Politics

Gaza war poses political dilemma for Iraq

The prime minister in Baghdad must deal with the demands of the US, Iran and his own country’s armed groups while prioritising his own national interests

Iraqis hold a mass rally supporting the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip on Friday, Oct. 13, 2023., in Baghdad

Gaza war poses political dilemma for Iraq

Ayad Al-Anbar

last update on 20 Nov 2023

Misfortunes are piling up for Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani, Iraq’s prime minister, as the international politics of the Middle East get more complicated.

He never anticipated Hamas’s attacks on Israel and the subsequent war in the Gaza Strip, and the shockwaves from it, which are rippling through his relations with the United States.

Before 7 October, Al-Sudani was pre-occupied with the dinar’s plunge in value against the dollar. He was hoping to visit the White House, to strengthen his relations with key decision-makers in the US to help alleviate the currency crisis dominating Iraq.

The formation of al-Sudani's government – made up of groups under the Coordination Framework banner – denoted a significant shift in the US approach towards Iraq. The coalition managed to reach a majority after MPs from the Sadr Movement withdrew from Parliament. But it includes political figures categorised by the United States as "terrorists."

And they have openly expressed anti-US views, vehemently opposing both its military presence in the country and its political influence over it. The formation of the government came about with regional and global circumstances playing a pivotal role in supporting the Framework group’s rise to power.

Its nomination of al-Sudani to lead the government showed deft navigation of the circumstances. He had a reputation as a non-controversial figure with expertise in international and regional relations, derived from his prior roles in various administrations.

The US moved quickly to establish communication with al-Sudani from the early stages of his nomination through to his appointment and the subsequent formation of his government. Its ambassador to Baghdad, Alina Romanowski, was the first to congratulate the new prime mimister.

That looked like signal of a willingness for a pragmatic approach from the US to internal politics in Iraq, and the outcome of its domestic political decision making. There was a perception that progress was being made away from perceptions that the US was imposing its own agenda on Iraq’s politics, or endorsing its own chosen candidates for government positions.

The nomination of al-Sudani to lead the government showed deft navigation of the circumstances. He had a reputation as a non-controversial figure with expertise in international and regional relations

Truce unravels

Individuals associated with armed Shi'ite factions – particularly those aligned with the political forces of the "Co-ordination Framework" – have suggested that al-Sudani's government amounts to a temporary truce to halt the targeting of US bases in Iraq and the campaigns of armed factions within the country.

There are no official statements confirming any such truce has been established by governmental figures or political leaders within the Coordination Framework. But the credibility of the idea is apparent. Missile attacks on US bases and the country's embassy compound in the Green Zone have ceased.

The events of 7 October changed that. Since then, there have been over 30 attacks on US facilities, specifically targeting the Ain al-Asad and Al-Harir bases.

Getty Images — Iranian men hold Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units, Hashd Shaabi (C), Iran, Iraq, and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) flags in Azadi (Freedom) square in Tehran

And so, it appears the truce has now come to an end. This will put al-Sudani in a more difficult position, with the US as well as the Iraqi public. If he did indeed assure the US that attacks from armed factions on US bases and diplomatic installations would halt, the implication is that he must now pursue those responsible for them, with the missile and drone attacks amounting to a breach of national sovereignty.

And he is likely to know who they are. The political forces associated with the armed factions are significant components within the Coordination Framework". This means the official backers of al-Sudani's government now face the imperative of clearly articulating their position.

Time for clarity

They must either reaffirm their support for the government – and its legal and security measures against those involved in armed actions against US facilities – or align themselves with the armed factions that have taken action in the context of American support for Israel's war in Gaza.

International diplomatic activity around Baghdad has stoked speculation, but not much clarity. The US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken's visit to the Iraqi capital and his meeting with al-Sudani ended in an official statement, but attention soon centred on disparity between it and the content shared on Blinken's social media platforms. It all suggested that the primary purpose of the visit has not been formally disclosed.

Al -Sudani's subsequent trip to Tehran for meetings with Iran's supreme leader and president support the hypothesis that he conveyed a message to the country's leadership.

