The war in Sudan is more than just a power struggle

Gridlock makes for gruelling battle

Fighting has mostly been limited to ground confrontations, and the army has, thus far, refrained from using its air force, to avoid inflicting considerable casualties. However, this has not helped to speed up the conflict with neither side being able to deal a decisive blow.

Domestic and regionally-brokered attempts to reach a permanent ceasefire have also failed, indicating that the demands of both camps have not yet been met.

A few temporary truces have been brokered to allow Arab and Western embassies to evacuate their citizens, but that's the extent of it. There have been no genuine attempts to find a way out of the crisis — which grows bigger with each passing day.

Foreign commercial interests

Last week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held a press conference at the United Nations where he defended the presence of the Wagner Group in Sudan, saying that Sudan has every right to benefit from its services.

His comments demonstrate the group's effectiveness in mitigating the impact of international sanctions imposed on Russia after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

In agreement with Sudan's de facto powers, Russia is investing in the mining and energy sector and is determined to preserve these operations and networks.

But Russia (through the Wagner Group) is not the only foreign country with commercial interests in Sudan. The United States and European countries are also involved in several of Sudan's sectors — including mining and energy — through their own respective private security companies.

These activities are also conducted under the auspices of the de facto government or tribal militias in their respective strongholds — particularly in the south.

Foreign interests in Sudan are centred on the country's rich resources — particularly its gold, uranium and energy.

They hugely benefited under the reign of Omar al-Bashir, who used them to make up for the losses incurred from economic sanctions. These players were able to take over a significant portion of the economy, forming a class of businessmen loyal to him.

The same setup continued after al-Bashir's removal as the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) through the Transitional Council stood in the way of the transition to a civilian-led government.

The sheer volume and nature of foreign investment in Sudan demonstrates the overlap of interests between these parties, the military and local militias to protect and maintain their investments.

This confirms that Sudan's two military factions and offshoot militias are all part of the intricate web of foreign interests in Sudan and are merely tools to protect these interests. 

This is evident in the number of foreign nationals that have been evacuated in the past two weeks. Many were evacuated via Port Sudan or by air through Djibouti.

Among the evacuees were 936 French, around 1,000 British nationals out of 4,000, 700 Canadians out of 1,200, 1,200 Indians, and 1,000 Chinese.

Germany used four Airbus planes to evacuate its citizens, while other countries, including Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, Ukraine, and South Africa, also conducted evacuations.

According to Saudi Television, the port of Jeddah received a Chinese warship with about 500 Chinese onboard, an Indian ship with 300 Indians onboard, and a commercial ship with 1,982 people, including 65 Iranians.

The number of evacuees from Sudan to the port of Jeddah reached around 5,000 people. Meanwhile, the United States did not provide numerical data on its evacuations, whether by air or via Port Sudan.

Read more: How the US handled evacuating its citizens from Sudan

Regional anxiety mounts

Regional anxiety is on the rise, particularly among the seven neighbouring countries, about the potential repercussions of the ongoing conflict in Sudan.

While the relocation of terrorist and extremist groups is a major concern, these countries are also apprehensive about displacement, human smuggling, illegal immigration, and the proliferation of organised crime gangs. These issues complicate international efforts to calm conflicts in Africa.

Read more: US counter-terrorism efforts increasingly focusing on Africa

Sudan — the third-largest country in Africa by area — shares the waters of the Nile with two regional heavyweights, Egypt and Ethiopia.

As Egypt is witnessing a drop in water levels in the Nile and Ethiopia is putting the final touches on a massive dam, maintaining stability in Sudan and strengthening its army has become a top priority for Egypt, to stand up to Ethiopia's 'intransigence'.

The question remains, however, whether Egypt will stand by idly if the Sudanese army looks like its nearing defeat.

On its part, Chad closed its borders with Sudan since the first day of the outbreak of clashes on 15 April "until further notice." Its primary concern is waves of refugees, as the two countries share about a thousand kilometres of border.

Libya — which suffers from deep internal divisions — is also anxious about security setbacks due to the conflict in Sudan since Sudanese mercenaries and militia fighters have previously played an active role in the internal Libyan conflict.

Meanwhile, Ethiopia is wary over its border areas which have witnessed intense strife in recent years, including a civil war in the Tigray region which erupted in 2020.

The political geography of the Sudanese crisis remains ambiguous, and the battle for control over money will be just as fierce as the fighting on the battlefield.

Wait-and-see approach

So far, influential states have opted for a wait-and-see approach, which, as commendable as it is, is actually part of the problem.

The sheer number of potential mediators, including the United States, the United Nations, the European Union, Egypt, the Gulf states, the African Union, and the eight-nation East African bloc known as IGAD, could potentially complicate peace efforts more than the ongoing war itself.

If the political deadlock continues, the ongoing conflict may be the first round of an expected civil war, morphing into a multi-dimensional game serving the interests of regional and international actors who seek to achieve their goals using funds, arms supplies, and possibly their own forces or proxies.

Is there an alternative approach to ending this wave of violence? One that enables the Sudanese people to build on the political participation that non-violent activists fought for four years ago?

As of now, the answer is not clear.

Until then, international players will be keeping a watchful eye to see how the conflict unfolds in the coming weeks.