Egypt’s options shrink amid growing Houthi threats

Cairo’s relative stability in a turbulent neighbourhood has yielded economic benefits, but its recent commitment to help Saudi Arabia has drawn the ire of Yemeni rebels

Al Majalla

Egypt’s options shrink amid growing Houthi threats

Some serious soul-searching is underway in Cairo after the Houthi militia in Yemen said any Egyptian military support for Saudi Arabia would amount to a “declaration of war”.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia are allies, and Saudi economic and civilian infrastructure has been attacked by the Iran-backed Houthis in recent months, so Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi asked the country’s parliament to approve the supply of defensive military aid to Saudi Arabia, which it duly did. Within hours, senior Houthi official Mohammed Ali al-Houthi said on 27 October that to do so would drag Cairo into its war with Riyadh.

If the Houthis targeted Egypt for sending support, it would have economic, security, and political costs. Cairo is keen to avoid ensnarement in the regional mess that unfolded after Gaza-based fighters attacked southern Israel on 7 October 2023, showing restraint as Israel responded by pushing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to Gaza’s border with Sinai and turning a deaf ear to the inflammatory rhetoric of Israel’s far-right ministers.

In response to Israel’s attack on Gaza, the Houthis attacked Red Sea shipping, diverting vessels and revenue away from Egypt’s Suez Canal transit route, and instead forcing operators to take the much longer route around the southern tip of Africa. Again, Cairo held its hand against the Houthis, despite the heavy damage it caused to the Egyptian economy.

When Israel and the US began attacking Iran in late February, the Gulf states were targeted by Iran in response. Cairo offered defensive aid to its allies, deploying fighter jets to some and air defence systems to others. It also worked hard diplomatically to push for de-escalation through a process in which Pakistan led. Egypt has steadily cultivated diplomatic channels with Tehran, but Houthi attacks against Egypt would complicate that.

AFP
Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian is greeted by Egypt's President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi during the D-8 summit in Cairo, Egypt, on 19 December 2024.

Benefits of non-alignment

Having kept itself out of the different conflicts, Egypt saw some economic gains, in the form of more tourists and more foreign investment, with efforts to make the country an AI data hub and an alternative route for energy supplies to the international market, especially with the Strait of Hormuz having been effectively closed by Tehran. To Egyptian policymakers, this reinforced the idea that non-alignment offered tangible benefits amidst regional volatility.

Egypt has not been completely immune, however. When a drone attack struck the Mediterranean port of Damietta in late July, Cairo discovered that its neutrality only took it so far. Now, the Houthis have warned Egypt that ending its neutrality would put it in harm’s way, hence the head-scratching. Whether to continue supplying the Saudis is now a much bigger decision.

President Sisi framed the military support as an act of gratitude to Saudi Arabia for its financial and political backing

In demanding parliamentary approval for the dispatch of defensive support to Saudi Arabia, President Sisi framed the provisions as an act of gratitude to the fellow Arab country for the financial and political backing it has given to Egypt in recent years, notably since the army (led by Sisi) ousted the elected Muslim Brotherhood government in 2013.

Egypt has therefore felt a moral obligation to support its ally, yet the decisions made in Cairo are not wholly driven by friendship; Egyptian interests are considered, too. For Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula has always constituted an integral part of its national security, just as Arab areas of the Levant are. Language, religion, culture, and history bind Egyptians to the peoples of these two regions, which, strategically, have long served as a buffer against Iranian/Persian and Turkish/Ottoman expansion.

AFP
A commercial vessel passes through an international shipping lane off Yemen's Hanish Island in the Red Sea on 27 July 2026.

A stable Arabian Peninsula also helps to secure the Red Sea, through which ships using Egypt's vital canal must be able to pass. Yet the Houthis' latest capture of territory in western and south-western Yemen, and their escalating attacks on Saudi Arabia, reverses this trajectory, since it introduces Iranian influence into the eastern bank of the sea, including the narrow Bab al-Mandab chokepoint, which is the gateway to the Gulf of Aden.

Iran's interest does not simply relate to the eastern bank of the Red Sea. On the western, to Egypt's south, Sudan has been wracked by a vicious civil war since 2023, pitting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), based on the coast, against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), based in Darfur but spreading south. Iran is eyeing the situation carefully. Houthi attacks against Egypt would also complicate Cairo's diplomatic channels with Tehran, which have been steadily growing over the past few years.  

Meanwhile, by attacking Gulf states since March, Iran has opened the door for some of these countries to pivot towards Israel, particularly if they feel that the American willingness to act as a regional security guarantor is on the wane. Such a pivot would exclude Egypt from regional contexts, confine it within its borders, and marginalise it from any discussion of Middle East security arrangements after the US-Iran war finally ends.

If the Houthis attack Egypt in the coming days, it may draw a military response, potentially pulling Cairo into a complex, multi-pronged conflict

Cost of engagement

Egypt faces other potential threats to Red Sea security, including from its rival Ethiopia's persistent pursuit of a foothold on the coast (it is currently landlocked), and from Israel's recognition of the breakaway region of Somaliland, with a view to building a military base there. These fears transform Egyptian involvement in defending Saudi Arabia from a tactical security choice into a strategic imperative.  

Cairo increasingly realises that neutrality can be far more costly than engagement, and that its security caution risks losing the strategic gains it has accrued over the decades. The Houthis' view of Egyptian support to Saudi Arabia is just one of many threats, but Egypt's armed forces are powerful and may act as a deterrent. Besides, the Red Sea is increasingly important for Egypt, with its rapidly growing population and its need to import natural resources from elsewhere.

If the Houthis began attacking Egyptian infrastructure such as airports, seaports, energy warehouses, or tourist destinations, it could undermine the country's stability in an instant, which would cost billions of dollars as investors and holidaymakers chose to stay away. To the militia, it did not matter that Egyptian officials stressed the "defensive" nature of its military support to Saudi Arabia. The essence of the Houthis' message to Cairo was that 'the friends of my enemies are also my enemies'.

KHALED DESOUKI / AFP
Türkiye's Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, Egypt's Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Ati, and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan pose for a picture ahead of a meeting in Cairo on 21 June 2026.

Decision time

By explicitly highlighting Egypt's abandonment of neutrality, the Houthis are effectively removing Cairo from the pool of states that could mediate a peaceful settlement between Sanaa and Riyadh, a role it aspires to play. It already tried to do so by invoking religious commonalities between the Yemenis and the Saudis, encouraging al-Azhar (the Cairo-based seat of Sunni Islamic learning) to launch an initiative to unite the two peoples under the banner of Islam.

If the Houthis attack Egypt in the coming days, it may draw a military response, potentially pulling the Egyptian armed forces into a complex, multi-pronged conflict. The fear in Cairo is that this entangles the country in an endless war of attrition that depletes its military capacity and its limited economic resources. Policymakers warn of overextending, just as Egypt did in the 1960s, when President Gamal Abdel Nasser deployed tens of thousands of Egyptian troops to northern Yemen in a disastrous, ill-fated intervention.

The region's tough realities have created what some Egyptians consider to be a strategic trap, so the choices made in the coming days and weeks will be significant. Egypt needs to fulfil its pledge to defend Saudi Arabia. How it does so without exposing the country to Houthi retaliation remains to be seen.

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