Politics

The UN is dead: Chemillier-Gendreau on the collapse of international law

In an interview with Al Majalla, the prominent French jurist discusses Israeli and Western duplicity, their violation of international law, and why Israel bears the cost of Gaza's reconstruction

Axel Rangel Garcia

The UN is dead: Chemillier-Gendreau on the collapse of international law

Elie Kossaifi

last update on 13 Jan 2026

French jurist Monique Chemillier-Gendreau has devoted her career to international law and state theory. In May last year, she appeared before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as legal counsel for the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation during public hearings convened at the request of the UN General Assembly, which sought an advisory opinion on Israel’s obligations as an occupying power.

Al Majalla caught up with Chemillier-Gendreau to discuss her latest book, Making a Palestinian State Impossible: Israel’s Objective Since Its Creation. Published by Textuel in May last year, the book analyses how Israel has methodically undermined the possibility of a Palestinian state since its establishment in 1948.

During a wide-ranging discussion, Chemillier-Gendreau assesses the compatibility of UN Resolution 181—the 1947 Partition Plan for Palestine—with the core principles of international law; the ICJ’s 19 July 2024 advisory opinion declaring Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories (including East Jerusalem) unlawful; responsibility for Gaza’s reconstruction; and the current status of international law.

The professor emerita of public law and political science at Paris Diderot University (now Paris Cité University) believes the UN is effectively defunct, though she does not advocate for its immediate dismantling. “The absence of any structure would be worse,” she warns. Instead, she calls for the preparation of a new institution. “It should be called the World Organisation of Peoples—not of states.”

Below is her interview with Al Majalla.

What are Israel’s primary reasons for opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state?

This is a central and profoundly important question. In addressing it, one must distinguish between the stance of the Israeli government—that is, those who have held power for a very long time—and the views of the Israeli public. These are two separate matters. While they may lead to the same outcome, the underlying motivations differ.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stands at an overview of the Israeli settlement of Har Homa (background) on 20 February 2020.

The position of the Israeli government is one of outright rejection of a Palestinian state, a stance that is no longer concealed but now openly declared. From the beginning—with the emergence of the Zionist movement in the late 19th century, the Balfour Declaration of 1917, and the eventual establishment of the State of Israel—there was no room, in the minds of the Zionist leaders who came to power, for a Palestinian state.

The Zionist project was built around a map drafted by the Zionists themselves, circulated from the moment they envisioned the creation of Israel. This map encompassed not only present-day Israel and Palestine but also parts of Syria, all of Jordan, and reached southward into Egypt. This vision became known as Greater Israel. It was driven by biblical and messianic impulses, an attempt to reconstitute the Kingdom of David, whose precise borders no one can define with certainty. This was the vision of Israel’s leadership. At no point were they sincere when the question of a Palestinian state was raised.

They accepted Resolution 181 because it presented a rare opportunity to secure recognition of the ‘Jewish national home’ mentioned in the Balfour Declaration—a concept that had previously been vague in legal terms. Suddenly, with Resolution 181, that Jewish national home, which had expanded during the British Mandate with the complicity and responsibility of Britain, became an actual state. Thus, they accepted the resolution because it served their interests and were, in fact, pleased when the Palestinians rejected it. The Arab states made tactical errors at the time, and the question of a Palestinian state was left suspended and neglected as a result.

During the Oslo period of the 1990s, I do not believe the Israeli government ever genuinely intended to establish a Palestinian state. The evidence lies in the fact that the Palestinian Authority was never granted sovereign powers. What it received was not sufficient to form the foundation of a state.

The Israeli public, however, presents a different picture. I believe that a segment of Israeli society—during the Oslo years, for instance—participated in the process in good faith. The presence of figures such as Yitzhak Rabin attests to this. A portion of Israeli society, particularly among modern, educated circles, believed the process was credible and that peace could eventually be achieved.

However, this public was shaped by the ideology of its leaders, an ideology rooted in an obsession with security, without understanding that Israeli security will never be assured except through the establishment of a Palestinian state. Nothing other than a Palestinian state can calm the Palestinians or eliminate the sources of violence.

Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP — A man raises the Palestinian flag as he watches the return of displaced people to northern Gaza via the Netzarim Corridor.

Do you believe Resolution 181 was compatible with the fundamental principles of international law?

The answer is a complex one. Resolution 181 was adopted in 1947, when the UN Charter had been in existence for only two years. The legal framework that the UN would later develop around the right of peoples to self-determination had not yet fully taken shape. The charter itself was ambiguous on the issue of decolonisation, for a clear reason: it had been drafted primarily by the major Western powers, among them the leading colonial empires of the time, such as France, Britain, Portugal, and others.

