How the US handled evacuating its citizens from Sudan

Some may wonder why the United States appeared to play a more active role in helping private US citizens living in Afghanistan at the time of the US withdrawal in August 2021 and its aftermath.

In that instance, the US government helped make special arrangements for evacuating diplomats, many private US citizens, and tens of thousands of Afghan civilians who felt endangered because of their affiliation with the United States and other allies who were ending a 20-year military presence aimed at defending the Afghan government that collapsed during the Taliban takeover more than a year and a half ago.

The United States made a bigger effort to evacuate a larger number of people outside of its embassy and military teams in Afghanistan for two main reasons. 

First, it felt some sense of obligation and commitment to help Afghans who risked their lives working with the United States for years, and many of the Americans in Afghanistan were in the country engaged in activities aimed at supporting the overall US government mission. 

Second, the United States had more capacity and knowledge about the situation in Afghanistan — particularly the security dynamics — given its long and sizable presence in the country. In other words, it made more of an effort in Afghanistan than Sudan because it had the resources in place, but it also felt that it should, given that the decades-long mission fell drastically short from meeting its stated goals.

In Sudan, none of those conditions were present. The United States had only a small number of US military personnel on the ground — a contingent of Marines who served as guards at the embassy in Khartoum. 

As a result, the United States lacked the deep knowledge of Sudan's security landscape that it possessed after decades in Afghanistan, and that combination of a lack of situational awareness, as well as a very thin security presence on the ground, limited the practical options. 

2. Only a small number of Americans in Sudan appear to have sought out help

A second factor that helps explain why the US government hasn't appeared to have done as much for American citizens stuck in Sudan relates to the overall numbers of US citizens, why some of them are likely there, and the conditions that they chose to operate in given the multiple warnings the US government gave about the risks of travelling to and living in Sudan. 

According to US government officials, there were about 16,000 American citizens living in Sudan when this conflict broke out. 

Less than a third of those citizens – about 5,000 people – were actually registered with the US embassy, which means they reached out to the embassy at some point after their arrival and provided their contact information in the event that they wanted to receive messages from the US government about various contingencies that might unfold, like what to do in this latest round of conflict. 

The US government has repeatedly warned American citizens not to travel to Sudan, and they cautioned that any consular services and help inside of the country from the US embassy might be very limited due to the conditions on the ground. 

Furthermore, many of the US citizens living in Sudan appear to be Sudanese Americans with family ties and deep familiarity of the situation on the ground, and one reason why most of these people did not reach out for US government help is that they assessed correctly that there would be severe practical limitations with what the US government could and would do to help them personally as the conflict grew more volatile. 

3.  Lack of institutional capacity and resources in US civilian agencies

A third factor that might help explain the US response in evacuating its own citizens from Sudan may relate to the relative lack of resources and know-how in key US civilian agencies, including the State Department. 

Despite all of the talk for nearly two decades inside US foreign policy circles about the need to invest more resources in order to develop and modernise agencies like the State Department, these civilian agencies still remain a lower priority compared to the investments made in the US military. 

The efforts to promote so-called "smart power," including two separate major reviews resulting in reports aimed at reforming civilian agencies of foreign policy, have not yet achieved their promise of fundamentally changing the way the State Department and other civilian agencies of the US government operate. 

These efforts to prioritise US civilian agencies of foreign policy after two decades of a very militarised approach to US national security still haven't produced the results many people hoped for in proposing the reforms. 

Add to it the simple fact that there was a recent brain drain of talent from the US foreign service under the previous US administration, and what one sees in today's State Department is an agency that struggles to maintain its relevance in the 21st Century. 

In the case of the Sudan evacuation, this weakened capacity of the State Department doesn't seem to be as major of a factor as the first two points noted, in part because the diplomatic mission inside of Sudan wasn't that large. 

Furthermore, the State Department has played an important role in successful evacuations of US citizens from conflict zones in the past, despite the resource imbalances.   

A prime example of this was the successful evacuation of nearly 15,000 American citizens living in Lebanon in July and August 2006 during the war between Israel and Hezbollah. 

The State Department has the lead responsibility for helping evacuate US citizens in cases like this, and an after action review found that this evacuation required significant help from the Department of Defense in helping provide safe passage as well as resources to secure sea and air transportation for large numbers of people. 

So, even in relatively successful operations that helped evacuate large numbers of people, the Pentagon necessarily has to play a large role. 

4.  A growing risk aversion in US diplomacy over several decades

A fourth factor that contributed to how the United States has responded to the challenge of evacuating US citizens from Sudan is linked to a longer-term trend that has hampered US diplomacy and consular activity across the world: the fact that the United States has a very low tolerance of risk for its diplomatic personnel and seeks to preserve its military assets already strained by a broad range of global threats and contingencies. 

Read more: US hesitance to retaliate against attacks emboldens Iran

During the early weeks of Sudan's conflict, the US State Department repeatedly stated that the uncertain security situation in Khartoum and the closure of the airport made it unsafe for an evacuation of private US citizens coordinated by the US government. 

Again, this is fairly standard practice, given the trajectory of US diplomatic operations in recent decades. 

The last thing US policymakers want to see is a repeat of the Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981, which is why the United States chose to prioritise evacuating the embassy. 

Add to this legacy a series of threats and deadly attacks like the 1998 embassy attacks in Africa and chronic terrorist threats, and US diplomacy has been increasingly conducted behind higher and higher blast walls in secure compounds that are closed more quickly due to threats compared to years past. 

Finally, the politicisation of the 2012 attack on US government facilities in Benghazi, Libya, have added to the risk aversion and the strong disincentives for US officials to put themselves in jeopardy in order to help evacuate private citizens.

As the crisis in Sudan continues to unfold, thousands of Americans remain in a volatile situation. Time will tell if the successful evacuation of hundreds of Americans this past weekend is an isolated incident or the first of many more missions. 

Most likely, Americans living in Sudan will have to rely on a mix of their own resources, limited help from the US government, and assistance from other countries neighbouring Sudan.