Hamas might have miscalculated in Gaza

In a video, Deif announced that "history opens its most pure and honourable pages on this day". He called on Arabs across both Israel and the West Bank to "turn the land into flames" for Israelis. He asked his "brothers" from the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen — referring to Iranian proxies in these countries —  to "unite".

This was not a small operation or anything like we had seen in the past: It was, as Deif put it, "the day of the grand plan to end the occupation."

Hamas internal divisions

Were other Hamas leaders aware of this "grand plan"?  Probably not. Looking at internal dynamics within Hamas, there has always been a divide between leaders "in exile" in Qatar, Lebanon, Egypt or Turkey and the ones living in Gaza. Leaders in Gaza have typically looked at those in exile either with suspicion or contempt, or both.

From a purely intelligence perspective, it also makes sense to only share this plan with a very limited number of people. Even if some outside of Gaza were aware that such an operation could take place (theoretically), it would be particularly risky to share operational details, including the targets of the attacks and the date of the execution of the plan.

Hamas leaders in Qatar, Lebanon, Egypt or Turkey are very visible and bound to be spied on. They are much more likely to "snitch": By living abroad, their hosts easily pressure them.

This means that, most likely, the decision to launch the 7 October attacks was taken in Gaza and solely in Gaza. This is a critical point to understand because while keeping the operation secret has obvious advantages, it also has several significant consequences.

The first is that it exposes Hamas to severe miscalculation. To be clear, I am not talking about Hamas's claim that it did not intend to kill civilians — it did. But by keeping decision-making inside Gaza, Hamas leaders may have misjudged the reaction of the outside world.

This includes Israel: Leaders in Gaza likely thought that Israel, a country that had since the beginning of this year been embroiled in the worst political crisis in decades, would be paralysed and confused.

In a sense, this bet was partially correct. There are clear signs of division and confusion at the very top of the Israeli state. Trust in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is at the lowest it has ever been, and for good reason. But the divisions among Israelis on 6 October have since largely disappeared.

Israel is readying itself for a long war that could take months, if not years. This goes against Israel's long history of waging short wars. Hamas may have bet that 7 October would lead to an immediate invasion of Gaza by an unprepared Israeli force.

This would have compounded Israel's initial 7 October failure with piles of new military casualties. Of course, this is not to say that the operation in Gaza is not risky or ugly. It certainly is.

Massive and indiscriminate Israeli strikes have caused unprecedented Palestinian casualties. Israeli military casualties are also poised to be high. But here, Hamas may have miscalculated.

Unmet expectations

The second miscalculation came from Hamas's expectation that the "Axis of Resistance" would fully join Deif's "grand plan to end the occupation". This assumes that Iran is genuinely interested in the Palestinian cause rather than using it for its own interests.

What the Ayatollahs in Iran are interested in is their own survival. While their rhetoric about Palestine certainly means they cannot stand on the sidelines of such an era-defining conflict, they will also act in a way that makes sure they are not the return address for any regional escalation.

Iran is generally happy to let its proxies (Iraqis, Yemenis, Syrians, Afghans, Pakistanis) do the dying and take the risks.

American deployment

Washington's dramatic reaction and the massive deployment of US military assets across the region may also have been something Hamas did not expect.

This explains why, despite Hamas's likely hopes, Iran has not engaged itself and its proxies — particularly Hezbollah — in a full-scale war against Israel. If the Hamas leaders in Gaza had been able to test the waters with Iran and Hezbollah ahead of time, they might have had a better idea of what to expect from their Iranian allies.

This gives us a better idea of what Hamas expected would happen. Hamas thought the unprecedented massacre of civilians, which it filmed with go-pros, would lead to a short and disastrous Israeli military campaign in Gaza.

Hamas was prepared to face such an attack and could even win, particularly if the opening of a second front tied down Israel. This would, in turn, have put Hamas in a position to negotiate the kind of deal Sinwar has always been aiming for since he was elected.

Since 2017, Sinwar has been acutely aware of one thing: Hamas as a "government" has been a great burden on Hamas as a militant/insurgent group. Taking responsibility for more than two million Palestinians is difficult.

