Asaad al-Shaibani on how Syria untangled its Russian knot

In Part 1 of a two-part interview with Al Majalla, Syria’s foreign minister explains how the Assad regime fell and how President Ahmed al-Sharaa went from a wanted man to a world leader

Al Majalla's Editor-in-Chief Ibrahim Hamidi interviews Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani on 14 November 2025.
Axel Rangel Garcia
Al Majalla's Editor-in-Chief Ibrahim Hamidi interviews Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani on 14 November 2025.

Asaad al-Shaibani on how Syria untangled its Russian knot

Few could have imagined that within a year, Ahmed al-Sharaa would go from a designated international terrorist to meeting leaders of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. But what has happened in Syria since 8 December 2024 has been anything but a routine diplomatic adjustment. Instead, there has been as a fundamental redefinition of Syrian politics and of Syria’s voice abroad.

At the centre of this shift is Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani. Still only in his late 30s, al-Shaibani has emerged from the depth of the revolution to the frontline of international diplomacy. He neither mimics the language of the former regime nor repeats the slogans of the past. Instead, his approach is altogether different.

In this extended conversation with Al Majalla conducted on 13 November, al-Shaibani discusses the country’s major strategic decisions, including the deliberate neutralisation of Russian air power over northern Syria in late 2024, and the preparations that led to the historic meetings between President Ahmed al-Sharaa and US President Donald Trump in 2025.

Al-Shaibani knows that Syria needs help and rejects the idea that it can be an island in international relations. He cites the support of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Türkiye, and the United States since ousting Assad 12 months ago but says there was already a plan in-place before they took Damascus. “I have been working on foreign relations since around 2018. We already had a vision of how Syria should look in the future and what keys would open the door to that future.”

Honest diplomacy

What marks al-Shaibani’s diplomacy is its avoidance of revolutionary overbidding and emotional pressure. It is a diplomacy built on realism, perseverance, and long-term planning. He summarises it as “honest diplomacy,” and is frank as to Syria’s situation. “We have a devastated country,” he says. “We want good relations with all states so they can help us. And we move step by step.” This has impressed foreign capitals. States that once saw Syria only through a narrow security lens now have a leadership delivering on its promises. “What I told them would happen did happen,” he says.

Regarding the “Russian knot,” al-Shaibani says he found himself across from senior Russian figures at the Bab al-Hawa crossing at a pivotal moment just less than a year ago, when he told them that the opposition would be in Damascus in 48 hours. Crucially, the Russians were told: “Bringing down the Assad regime does not mean Russia must leave Syria.” That led the Russians to fall back, which in turn led to Bashar al-Assad’s army disintegrating.

The new Syrian government’s approach to the Russians came from critical analysis, gauging Moscow’s interests and Syria’s priorities. It has led to a redefined relationship that remains an ongoing process. The Russian bases at Hmeimim and Tartus are part of those considerations.

Here is Part 1 of the conversation.


AFP
US President Donald Trump and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa at the White House, Washington, on 10 November 2025.

In 2024, President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham were blacklisted, with no recognition either from Arab states, the West, or the UN. Today, he meets world leaders, a staggering diplomatic leap. How did it happen?

There is widespread astonishment, but personally, I am not surprised. I’m not sure why, but the success achieved through Syrian diplomacy does not strike me as improbable. I have been working on foreign relations since 2018 and have had access to many countries in that capacity. A vision for the (Syrian) state was already present in our minds—what Syria could become, and what keys would unlock that future.

You cannot speak of a project that leads a nation without foreign relations. We are not an island cut off from the world. The international arena often operates on rigid, pre-packaged assumptions that individuals must learn to navigate. If one remains captive to those assumptions, failure is virtually guaranteed. What is required is perseverance and the creation of new tools to influence the outside world.

Was the transformation sudden?