The charter does affirm the principle of self-determination in its general provisions and in Article 1. Yet, when it comes to colonised peoples, Chapter XI, titled ‘Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories’, does not enshrine independence as a core principle. Instead, it stipulates that administering powers must govern these territories for the benefit of their inhabitants, without committing to their liberation, while requiring them to submit an annual report to the secretary-general.

When the question of Palestine was brought before the UN, the legal texts establishing the right to decolonisation had not yet been developed. Those would come later, through armed resistance—the Vietnamese in the Indochina War, the Algerians, and the peoples of the Portuguese colonies. These were the great liberation movements that helped reshape international law.

So, I cannot offer a definitive answer to your question. The Palestinian people were a colonised people under the Ottoman Empire, to which Palestine had belonged. After the First World War and the defeat of Germany and the Ottomans, the Treaty of Versailles determined that the victorious powers would administer former Ottoman territories under the Mandate system.

One point that might permit a cautiously affirmative answer is that the Mandate system explicitly stated that Class A Mandates—those applied to former Ottoman territories—were intended to guide their peoples towards independence. This was clearly articulated in both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Mandate instruments themselves. This is what took place in Lebanon, Syria, and other countries that emerged from the Mandate in the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire. One may therefore argue that Resolution 181 did not adhere to what had been outlined by the Mandate system. That would be a fair way to frame the issue.

AFP-Reuters-Axel Rangel Garcia

What complicates matters further is that the Jews and Zionists, supported by British complicity via the Balfour Declaration, claimed a right to self-determination as well. This claim presents a deep paradox. In modern international law, the right to self-determination belongs to a people living on its own land yet subject to the authority of another power, and seeking liberation on that same land. The Jewish people, however, did not possess a land. They constructed one for themselves by asserting their presence on the land of Palestine.

Thus, we were faced with two competing claims to self-determination. One was the Palestinian claim, rooted in a clear legal framework: the Mandate for Palestine, whose terms were explicit, and the later development of the UN’s self-determination doctrine. The other was the so-called Jewish right to self-determination, a claim lacking any clear legal basis. The answer, therefore, is both precise and nuanced. International law at the time had not yet matured into a settled and coherent set of standards.

The settlements are illegal. Israel must dismantle them and compensate the Palestinians for all the damage inflicted on their land and property.

French jurist Monique Chemillier-Gendreau

What is the significance of the ICJ's advisory opinion regarding the Israeli occupation? Could it serve as a basis for concrete action in the future?

This opinion is of immense importance. Yet, regrettably, it remains an advisory opinion and not a binding judgment. The ICJ expresses a legal view, although it stands as the highest judicial authority in the world.

Its significance lies in the fact that the court was asked to examine the full scope of Israel's policies and practices in the occupied territories. It conducted a detailed review, and the conclusions it reached, which have long been known to scholars and researchers of international law, are now stated with complete clarity. Quite plainly, the settlements are illegal. Israel must dismantle them, return the settlers to its own territory, and compensate the Palestinians for all the damage inflicted on their land, property, and other losses. The court also affirmed that all states must ensure they do not support or contribute to Israel's policies in any form.

The opinion goes even further. Until now, international legal discussions had not included a formal assessment of whether the occupation itself was lawful. The settlements had been described as violations of the Geneva Conventions, especially Article 49, which prohibits an occupying power from transferring its own population into occupied territory. For a long time, the settlements were condemned as illegal, but the legality of the occupation itself had not been addressed. When the Geneva Conventions were drafted in 1949, the question of whether a military occupation could, in itself, be lawful or unlawful was not raised. Occupation was regarded as a consequence of conflict, and humanitarian law focused on regulating the conduct of occupying forces rather than on examining the legality of the occupation itself.

AFP — Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Palestinian Authority Riyad al-Maliki (R) at the International Court of Justice at a hearing on the legal consequences of the Israeli occupation on 19 February 2024, in The Hague.

The ICJ has now addressed this issue, marking a major development. It declared that the military occupation, which began as a factual situation in 1967, had by 2024 become unlawful. This is because its prolonged continuation amounts to a form of concealed annexation. This legal characterisation represents a significant contribution by the court.

The serious problem, however, lies in the fact that the court's opinions, and international law more broadly, are often ignored by the major powers. As the saying goes, "the opinion leaves no trace"—it leads to no action. Supporters of Israel continue to repeat the same narrative, claiming that Israel acts justly, possesses the most moral army in the world, and only defends its security. This discourse endures despite the court's opinion, which states that Israel has been violating international law since 1948 or, at the very least, since 1967. The court was bound by the General Assembly's request, which limited its analysis to the period beginning in 1967.

