“Somaliland is a completely different country from Somalia.” Those were the words of US President Donald Trump at an election rally in Minnesota last month. A few days later, China and Djibouti issued a joint statement rejecting Trump’s assertion. Somaliland is not an independent entity, they reminded him; it is an integral part of Somalia. The timing was no coincidence. Israel, which wants a naval base on the Red Sea coast near Yemen, had just sent its first ambassador to the region.
Although the Trump administration has not announced any formal departure from its ‘One Somalia’ policy, the president’s remarks renew attention to the territory. Some in the Republican Party want Washington to follow Israel and recognise Somaliland as a country. The territory has strategic significance near the entrance to the Bab al‑Mandab Strait, the gateway to the Red Sea. In Yemen, on the opposite side, the Iran-backed Houthi militia is capable of disrupting international maritime shipping.
There is a much broader context to the statement issued by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his Djiboutian counterpart, Abdoulkader Houssein Omar. Their meeting coincided with rising tensions in the Red Sea and the Bab al‑Mandab Strait following the resumption of fighting in Yemen, tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa, and Egypt’s promise of military aid to the Saudis. Taken together, these developments carry significant implications for China’s strategic ambitions in the region, from the security of maritime corridors to its investment in infrastructure, trade networks, and regional connectivity.
Confronted with mounting challenges, Beijing seems intent on deepening its partnership with the tiny state of Djibouti, which has a Red Sea coastline. Its neighbours include Eritrea to the north, Ethiopia to the west and south, and the self-governing breakaway territory of Somaliland to the south-east. Djibouti hosts several naval facilities for foreign powers, including the US and China. Now Beijing was to build on that, expanding the scope of security and diplomatic coordination between the two countries.
Unrest erupted in the Red Sea in late 2023, when the Houthis sought to support Palestinians in Gaza by attacking Israeli-owned or Israel-bound commercial ships. China publicly upheld the principle of freedom of navigation through international waterways, much as it did this year over Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz. In practice, Beijing has engaged in negotiations with both the Houthis and the Iranians to ensure the safe passage of its oil tankers and merchant vessels.
China sees the two situations differently. In the case of Hormuz, it considers that a United Nations member state (Iran) was subjected to an American and Israeli attack without international authorisation. In Yemen and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, however, it recognises the authority of the Aden-based government (which is supported by Saudi Arabia) and does not regard the Houthis’ use of military force against the government as justified, although it supports a political settlement to the conflict.
In the Hormuz, Beijing has applied quiet diplomatic pressure on Tehran to end its obstruction of shipping and restore normal maritime traffic. In the Red Sea, it has increased its security monitoring, paying close attention to events. An analysis published in September by the US‑based Centre for Strategic and International Studies revealed that China had been expanding and modernising its facilities in Djibouti since 2024. The base, China’s first outside its mainland, is being upgraded to strengthen Beijing’s capabilities.
But these improvements do not necessarily signal a change in its military posture. Chinese political commentator Zhao Zhijun argues that closer security cooperation with Djibouti should not be interpreted as an intention to expand China’s military presence or replace Western alliances. Speaking to Al Majalla, he said such cooperation does not require substantial enlargement of the base or any alteration to its existing missions.
There are growing fears that the Red Sea stand-off could deteriorate, particularly after Egypt declared its readiness to support Saudi Arabia against Houthi attacks. The Iran‑aligned militia said that would be treated as a declaration of war, meaning that Egyptian installations along the Red Sea coast and Suez could become targets. This would place additional strain on shipping and trade through the region’s waters.
Read more: Egypt’s options shrink amid growing Houthi threats
Developing partnership
China and Djibouti worry about more than just maritime navigation and military activity, given the prospect of a rising terrorist threat in the Horn of Africa. The Houthis in Yemen and Al‑Shabaab in Somalia are believed to be working together to pursue their common interests. In response, Djibouti signed a memorandum of understanding during its foreign minister’s visit to Beijing, establishing cooperation under the Global Security Initiative launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping.
The agreement reflects a bilateral desire to strengthen coordination on maritime security and the protection of commercial vessels passing through the Bab al‑Mandab Strait. It also provides a political framework for developing their security partnership, including modernising Chinese facilities in Djibouti. This may help Djibouti avoid any regional military entanglement while diversifying its security partnerships.