What occurred on 8 December 2024 was, in itself, a profound surprise, not only for the Syrian people but for foreign governments, whether they were invested in Syria or not. The event was anything but ordinary. What caught everyone’s attention was the sheer velocity of change, how rapidly things began to move inside Syria. Diplomatic relations accelerated almost immediately. We began receiving delegations and engaging with both domestic and international actors, especially decision-makers in the region.

Naturally, there was initial hesitation. They wanted to know who we were and where we came from. Any political shift is bound to provoke scrutiny. But that scepticism began to dissolve at the first meeting, once they heard the vision we presented, the clarity of our thinking, and our national orientation. Suddenly, here was a message rooted in patriotism, openness, and sincerity.

AFP
Syrians celebrate Assad's ouster outside the Umayyad Mosque after Friday prayers, Damascus, on 13 December 2024.

Perhaps for the first time, we presented a diplomacy that was honest, free of deception and double-speak. We have national interests—our country is in ruins. We want constructive relations with all nations, so they can assist us in this (reconstruction) phase. We move forward in deliberate steps; that was the foundation we laid at the beginning of liberation. Now, countries see real credibility. What I told them would happen has happened. What I forecasted would materialise has materialised.

The new leadership has faced serious challenges and met them with composure. The threat of the Islamic State (IS), the remnants of the previous regime, political landmines, the question of sanctions... Every move we made was backed by a vast team. There were layers of detail, tensions, strain, and strategy, but we showed that we could manage this phase with immaturity. We are not novices who fail to grasp the gravity of our position. There was no naïveté, no simplistic thinking, but rather seriousness, integrity, commitment, and a clear vision. That gave us confidence and convinced our counterparts that we were a trustworthy partner.

The first foreign visit was to Saudi Arabia?

Syrian diplomacy today operates with realism and relentless perseverance. We have learned from the missteps of others and managed to chart a clear and deliberate course. Yes, our first destination was Saudi Arabia. From there, we raised our flag at the United Nations (in New York) and attended every conference. Even when we were not fully prepared, we showed up and took part.

Until then, Syria had been largely absent from the international stage. Now, it was not only present but active. Syria went from being a distant and misunderstood case to something familiar, engaging, even admired. Syria began to look like a model worth studying or a partner worth having. We began to offer a credible alternative.

Naturally, there was initial hesitation on the part of the US. But diplomatic relations accelerated almost immediately. We began receiving delegations.

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani

Did you foresee this trajectory on 26 November 2024 (before striking out from Idlib to retake the country)? Did you envision that by the end of 2025, Ahmed al-Sharaa would be Syria's president, meeting Donald Trump?

We dreamt it, but dreams alone are not enough. We envisioned it, yes, but we also worked tirelessly to reach this stage. Dreams do not build nations; work does. We laboured with discipline to earn each milestone. Yesterday we were in Washington, today we are in London. We have not paused.

And you visited China?

Yes. We do not undervalue any relationship, partner, event, or platform that might serve Syria's interests. This persistence yields results. The world today seems genuinely hungry for a successful example that can lift the fog of despair, especially in the Arab region. The previous regime cast Syria in a grim light—rigid, irrational, hostile to the world… closed off from reality, inflated with empty pride. But people love Syria, and when they see that Syria now has representatives who speak with dignity, who are likeable and beneficial, it becomes, frankly, the best kind of partnership.

Al Majalla
Al Majalla's Editor-in-Chief Ibrahim Hamidi interviews Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani on 14 November 2025.

One of the most complex challenges was Russia, which has a military presence in Syria and, to some extent, was complicit in the bombing of Syrian civilians. How did you manage to untangle that knot?

We had to ask ourselves why we were defeated (years earlier). The fall of Aleppo in 2016 marked the beginning of the revolution's unravelling, but it was between 2019-20 that we suffered our greatest loss. The March 2020 ceasefire in Sochi, brokered between Türkiye and Russia, came when despair had reached its peak. But President al-Sharaa taught us a different discipline.