This occupation is unlawful. It must end. Israel must withdraw. The pressing question, therefore, is how to make this opinion, with all the moral and legal authority that the court possesses, meaningful and effective in practice.

International law, in any meaningful sense, no longer exists. The West, which founded it, now violates it.

French jurist Monique Chemillier-Gendreau

How did international law become so ineffectual?

We have arrived at this state of paralysis due to bad faith. One might also call it hypocrisy and opportunism on the part of the major powers—the very states that built the framework of international law and yet have never ceased to violate it. This lies at the heart of the problem. It is precisely what has led to the loss of respect that the Global South now holds towards the European powers and the broader West. Today, we find ourselves stripped of credibility.

It was we (the West) who invented international law. We drafted the UN Charter. We authored the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We negotiated the major treaties and international covenants. And yet, we consistently violated them. Perhaps the clearest example lies in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms that all human beings and all peoples are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Yet, even as we were drafting and adopting that declaration at the UN, the Indochina War was being waged, and the French navy was bombarding the city of Haiphong. Then came the Algerian War, and others followed. Today, we treat migrant populations in ways that openly defy the very human rights we claim to uphold.

PATRICK KOVARIK / AFP — Skulls taken from Algeria in the aftermath of the French-Algerian war sit at the Musée de l'Homme (The Museum of Man) in Paris.

We were proud to present ourselves as the architects of international law and of the great principles of democracy and the rule of law, while simultaneously breaching them. The same duplicity fully applies to Israel. In political discourse, I still hear the claim that Israel is a democracy. But how can this be maintained, even prior to the 2018 Basic Law, and especially after it, when that law declares that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people?

Israel, therefore, institutionalises discrimination. It does not treat its Arab, Druze, Bedouin, and other non-Jewish citizens as equals, despite their inclusion within the Israeli polity. It is a system fundamentally at odds with democracy, and one that violates international law at the level of its foundational legislation.

If the West violates international law, how can it ask China to uphold it?

China is violating international law in the South China Sea, having seized islands that never belonged to it—territories that were under the sovereignty of the Philippines or Vietnam. These islands are uninhabited, yet because they contain oil and gas reserves, they are the subject of intense competition. China's actions are in breach of international law. The US, meanwhile, criticises China, accusing it of violating the Law of the Sea. Yet the US has never ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. How, then, can it invoke a treaty to which it is not even a party?

In this light, the roots of international law's paralysis become clearer. We are living through a perilous moment. International law, in any meaningful sense, no longer exists. The West, which founded it, now violates it. The countries of the Global South, seeing this, ask why they should continue to abide by it.

I believe the UN has died. However, it should not be dismantled abruptly, for the absence of any structure would be worse. But the core of its peacekeeping mechanism is no longer functioning. The war in Gaza, the war in Ukraine, the conflict in Sudan, the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the tensions between Congo and Rwanda—all of these show that the Security Council is paralysed and that the peacekeeping framework, the very heart of the UN Charter, has collapsed.

Of course, excellent agencies remain, such as the World Food Programme and other humanitarian efforts, and these forms of solidarity must be preserved. But the heart has stopped beating. We drafted our first blueprint with the League of Nations, and it failed with the outbreak of the Second World War. We drafted a second with the UN Charter, and it is now unravelling. We must not wait for a third world war. We must prepare for the future. I call, with humility and without any claim to dominance, upon our partners in the Global South and our colleagues across the world: let us work together to design a new organisation. It should be called the World Organisation of Peoples, not of states.

Should Israel, which has destroyed Gaza, be responsible for rebuilding it?

The answer is both swift and unambiguous. It was settled by the ICJ in its 2024 advisory opinion: Israel bears full responsibility for the destruction it has caused in Gaza, and it is Israel that must undertake the reconstruction. Full stop. That, in essence, is the entire matter. This war was entirely unlawful. It was wholly disproportionate. The ICJ stated this in plain terms. Yes, any state has the right to self-defence, but that right is subject to the principle of proportionality. Hamas committed serious and unacceptable crimes under international law—I say that without ambiguity. Around 1,200 people were killed in several kibbutzim during the initial attacks.

But in response, an entire territory has been obliterated over the course of two years. Not a single building remains standing. Hospitals, schools, all public facilities, and virtually all international and non-governmental organisations have been bombed. So, who should pay? The answer is clear: Israel must pay. International law is unequivocal. Israel bears the cost.

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