Washington’s chief concern regarding Israel’s ground offensive against Hamas in Gaza is the risk of regional escalation and Iran’s opening of another front against the Jewish state, which could drag the United States into the war.
The United States has communicated to Tehran the consequences of further Iranian involvement in the conflict, and it has moved additional military assets to the region to boost the credibility of its threats.
However, this hasn’t stopped Iran from coordinating with several of its regional proxies – in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen – on attacks against Israel and US military installations in the region. On 30 October, Pentagon officials said that US targets in Syria and Iraq were attacked by drones and rockets at least 23 times in less than two weeks.
An American contractor died, and 24 troops were injured as a result. The following day, Yemen’s Houthis claimed they launched drones and ballistic missiles towards Israel, though Israel said it hit an “aerial target” off the coast of the Red Sea city of Eilat. Meanwhile, Hezbollah and the Israeli army have been exchanging deadly fires across the Lebanese-Israeli border.
To try to compel Iran to contain the conflict, US President Joe Biden ordered two air strikes against targets in eastern Syria last week. The week before that, a US naval ship in the Red Sea intercepted a long-range rocket aimed at Israel that was launched by the Houthis.
If it isn’t obvious by now, the United States has failed to deter Iran from pouring more gasoline into the Gaza fire and from exploiting the crisis to suit its strategic interests.
Also obvious is that deterrence is not a strategy. It never has been. US deterrence against Iran is not failing because deterrence is weak. It is failing because Washington has yet to integrate deterrence into a broader strategy for Iran. The Gaza crisis is just the latest proof of that.