He and those around him do not deny the reality of defeat, but categorically reject surrender. We may lose a battle, that is acceptable. What is not acceptable is resignation. We return, assess our failures, and ask where we went wrong, what we should have done, and how we move forward. We do not dwell in mourning but move immediately toward solutions. Evaluating the revolution, we had to admit, frankly, that 2020 was a year of crushing defeat. And we needed to understand why.

Was this when the losses in rural Idlib occurred?

It was not just Idlib. We had lost nearly everything: Eastern Ghouta near Damascus, Daraa, Homs… Between 2016-20, we endured a series of devastating setbacks. We dissected the regime's strategy, how it managed to claw back territory, exploit our weaknesses, take advantage of internal divisions, and leverage Russian intervention. It manipulated certain actors and capitalised on disarray. This was all part of our analysis.

We asked ourselves difficult questions. Why are segments of the Syrian population still ambivalent? Why have some communities not taken a clear stance against the regime? Why did certain sects align with a regime that offers them nothing in return? We had to think about how to prevent these groups from rallying behind the regime, even symbolically, and how to ensure that the regime could no longer exploit them.

In this questioning, we asked ourselves about the Russians. We could not initiate any meaningful change in Syria without addressing the issue of Russian air power. Its advantage in the skies remained decisive. It would bomb a city into submission, then send in ground forces to claim it; that was the pattern. By 2024, we faced a strategic choice. Iran could no longer offer the (Assad) regime meaningful support; its influence was diminished. But the Russians were still active.

AFP
A military parade commemorating the 78th anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory over Nazi Germany during World War II, at the Russian Hmeimim Air Base in Syria's Latakia governorate.

We had been monitoring Hmeimim Airbase closely. There were roughly 20 aircraft stationed there. If activated, they could have destroyed everything we had built. This was especially dangerous because, by 2024, the Salvation Government in Idlib had begun to foster real economic development. The region had changed. Industrial zones had been established, residential areas had grown, and from 2020-24 people had experienced a rare period of calm.

To return to aerial bombardment would have been a catastrophic regression. We had to neutralise Russian air power, so we asked: what are Russia's true interests in Syria? Are they tied to Bashar al-Assad as an individual, or do they lie in maintaining influence in Syria as a strategic space? On that basis, we crafted a plan.

We avoided frontlines where Russian forces were present and stayed away from the coast and from other zones where Russia had a direct presence. Instead, we shifted the axis of confrontation to a distant front, Sheikh Aqil, where the regime was backed by some Iranian elements. By the midpoint of the campaign, after the launch of Operation Deterrence, President al-Sharaa recognised that the balance had begun to shift. It was then that he judged the moment ripe to open a direct channel with Moscow.

By 2024, we faced a strategic choice. Iran could no longer offer the (Assad) regime meaningful support, but the Russians were still active.

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani

After the capture of Aleppo?

Yes, after Aleppo, and as we began operations toward Hama. Around that time, it became clear that someone might finally be willing to listen. But just then, the bombardment of Idlib intensified dramatically. The city was emptied. Aleppo also came under heavy fire. We were astonished. The regime and the Russians were shelling a city that, only yesterday, had stood with them.

It is one thing to bomb Idlib, a city that had broken away since 2015 and was populated by revolutionaries, but to bomb Aleppo, a city that had been under your control and was still inhabited by your own supporters? What changed overnight to justify such violence? It revealed a criminal mindset. The regime does not see people; they do not factor into its calculations. The Syrian people are its last concern.

With whom did you speak? The Russian military?

No, not with the military command. We spoke with a very senior figure. I will not name them, but it felt as though I were speaking directly to President Vladimir Putin.

Was this through Turkish mediation?

No. It was a direct channel. First, we issued a public statement. Shortly afterwards, a trusted intermediary told us: "Putin read the statement and liked it." We got the message, and we understood what it meant. The message had landed. Then came the meeting. It was not a phone call; it was a political encounter, face-to-face, at the Bab al-Hawa crossing. They came to us. We chose not to speak from a place of triumph.

We began from a different premise. 'We are the Syrian people and we chose change. Russia's alignment with the regime was a mistake, but mistakes can be corrected. That position can be revised and the partnership can be rebuilt, not with a regime that cannot be trusted, but with a nation and its people.'