The Iranian response – as conveyed in the words published by Ayatollah Khamenei following his meeting with Al-Sudani – could be construed as a reply to a message from the US. Khamenei urged Iraq to assume a "distinct role in pressuring America and the usurping entity to cease the massacres against the people of Gaza."

More than a messenger

The crucial point here is that the role of a messenger between Tehran and Washington, or Tehran and other nations, does not suit the prime minister of Iraq.

It does not live up to the vision for the government in Baghdad to restore Iraq's regional and international influence. The Iraqi government's action internationally should be about its own national interest, rather than as serving as a conduit for messages between other rival parties competing for international influence in the region.

Al-Sudani's government requires a comprehensive and critical review, with a strong emphasis on avoiding the repetition of the mistakes made by the administrations of Adel Abdul-Mahdi and Mustafa Al-Kadhimi. Both of them failed to boost state's prestige and protect its sovereignty.

The Iraqi government's action internationally should be about its own national interest, rather than as serving as a conduit for messages between other rival parties competing for international influence in the region.

Al-Sudani cannot afford to replicate the mistakes of the Abdul-Mahdi and al-Kadhimi administrations. Both made critical errors against the state and its sovereignty in their pursuit of staying in power. They failed to strike a delicate balance between reasserting the authority of the state and appeasing internal and external forces.

Adel Abdul-Mahdi's touted mission – to establish a balance in the relationships among the conflicting regional parties in the area – did not work. He inadvertently allowed non-state actors to exert control over the state's decisions and resources, in the mistaken belief that involving the groups in decisions would reassure them.

Similarly, Mustafa al-Kadhimi's narrative – of assuming the role of mediator between Saudi Arabia and Iran – failed to restore Iraq's standing as an influential state in the eyes of Iranian political decision-makers. His approach, which he once described as "dancing with snakes" did not prolong his time in office.

Al-Sudani's limited options

In the coming days, al-Sudani is set to face a critical political challenge, internationally and at home. It will possibly be the most complex since the start of his government.

The outcome is likely to define the fate of his government, either giving it momentum or setting it on course for its own downfall.

On the domestic front, he must convince the Shi'ite political factions within his government to avoid repeating the mistakes seen in their dealings with Abdul-Mahdi's administration. Back then, even when participating in the government, they undermined it by launching Katyusha rockets at embassies in the Green Zone and US military bases.

AFP — Fighters from the Hashed Al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization units) advance towards the town of Tal Afar, west of Mosul,

Al-Sudani must emphasize that the trajectory of foreign policy must align with the national political interest, rather than predetermined positions. The government – as the sole entity responsible for foreign policy decisions – cannot tolerate any encroachments on its role in safeguarding Iraq's sovereignty.

He has limited options in dealing with Iraq's three key stakeholders: Iran, the armed factions, and the US. Primarily, he needs a fundamental shift in the mindset of crisis management, which may be the most challenging requirement for Iraqi politicians.

He has limited options in dealing with Iraq's three key stakeholders: Iran, the armed factions, and the US.

Al-Sudani is restricted to three options:

The first involves persuading the Iranians that the consequences of Iraq's involvement in a military conflict with the US military presence within its borders will not only impact Iraqis but will also have a significant economic impact on Iran. Therefore, Iran must restrain its armed proxies and prevent them from causing embarrassment to the government in its dealings with the United States.

The second involves applying pressure on the political forces overseeing armed factions – or those affiliated with them – to secure their support for the government in its decisions and positions that safeguard the paramount interests of the state. The government's role in preventing these attacks marks the initial step toward restoring the authority of the state.

The third option comes with the highest cost. It involves the political and military confrontation of those attempting to weaken the government and its role in determining the national interest.

To do this, al-Sudani may suggest delaying the elections for provincial councils and advocate early parliamentary elections. He might also imply the government may resign if its crucial national decisions continue to be challenged by groups motivated by international events.

This could help al-Sudani discover that public support outweighs the backing of political forces treating him merely as a means to further their own agendas, which so often involve dismantling the state or turning it into regions controlled by political mafias.

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