Iran's weakened hand in Iraq shows US pressure is working

Washington’s long-term strategy to unshackle Iraq from Iranian influence is yielding results. Having pulled a potent mix of financial and military levers, the militias have been eerily quiet of late.

Sara Padovan

Iran's weakened hand in Iraq shows US pressure is working

During the brutal 12-Day War between Israel (backed by the United States) and Iran in June, Iran-backed proxies in the region may have been expected to intervene in support of their benefactor. Yet when the guns finally fell silent, these proxies were by and large nowhere to be seen. Iran-backed militias in Iraq were thought to be among the most able, yet they too were conspicuous by their absence.

This now seems to be a moment of profound geopolitical significance. The militias in Iraq that Iran trained, armed, and directed for years, and that once looked stronger than Iraq’s own armed forces, now appear to be mere shadows of their former selves. Their silence during those 12 days in June was not merely tactical; it signalled a deep fracture in Iran’s influence within Iraq, driven by increasingly effective US pressure exerted through financial, political, and security frameworks.

Where are they now?

More than 200 Israeli aircraft and around 300 ballistic missiles crossed Iraqi airspace to strike targets in Iran, yet Iraq’s militias did not defend their longstanding ally and mentor, in contrast to Yemen’s relatively modest Houthi militia, which attacked maritime targets and launched missiles at Israel.

For decades, these Iraqi militias have served as one of Iran’s primary instruments in the region. Born after the US 2003 invasion, they matured through sustained Iranian funding and training. On the battlefields of Syria, Yemen, and Iraq itself, these factions pledged unwavering loyalty to Iran’s concept of Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist), forming a crucial pillar of the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance.’

Morteza Nikoubazl / Reuters
Members of Iran's Revolutionary Guards take part in a military parade to commemorate the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war in Tehran September 22, 2007.

Power shifted after Hamas attacked Israel in October 2023. At the time, Iraqi factions—most notably Kata'ib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq—said they would engage militarily if the US helped Israel. When it did, the militias targeted US and Israeli assets using drones, but the US response was swift and devastating, killing key commanders and destroying weapons depots. By March 2024, militia attacks had ceased entirely.

Deafening silence

When Israel and the US attacked Iran directly in June 2025, Iraqi militias did not engage, contrary to expectations. They launched no rockets and conducted no operations. All they did was issue statements. Analysts suspect that this was not due to military incapacity, but rather to their forced reorientation, driven by both internal shifts and intensifying American pressure.

The militias that Iran trained, armed, and guided that once looked stronger than Iraq's own armed forces now seem shadows of their former selves

Deputy Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament Mohsen al-Mandalawi said "the decline of Iranian influence will not harm Iraq" and stressed Baghdad's goal of establishing an independent foreign policy and diminishing the power of pro-Iran armed groups, while preserving its deep historical and geographical ties with Iran. It was important to consolidate state authority, he said, and disarm non-state actors.

Kazem al-Fartousi, a political commentator aligned with the militias, suggested that the factions had developed independent local structures and no longer followed Tehran's directives unquestioningly. "The boys have grown up," he said. Others, such as academic Prof. Anmar al-Sarai, felt that although Iran's regional influence may have diminished, the militias' clout within Iraq "will not fade easily" and is likely to persist.

Tightening the screws

Despite maintaining a limited ground presence in Iraq, the US has deployed a potent mix of sanctions targeting oil-smuggling operations, restrictions on bank transactions used to procure weaponry, and targeted strikes against commanders.

Antonio Castaneda / AP
Lt. Col. Erik Kurilla (R) of the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, and a US soldier speak near Mosul, Iraq, on 31 July 2005.

These have had an effect in the heart of Baghdad, as evidenced on 29 June 2025, when Judge Jasim Mohammed Abboud—head of the Iran-backed Federal Supreme Court—was compelled to retire by a national judicial committee. Unthinkable just a few years ago, it passed without resistance, in a sign of Iran's diminishing sway.

Political analyst Hamza Mustafa observed that the militias' silence during the 12-Day War marked a shift in the regional power dynamic, possibly influenced by instructions from Tehran to de-escalate. He added that Iraq's government "demonstrated full command in managing the crisis," adopting a neutral policy that gave it a level of autonomy not seen in recent years.

Redefining relationships

Despite Iraq's ongoing political and sectarian divisions, Iraqis increasingly reject those who would use the country as a proxy battleground for their regional disputes. This shifting sentiment is not confined to the streets but is also mirrored in the policies of Baghdad's leaders, who aim for balanced foreign relations and national sovereignty.

AFP
Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani attends the 34th Arab Summit in Baghdad on May 17, 2025.

Although Iran retains influential networks across Iraq, its capacity to mobilise political and military assets is visibly waning. Washington has had success in curbing militia movements, and its efforts to further erode Iranian influence are only likely to intensify, particularly in the energy sector and within the corridors of power.

Analysts think that the absence of Iran's backing will negatively impact its allies in Iraq, but that there are as yet no clear signals of a complete withdrawal of Iranian influence, rather, a change in how it is exerted. This is redefining the Baghdad-Tehran relationship and the contours of influence, which is being recalibrated in line with Iraqi national interests.

Instruments of pressure

Money plays a huge part in that, and therefore, so does the US Federal Reserve, since Iraq's oil revenues—held in US dollars—are deposited at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. This gives Washington the authority to delay or disrupt financial transfers to Baghdad, a formidable lever of influence over Iraq's government.

AFP
Members of the Popular Mobilisation Front (PMF) during the funeral of Wissam Aliwi, the leader of the Asaib Ahl al-Haq faction, in the Iraqi capital Baghdad on October 26, 2019.

Furthermore, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) is a US law that imposes oversight on international financial transactions, affecting Iraqi banks engaged in dollar-linked operations. In parallel, the US has effectively disrupted financial flows to Iran-aligned militias by monitoring dollar-denominated transfers through the SWIFT banking system, thereby gaining oversight over the system. Finally, from 2023-24, the US sanctioned 14 Iraqi banks accused of funnelling dollars to Iran and Syria.

More persuasive than finance, however, can be weapons and military capability. In this context, the Ain al-Asad Airbase in the al-Anbar Governorate of western Iraq is a critical hub for US military operations, serving as a surveillance and command centre for tracking the activities of Iran-aligned factions. Positioned at US bases, Patriot and THAAD Missile Defence Systems offer a strong deterrent against militia threats.

Since 2020, the Americans have been on the front foot, conducting targeted air strikes in Iraq to eliminate senior leaders of Iran-backed Shiite factions. The US presence in Iraq is legitimised by its role in the international coalition, which gives it legal cover to conduct military and intelligence operations. By the same token, this framework also complicates any unilateral attempts by Iraq to end the US deployment.

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