The conspicuous rise of Iraq's mafia class

The pioneer in predicting the phenomenon of the emergence of mafias in Iraqi society was the Iraqi sociologist Falah Abdul Jabbar (d. 2018). He articulated this phenomenon in an article titled "Emerging Iraqi Mafias," published in the London-based newspaper "Al-Hayat" in 2009.

In this article, Abdul Jabbar traced the historical genesis of the Iraqi mafia, pinpointing its inception during the sanctions era and its zenith following the invasion.

He drew from the approach used by Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm in his work "Primitive Rebels," concerning the emergence of the mafia, which states "The latter emerges during the transitional period from a rural to a densely urban society or from a centralised mode of governance to another post-centralised mode of governance."

According to Abdul Jabbar: "Iraq embodies both conditions. In the 1980s and 1990s, it transitioned into a highly urbanised society (72% urban population) where the central state collapsed."

Describing the social standing of the emerging mafias, he explains: "A significant portion of the nouveau riche come from the lower strata of society. They do not belong to the increasingly prosperous new political-bureaucratic elite; rather, they are involved in murky business enterprises."

From murky underworld to legitimate public sphere

"Iraqi mafias transition from this murky underworld to the legitimate public sphere in order to launder unlawfully acquired wealth, thereby forcibly redistributing communal affluence and overturning existing class systems." 

While this observation was highlighted 14 years ago, this parasitic class began to creep into legitimate society in 2017 in the aftermath of the offensive against the Islamic State (IS) in Mosul.

Numerous armed factions capitalised on their participation in the efforts to liberate territories from the grip of IS. Their objective was to attain legitimacy, thereby transforming into components interconnected with the power structure, leveraging their influence within the realms of both politics and economics.

This transformation marked their shift from being armed groups wielding illicit weaponry to using this weaponry to attain political and economic advantages.

A recurring phenomenon

The surge of the parasitic class is not exclusively linked to Iraq's governance transformation post-2003. It is a recurring phenomenon that happens with each shift in the political landscape.

Following the overthrow of Iraqi prime minister Abdul Karim Qasim in 1963, a surge in military influence ensued, accompanied by individuals from backgrounds less entwined with political intricacies. Similarly, during the Ba'ath Party's ascendance to power in 1968, emerged what Talib al-Hasan called the "Village Government."

However, the emergence of mafias had a very distinct trajectory after 2003 as they were able to take advantage of weak national governance and authority to ramp up their operations.

Some engaged in abductions and the seizure of public or private assets, while others evolved from clandestine business figures associated with the previous regime or its figures, transitioning into prosperous entrepreneurs aligned with the leadership of the ruling political elite. So, it is just a matter of a shift of allegiances, i.e., transitioning from one ruling party to another.

The sources of funds for this mafia class come from its relationship with the forces of power and influence. This relationship has enabled the mafia class to control the fields of investments, the banking sector, and government projects in the fields of energy and oil.

Crony capitalism

The expansion of the state's oil resources and its increased spending on service and investment projects has produced a system of crony capitalism where individuals can leverage their ties with politicians to obtain lands and loans from banks.

Among the different regimes that have ruled Iraq over the years, two distinct types of mafias can be identified. The first type comprises financiers who align with the ruling elite to safeguard and expand their wealth.

While they don't fit the typical definition of mafias, their inability to operate in the legitimate spheres of business except through their connections to politicians makes them no different from mafias.

The second type of mafia comprises those who emerge from the bottom of society and become businesspeople, run banks, or own investment projects, overnight.

What these two types of mafias have in common is their transformation into wealth-hoarding parasites that could not operate their business without their ties to the political elite.

Iraq provides the perfect breeding ground for mafias. 

It embraces a rentier economic model based on the leasing of land and resources, which produces power centres that exploit the system to accumulate supporters and a group of clients who have a vested interest in keeping them in power.

So the chaos that ensued after 2003 left power vacuums that allowed mafia groups to flourish and impose themselves in all political, social, and economic spheres.

Several influential personalities made a name for themselves during the economic blockade of the former regime of Saddam Hussein. These individuals were able to expand their operations after 2003.

They prefer not to be directly involved in economic activities but rather play the role of middleman to reap illegal commissions and exorbitant rents by facilitating bureaucratic procedures and being the frontman for murky economic activities of some businesspeople.

More than $150bn embezzled from Iraq

To compare, the wealthiest individuals globally, including figures like Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg, face challenges in managing and swiftly transferring their wealth. Moreover, their liquid assets are often dwarfed by the substantial cash holdings of emerging mafias in Iraq.

Former President Barham Salih highlighted "indicators and data that suggest a staggering sum of at least $150bn has been siphoned off through corrupt transactions since 2003."

Read more: How systemic corruption plundered Iraq's economy

Undoubtedly, these funds were distributed among figures within the political sphere and their affiliates, and eventually funnelled out of Iraq or invested in property or other businesses — both domestically and internationally.

The rise in prominence of mafias has had a deep impact on societal values and has shifted political norms.

to a prominent role within society or a novel political façade is currently manifested through shifts in societal values and even political norms.

This newfound parasitic class lacks the ability to foster the development of communal values or cultural conduct aligned with civic principles. Instead, it props up unremarkable individuals within society, transforming them into figures deemed socially acceptable.

The attempt by the rising mafias to control the global sphere and impose their values and behaviour is best described by Alain Deneault, professor of philosophy and political science at the University of Quebec - Canada, in his book "The Banality System."

"We find ourselves in an unprecedented historical phase marked by the ascendancy of a regime that progressively led to the hegemony of the philistines across all facets of the modern state model," Denault writes.

"Petty people support each other, enabling each individual to elevate the other, resulting in the consolidation of power within a continually expanding group. Birds of a feather flock together, contributing to this dynamic. The focus isn't on evading ignorance; instead, it's about strategically enveloping it with symbols of authority."

Read more: Iraq: A land riven by fighting and laced with militias

Rule of thieves

When the mafias controlling politics and economy join forces with the mafia of arms traffickers in running a totalitarian regime, the upshot of such an alliance is a kleptocracy or a 'rule of thieves'.

This system allows corruption and theft of public and private money by facilitating the exploitation of administrative and political positions by those in charge of state facilities. This is the most accurate description of the regime in Iraq.

The rise of mafias and parasitic classes is directly linked to the fragility of the state and the pervasiveness of corruption within it. These classes grow and thrive in the absence of law and the continuation of the relationship between corruption and the system of government.

As long as this political class believes that controlling the political sphere is the only way to perpetuate its access to influence and that its survival in power is the only guarantee for the continued flow of its wealth, it will surely work to perpetuate the chaos that enables it to extend its influence and control over public money.

Until the state regains its strength and power, these mafias and parasitic classes will continue to enjoy political and economic influence.