Asaad Shaibani: no deal with Israel without troop pullback

In the final part of a two-part interview with Al Majalla, Syria’s foreign minister says the policy of having good relations with neighbours does not equate to acquiescence over land grabs

Asaad al-Shaibani lead picture for part 2
Al Majalla
Asaad al-Shaibani lead picture for part 2

Asaad Shaibani: no deal with Israel without troop pullback

In Part 2 of Asaad al-Shaibani’s conversation with Al Majalla, which was conducted on 13 November, the talk turns to the moment that changed Syria’s global position: President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to Saudi Arabia in May, and his pivotal meeting with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, during the visit of US President Donald Trump. In November, Trump invited al-Sharaa to the White House, the first sitting Syrian president to visit the Oval Office.

Al-Shaibani’s insights add a valuable depth and understanding regarding Damascus’s diplomatic journey since December 2024, notably the shift from a guarded American stance to one of direct political engagement and the easing of sanctions, brought about on 14 May in Riyadh after intervention from the Saudi Crown Prince and from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, when both men “vouched” for Syria.

The impact was immediate. Syria has joined the international coalition against the Islamic State and secured three significant commitments from the United States: on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria’s north-east, on Israel, and on sanctions. Al-Shaibani explains how Damascus has “offered everything” to the SDF, a US partner in the fight against IS. For the first time, he explains that Washington and Ankara are now on the same page regarding Syria’s autonomous region and the need for integration.

Syria’s foreign minister, still only in his late 30s, also discusses the country’s different approach to international relations under the new government. Whereas Bashar al-Assad’s regime leaned on Russian and Iranian support, Damascus now leans closer to the Gulf states, Türkiye, and the United States, whilst striving to keep a balance. He baulks at the idea of taking sides. “We do not believe in blocs,” he says. “We are like an old TV antenna searching for a signal, facing wherever Syria’s interests lie.” After publishing the first part of the interview yesterday, here is the second and final part of the interview.

Al Majalla
Al Majalla Editor-in-Chief Ibrahim Hamidi interviews Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani.


Until May of this year, the American approach was conditional or cautious, but when President al-Sharaa and you went to Riyadh to meet with Trump, it shifted from conditionality to support. Is that a fair assessment?

The Trump administration seizes opportunities. It is bolder than previous administrations. The transformation in Syria took everyone by surprise and is now a tremendous opportunity for change in this region. This new system is open to the United States. If I, as an American, do not capitalise on this, then I understand nothing about politics.

There was openness. The United States had long supported the Syrian revolution. Admittedly, its stance wavered at times, but it consistently upheld core principles. It kept sanctions in place, refused to normalise relations with the regime, and held this line until liberation. Then came the shift. This affected the American presence in Syria, removed Iranian forces and militias from Syrian territory, and rejected the alignment policies that the former regime had pursued.

The current government shares the United States' interest in combating IS. It has also stopped the export of (the illegal drug) Captagon. There is real potential for partnership. If I, as an American, fail to take advantage of this, then I have understood nothing about politics. From the beginning, we sent positive signals—written messages, voice recordings, meetings, phone calls. We had good communication with a well-known Democrat who was fluent in Arabic. We met him several times. He was the first ambassador appointed by the Americans.

They saw that our proposals were rational and coherent, and that there were real challenges on the ground. They began to ask: how do we deal with this (new) system? Do we really know them? Or do we only carry past grievances? We opened channels with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other Arab states, and we maintained a good relationship with Türkiye. More endorsements followed. People vouched for us.

Mustafa Kamaci / AFP
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (L) shaking hands with Syria's Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani on 15 January 2025 at the Presidential Complex in Ankara.

Then the meeting in Saudi Arabia took place...

That was a major turning point, the moment that steered things towards a more practical path. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s support for Syria was pivotal. He used Saudi Arabia's leverage and his own political capital to back this government. He urged Trump to lift the sanctions and invited him to meet President Sharaa. Saudi capital was mobilised in support of Syria at this stage.

The first impression at that meeting was positive. When President Sharaa met President Trump, the atmosphere was constructive. I was present, and Türkiye’s President Erdogan joined via phone. The message was clear: Syria was being vouched for. The impression President al-Sharaa made was strong. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Erdogan encouraged Trump to lift the sanctions.

Trump has very strong ties with Türkiye and Saudi Arabia. His impression of Syria improved markedly, and he embraced the new phase. We then entered discussions on critical issues: IS, chemical weapons, and missing American citizens. Would we be able to form a government? We did. Would it be inclusive? It was. Would we conduct a national dialogue? We did. Could we draft a constitutional declaration? We did.

The government was functioning properly, and trusted partners supported it in Washington. Everything was progressing. Syria was shifting its foreign relations from one geopolitical camp to another, from past alignments to a new direction, one that included the Arab Gulf states, Europe, and the United States. That is the course we are pursuing. The language began to resonate. Profound changes are sweeping the region, and Syria is not a marginal state. Why would I not benefit from it?

Even with the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces, the autonomous Kurdish-led government and militia in Syria's north-east that Damascus wants to integrate into new national structures), we presented a logical approach that helped ease American concerns. Had we handled these matters differently, there would have been no opening from Washington at all.

We opened channels with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other Arab states. More endorsements followed. People vouched for us.

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani

Did you expect to meet Trump?

Why not? We believe Syria is a country of stature, and we see what events are unfolding. The most striking statement the president made was that 'Syria befits the Syrians.' We Syrians hold our heads high. We see Syria as important, not as a minor state hoping for someone to grace us with a meeting, quite the opposite. We believe we add value to those who choose to engage with us, not the other way around.