Alexander Zemlianichenko / REUTERS
Russia's President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with Syria's President Ahmed al-Sharaa during a meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, on 15 October 2025.

I asked them: 'How many times will you return Aleppo to the regime? Russia handed Aleppo back in 2016.' I said: 'Imagine your son playing in the street with a ball. Someone takes it from him. You would not buy him another, nor scold him for letting it go. You gave Aleppo back to the regime. You invested in it. You damaged your international reputation to restore it. And the regime abandoned it. You are now in a partnership built on illusion.'

I also said: 'If you have real interests in Syria, they can be organised through the new government on national foundations, not through deals or militias. Those arrangements are always temporary. They are tied to the regime, not to the people. Russia signed a 49-year agreement with the regime (later extended indefinitely) but it was never ratified by parliament. It was a deal with a gang, and when the gang disappeared, so did the deal. We focused on rational, interest-based dialogue. We made it clear: 'let us move past this phase, let us help Syrians find relief.'

We entered negotiations (with Russia) regarding the bombardment. We could strike bases and strategic sites, but chose restraint. However, the shelling of Idlib and Aleppo had to stop. We conveyed a pivotal sentence, one they took seriously: bringing down Bashar al-Assad does not mean Russia must leave Syria. It was a key phrase, clear in its meaning. 'Do not tether your future to Bashar. He is transient. There is a government in place with which you can build.'

We agreed on several points: no political mobilisation against us; no alarmist sessions at the Security Council; no media incitement against the transition underway; no bombardment of cities. We agreed to future meetings once the situation stabilised. If they wanted to withdraw from certain positions, we could assist them, given the inevitable collapses ahead. We even asked them to help convey to the regime that the game was over.

We did not want a battle in Damascus. It would have destroyed the city. Damascus cannot withstand such violence. Two or three shells would reduce its historic quarters to rubble. That kind of loss is irreversible and perhaps even impossible to restore. We were determined to avoid that. We anticipated a fierce battle, especially in fortified areas like Qalamoun, but thankfully, the regime collapsed.

We are rebuilding Syria's relationship with Russia on the basis of respectful engagement and in line with Syrian interests

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani

Did they inform the regime (that the game was up)?

We do not know. But we did share that key phrase. And at the end of the meeting, they asked me if I expected to reach Damascus. I said: 'Yes, absolutely.' They asked how long it would take. I said 48 hours. When they heard that, they began withdrawing their assets from Damascus. Who saw them? Who noticed? Bashar's people. That triggered their collapse. If the Russians were pulling out, it meant they knew we were coming. At that point, we were still in Hama.

I believe the position they took was intelligent. It was more pragmatic than the Iranians, and the world moves in that direction. Some countries now call for Russia's expulsion (from Syria), but Russia has been in Syria for ten years. We face the monumental challenge of rebuilding Syria. At this stage, we must move past what can be moved past. There is an English proverb: you cannot catch two rabbits at once.

I cannot chase both rabbits. I must focus on the one I want. We are focused on reconstruction. Any relationship that disrupts that goal, we resolve. Any relationship that advances it, we preserve. Any legacy that keeps us mourning ruins, we reject. We are not here to live in the past. Today, we have an opportunity. We look forward. We do not wish to return to old battles.

One final question on Russia. What is the future of the (Russian) Hmeimim and Tartus bases?

There is no finalised agreement with Russia. Negotiations are ongoing. What our people must know, and trust, is that we are rebuilding the relationship with Russia based on respectful engagement. I reviewed the Hmeimim agreement between Russia and the regime. It was entirely one-sided. Syria had no right to object, no right to arbitration. We are reorganising this relationship in line with Syrian interests. If there is mutual benefit, we will proceed. If not, we will not. We will not keep them as ornamental guests. If the presence of those two bases serves Syria's interests, then so be it. But as things stand, they serve no purpose. We will not keep them as decorations.

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