The Israeli blockade on Gaza means the Palestinian enclave barely survives. Though many rightfully blame Israel, Hamas is still the de facto government. Some of the popular frustration is bound to be directed at it.

If Hamas wanted to stabilise Gaza, it would have had to fully renounce violence against Israel, which would directly affect its core identity. What Hamas wants, fundamentally, is to be able to continue its fight against Israel without being blamed for the cost this fight subsequently imposes on Palestinians.

As Musa Abu Marzouk, one of Hamas's leaders, said on October 30, protecting Palestinian civilians is not Hamas's job, but it's the responsibility of the United Nations. This is not a cynical expression of disregard for Palestinian life — at least not in Hamas's mind - but the expression of their core belief that the "resistance" must be placed above all other considerations.

Two solutions

As a result, since 2017, it has explored two main solutions. The first was to negotiate a return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza. This is even though Hamas despises Mahmoud Abbas and took over the Palestinian enclave in a coup in 2007.

Still, Hamas offered to let the Palestinian Authority take over civilian duties in Gaza as part of various unsuccessful unity deals. Yet President Mahmoud Abbas saw this proposal for what it was: A poisoned gift. As a precondition for any such return, the Palestinian Authority asked that Hamas relinquish its "weapons" and effectively dismantle most of its military wing.

Hamas said no. This was a non-starter: The very purpose of its proposal was to salvage its military wing. What Hamas wanted was to be able to fire at Israel without bearing any of the consequences — a set-up similar to that of Hezbollah in 2006 and the Lebanese State, for instance.

The other option Sinwar has been exploring is a "Hudnah" - an Arabic term for a binding long-term truce in Gaza. As part of this Hudnah, Sinwar has been making several key demands, namely the development of several infrastructural projects to better the lives of Gazans, including new water treatment and energy facilities and even a seaport for Gaza.

This would ease the burden of governing Gaza, neutralising it as a theatre of war and enabling Hamas to focus on other endeavours — namely, undermining the Palestinian Authority.

Perhaps more importantly for Sinwar, any 'hudnah' would have to involve the release of a significant number of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons. In his speeches, Sinwar often mentioned the number 1,111: This is a reference to the repeated demand by Hamas to release 1,111 prisoners in exchange for the bodies of two Israeli soldiers and two Israeli civilians held in Gaza.

Even after the 7 October attacks, Sinwar released a statement indicating the group was willing to exchange all Israeli hostages against all Palestinian prisoners.

The prisoner issue is very personal for Sinwar, himself a former prisoner. But there is more to this: By freeing prisoners, Hamas hopes to position itself as the sole representative of Palestinians.

A 'hudnah' that would include the release of thousands of prisoners would position Hamas as the most popular Palestinian faction for years to come. Sinwar himself would emerge as the most successful Palestinian figure since Arafat, brushing aside his rivals both outside of Hamas and within the group.

This would be a particularly dramatic come-back, given that Sinwar's popularity has largely faded. Despite new tricks, Sinwar has not been able to deliver. In 2018, a year after being picked as Hamas's new Gaza chief, Sinwar engaged in a new strategy to try and pressure Israel: The March of Return.

It involved a series of violent riots along the border with Gaza. This led him nowhere. In 2021, Hamas launched the "al-Aqsa Sword" Operation by firing missiles at Jerusalem amidst great tensions in Jerusalem surrounding the eviction of Palestinians in the city and after President Abbas dashed the group's hope that elections would be held in the West Bank. This also failed to achieve any tangible results.

The same year, Sinwar was barely re-elected as Hamas's Gaza chief in secret internal elections. The elections were too close for comfort: It took four rounds of votes for Sinwar to be picked despite only being challenged by Nizar Awadullah, a relatively unknown Hamas figure.

Documents found on Hamas commandos who carried out the 7 October attacks suggest official military planning started in 2022. Some reports and statements indicate the idea for the attack emerged a year prior. In 2021, after the elections, Sinwar must have felt that changes needed to be made, and the decision to launch the "Al-Aqsa Flood" likely emerged at that time.