When President Sharaa met Trump, it was the first time a Syrian president had set foot in the White House. He promised to support you with the SDF, Israel, and sanctions. Can you outline your vision for each?

The agreement reached with the SDF has strong American backing. Türkiye and the United States always disagreed on this issue, but for the first time, they have found common ground. Our approach has been entirely rational. Nothing more could have been done or offered to the SDF.

We proposed an agreement, mutual respect, a belief in shared governance, a clear commitment to Kurdish rights, and even mediation with Türkiye. We are resolving their disputes with Ankara. Some are wanted by the Turkish authorities, but we are working with Ankara to secure pardons. We extend concessions and facilitation to the fullest extent, ready to do whatever is needed. Let us move past this stage and advance together. We do not want to remain stuck on this. If the former regime had offered even a fifth of what we are offering now, the SDF would have accepted.

Did the Americans pledge to ensure the agreement is implemented?

They did. There are two camps. One views the SDF as an essential ally or favoured child and insists they cannot be abandoned. The other argues for a full withdrawal from Syria and for letting events take their course. We have developed an approach that allows them to neither abandon the SDF nor leave them in a legal or political vacuum, but rather to oversee their integration, ensure their well-being, and proceed confidently.

To avoid another Afghanistan (exit) scenario, we are offering clear guarantees. We are resolving the legal ambiguity surrounding the SDF and not demanding that the United States walk away from them. Rather, we propose their integration into the Syrian government, while ensuring their respect and protection. If the United States chooses to remain, let that presence be coordinated with the Syrian government. If it chooses to withdraw, let it do so in peace. That, in essence, is the proposal. It was well received. It allows Washington to say 'this is our ally, and we did not abandon them. On the contrary, we integrated them.' Today, they are partners in the Syrian government.

On the matter of IS, Syria has joined the coalition and is actively fighting alongside its members. This does not diminish the fight against IS—it strengthens it. The SDF had previously warned that their abandonment, or a US withdrawal, would result in the return of the Islamic State. That is not going to happen.

AFP
Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi (left) watches as Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani (center) greets US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack after signing an agreement in Damascus on September 16, 2025.

Regarding Israel, what is your vision?

We expect that by the end of the year, an agreement will be reached between Syria and Israel. It would be similar to the 1974 agreement, with slight adjustments.

Will there be three buffer zones?

No.

Three areas of limitation?

These would be temporary, not permanent. They are intended as confidence-building measures. The 1974 agreement included provisions designating areas where military forces would be absent, where only police and observation posts were permitted, and where a military presence would be established at a set distance. The new agreement would closely follow this structure, with minor amendments.

We firmly reject any suggestion of discarding the 1974 framework in favour of an entirely new deal. It was endorsed by the UN Security Council. Why should we now pursue a new agreement in 2025 and seek fresh UN validation? There is no justification for that. Any attempt to take advantage of our current situation to seize additional territory is unacceptable to us.

Will the Americans pressure Israel to withdraw to the 7 December 2024 line?

There is an American promise on that front, but we will not sign any agreement unless a withdrawal takes place. At present, there are efforts to impose a new reality on the ground, then negotiate an agreement later. We reject that approach entirely. If that is the proposal, then the situation will remain unresolved and unlawful. We will not sign an agreement while they are occupying new land. It is absolutely out of the question. Withdrawal is non-negotiable. Nothing else matters.

As for whether certain provisions require trust in the government, that is another topic. We are open to limited arrangements, such as military restrictions in the south. That is not problematic for us, provided it does not affect our national sovereignty, invite foreign interference, or compromise the current security structure. Any security failure in the south will be blamed on the Syrian government. No one else will be held accountable.

We also believe this is an opportunity for Israel. Today, there is a Syrian government that openly declares that it is negotiating with Israel and openly calls for a security agreement, in stark contrast to the former regime. This is a real challenge, but one we are willing to take on. We must return to the 7 December 2024 line and reach a security agreement. We are prepared to address Israeli security concerns directly. Our primary focus is rebuilding Syria. If a peace treaty is desired, that can be discussed after a security agreement is reached, but the Golan Heights will remain the central issue in any such treaty.

If the US chooses to stay in Syria, let that presence be coordinated with Damascus. If it chooses to withdraw, let it do so in peace.

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani

You've mentioned that Syria has shifted from the Iran-Russia axis to the US and the Gulf. Is it transitioning from one bloc to another, or is it striving for a balance?

We do not subscribe to the notion of 'blocs;' we do not believe in them. Our objective is to maintain the greatest possible balance as we emerge from a national catastrophe. Today, we are entering a reconstruction phase that is as significant as the revolution itself. Rebuilding Syria could take ten years. Full reconstruction, including the return of the displaced, rebuilding schools and hospitals, and realising our national vision, may take up to 15 years.

Within this framework, we aim to maintain balanced relations with key global powers. We do not wish to become entangled in security, intelligence, or military arrangements that could distract us or weaken our position. That said, there can be varying degrees of alignment. It is not an issue if we lean more towards one direction than another. We are not leading a unified march. We are pursuing balance.

We are like an old TV antenna, turning to the signal of Syrian national interest. We need support and assistance. Syria is not a global power that alters international balances. If we align with America, Russia will not collapse. If we side with Russia, Ukraine will not fall. These are issues beyond our influence. Wherever we find genuine stability, economic support, and backing for Syria's transitional phase, that will be our path.

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