East.
