How Türkiye has reacted to the Israel-Iran 12-Day War

At a more practical level, Iran's momentary weakness could let Türkiye expand its own military deterrence capabilities, while re-emphasising its own diplomatic, trade and geopolitical relevance. Turkish defence planners are likely to have dissected Iran's air defence vulnerabilities, the way it hit back against Israel, and Israel's intelligence penetration. It could prompt Ankara to reinforce its counterintelligence capabilities and review the security of its most strategic assets.

Reinforcing capabilities

The 12-day Israel-Iran conflict turbocharged Türkiye's ambitions to advance its indigenous ballistic missile programme. On 20 June, President Erdogan announced plans to develop its medium and long-range missile capabilities. Its short-range hypersonic ballistic missile, the Tayfun, is thought to have a range between 280km and 800km. The Tayfun was test fired in February, launched from Rize-Artvin Airport on the Black Sea coast. Post-launch analysis suggested its range exceeded the 560km range of the previous test.

Türkiye continues to emphasise the strategic value of its domestically-produced defence systems, framing indigenous production as a key competitive advantage. It has also accelerated efforts to rejoin the US-led F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programme after a long hiatus, even though this would require Ankara to potentially deactivate or offload its Russian S-400 aid defence system, purchased in 2019.

The recent 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran will have reinforced the imperative for Türkiye to invest in its own deterrent power and operational readiness, not least because Israel wants to capitalise on its recent military gains by reshaping the regional balance of power. This has not gone unnoticed in Ankara.

Kurds and Syria

With Syria's Interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa still struggling to assert full territorial control seven months after taking power, Israel has positioned itself as a protector of Syria's minority groups—most notably the Druze in the southwestern Quneitra region (with whom it shares cross-border communal ties) and the Kurds in the north-east, whose autonomy claims have long been a point of regional contention.  

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar said in December 2024 that he had "stressed the international community's responsibility to the Kurds" in his calls with world leaders, highlighting "the sacrifices made by the Kurds in their fight against ISIS". He further warned of "the dangers of dismantling Kurdish autonomy".

Since last October, nationalist Turkish politician and coalition partner Devlet Bahçeli has publicly backed an initiative to end the four-decade-long insurgency waged by the outlawed Kurdish separatist group, the PKK. There has been tentative progress, and Ankara is keen for more, because neutralising the threat posed by the PKK and its affiliates remains a top national security priority.

It appears to be working. In a rare video statement released on 9 July, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, reiterated his call for the end of armed resistance against Turkey and a transition to democratic politics. While highly anticipated, the visual evidence of Ocalan's words will reverberate across the ranks of the PKK and its offshoots in the region.

An inaugural and symbolic 'laying down arms' ceremony is expected to take place within days in northern Iraq. Ankara's effective implementation of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process will alter the balance of power with Iran, undercutting Iran's efforts to leverage armed PKK fighters to destabilise or distract Turkey.

At the same time, the process may catalyse PJAK (a Kurdish nationalist anti-Iranian armed militant group) to pursue a different tack inside Iran, especially if Tehran's military and political command structure appears to be weakening.

Fighting for dominance

This is part of a broader calculus, one in which Türkiye seeks to assert itself as the principal actor shaping the region's future, particularly during Syria's political transition. Its main rival for the title of regional powerbroker would now be Israel. Within that dynamic, the Kurds in Syria will play a key role.

Represented by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), they have been supported by Washington for the past decade, partners in the war against Islamic State. Ankara sees the militias attached to the SDF as the extension of the PKK, while Israel may see them as useful bulwark. Within that context, Israel has endorsed Kurdish autonomy in Syria.

As one of the Middle East's longest-running counterterrorism campaigns edges toward a possible end with the full disarmament of the PKK, important lessons are being drawn about the evolving character of warfare, with Israel's intelligence-led operations against Iran and its proxy forces likely to become case studies.

As regional actors look to strengthen their own capacities, they will seek to better predict, pre-empt, and respond to the spectrum of tactics Israel may employ in the future—including sophisticated intelligence gathering, disinformation campaigns, and psychological operations. In asymmetric warfare, intelligence is a force multiplier: it enables the selection of precise, high-value targets, and shapes the narrative. Future conflicts will be defined as much by innovative and covert intelligence operations as by conventional firepower. And Ankara knows it.