The Gaza war has shattered illusions of regional stability and exposed the limits of Israeli and American dominance, but most importantly, it has hinted at what appears to be a rediscovery of Arab agency after decades of accumulated pressures, through the end of the Cold War and the Arab Spring 20 years later. What began as a regional response to Gaza two years ago has rapidly evolved into something much more profound, forcing a historically passive Arab world to reclaim a measure of strategic autonomy. The effects could be huge.
This story incorporates the unravelling of an old order, the catalytic role of death and destruction in Gaza, the failures of hegemony, the rediscovery of Arab diplomacy, and the rise of middle powers, with issues such as Palestinian statehood and Israel’s strategic dilemmas offering key lessons amid the region’s changing contours. Already an undoubted tragedy, Gaza may yet become the catalyst for seismic change.
Old order unravels
Since the early 1990s, the Middle East has been a largely US-managed system. Washington’s security umbrella, underwritten by regional alliances, ensured a rough stability that prioritised containment over genuine resolution. The 1991 Gulf War, in which a US-led 30-nation coalition expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait, confirmed American primacy in the region, establishing a precedent for intervention by international coalitions.
The 1991 war, which culminated in a swift victory, reinforced the notion that the US could dictate terms in the Arab world, from sanctions to no-fly zones. Yet the war left Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime intact, sowing the seeds of future instability. Just over a decade later, the Americans were back. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, though disastrous in its execution and aftermath, initially reinforced US dominance.
Framed as a mission to get rid of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (which later proved to be non-existent) and promote democracy, it got rid of Saddam but unleashed sectarian chaos and insurgency, paving the way for extremist groups like Islamic State (IS) to emerge years later. The human cost was staggering—hundreds of thousands dead, millions displaced. Financially, all told, it has cost the US more than $1tn.
In the Arab psyche, this invasion symbolised the perils of external imposition: a superpower’s hubris leading to regional fracture. It also eroded trust in American intentions, as promises of liberation gave way to occupation and the abuse of detainees in prisons such as Abu Ghraib. By the late 2000s, the unipolar facade was cracking.
The global financial crisis of 2008 exposed vulnerabilities in the neoliberal model that the West had exported to the region via structural adjustment programmes and trade agreements. Arab economies, heavily reliant on oil exports and remittances, suffered unemployment, particularly among the young. This fuelled the discontent that eventually erupted in 2011 in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria.
The Arab uprisings of that year exposed the fragility of regional regimes and the bankruptcy of the old social contracts. From Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution to Egypt’s Tahrir Square, millions demanded bread, freedom, and social justice. These movements were not imported ideologies but organic responses to decades of authoritarianism, corruption, and economic inequality.
What followed highlighted the limits of people-powered change without institutional safeguards. Syrian protests against Bashar al-Assad morphed into a regional and international war by proxy, drawing in Russia, Iran (via Hezbollah), Türkiye (supporting opposition factions), and the US (supporting the Kurds and others).
