Israel sharpens its focus amid growing unrest in Iran

During operation "Midnight Hammer" in June last year, Trump ordered strikes on Iran's nuclear installations. In his first term as president, he greenlit the strike on Iran's Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani.

And while Trump is openly averse to war, he is not opposed to exercising a massive show of force. US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth has repeatedly said "F around and find out" when addressing America's foes around the world, in line with a more assertive Trump administration.

Trump sees himself as a "deal-maker in chief," treating  force less as a tool of conquest than as leverage—a dramatic signal meant to change an adversary's behaviour through coercion and persuasion, not outright defeat. He tends to apply it fast and theatrically, in a hit-and-run style designed to avoid long entanglements.

But it's unclear whether this approach will work in the Iranian context. Regime change or prolonged pressure could require sustained US commitment. Having said that, limited strikes on key security organs could be enough to degrade Tehran's capacity to crush protests. And even short of action, the credible possibility that Trump might intervene can throw sand in the regime's well-oiled repression machine, forcing delays, hesitation, and costly redeployments.

We may soon reach the point where Trump will have to make a decision. Growing protests prompted the Islamic Republic to cut internet access. Multiple reports suggest phone lines are cut. This is often the sign of an upcoming forceful repression, with opposition outlets in Iran already reporting a dramatic increase in the use of live fire by Iranian security forces. President Trump warned again, during an interview, that he would hit Iran "very hard" if it killed protesters. However, if he continues to threaten without taking action, this could backfire. Deterrence through uncertainty only works for a time. 

Israel's calculation

The other actor watching closely is Israel. Its approach to exploiting Iran's current vulnerability involves a sophisticated blend of instruments. At one level, there is the visible diplomatic pressure—Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's public expressions of support for Iranian protesters, statements from his office that "we identify with the struggle of the Iranian people". These declarations serve multiple purposes: they signal to Iranians that they are not alone, they unsettle the regime, and they lay the groundwork for future action.

To be sure, one could argue that Israel's involvement only makes it easier for Iran to point to foreign involvement.  On Sunday, 11 January, Iran's President ‌Masoud Pezeshkian said that the US ⁠and Israel want to "sow chaos ⁠and disorder" in ‌Iran ‌by ordering "riots", ‍and called ‍upon Iranians to distance themselves ⁠from "rioters and terrorists". He also warned that the US military and Israel will be "legitimate targets" if America strikes the Islamic Republic, as threatened by Trump.

Later on Sunday, Trump said that he was considering "strong options" in response to the protests in Iran, including possible military intervention.

"We're looking at it very seriously. The military is looking at it, and we're looking at some very strong options. We'll make a determination," he told reporters on board Air Force One late on Sunday.

But at this point, blaming the Mossad for domestic unrest is less a revelation than a reflex. So what can Israel do differently this time? It has shown its ability to operate within Iran during the 12-day war, with Mossad operatives being used to both neutralise Iran's air defences and its ability to launch a massive barrage of ballistic missiles against Israel.

Since the war in June, Iran's air defences have lain in ruin, allowing Israel to potentially operate on a near-daily basis in the skies of Iran, if needed. This gives Israel some freedom of action and space between direct and overt action, which could still trigger a war, and more pinpointed strikes that could both weaken the regime in a future conflict or hinder its ability to quell unrest.

Israel's renewed "freedom of action" does not mean it believes it controls the regime's fate. What happens inside Iran will largely be decided by Iranians themselves—people now risking their lives in the streets. A full-scale war could even prove counterproductive for Israel, because it might halt the protests rather than accelerate them. Many Iranians who could be pivotal to any revolutionary breakthrough—especially risk‑averse, middle‑class citizens with more to lose—are less likely to mobilise if Israeli jets are overhead and the country is bracing for bombardment.

Israel may still choose to strike, but it has incentives to keep any campaign brief: an operation designed to tip the balance, not a sprawling confrontation that rallies the public around the flag and smothers dissent.

What Israel is better placed to do, however, is to convince Trump to make good on his threats. As mentioned, his administration is already in an assertive mode—at least rhetorically. A broader series of US strikes, this time could be aimed at not just removing the nuclear threat, but removing the regime entirely.